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ABSTRACT
Modern control systems can be viewed as interconnections of spatially dis-
tributed multiple subsystems, where the individual subsystems share their
information with each other through an underlying network that inherently
introduces limitations on information flow. Inherent limitations on the flow
of information among individual subsystems may stem from structural con-
straints of the network and/or communication constraints of the network.
Hence, in order to design optimal control and estimation mechanisms for
modern control systems, we must answer the following two practical but
important questions:
(1) What are the fundamental communication limits to achieve a desired
control performance and stability?
(2) What are the approaches one has to adopt to design a decentralized
controller for a complex system to deal with structural constraints?
In this thesis, we consider four different problems within a game-theoretic
framework to address the above questions.
The first part of the thesis considers problems of control and estimation
with limited communication, which correspond to question (1) above.
We first consider the minimax estimation problem with intermittent ob-
servations. In this setting, the disturbance in the dynamical system as well
as the sensor noise are controlled by adversaries, and the estimator receives
the sensor measurements only sporadically, with availability governed by an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli process. This prob-
lem is cast in the thesis within the framework of stochastic zero-sum dynamic
games. First, a corresponding stochastic minimax state estimator (SMSE)
is obtained, along with an associated generalized stochastic Riccati equation
(GSRE). Then, the asymptotic behavior of the estimation error in terms of
the GSRE is analyzed. We obtain threshold-type conditions on the rate of
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intermittent observations and the disturbance attenuation parameter, above
which 1) the expected value of the GSRE is bounded from below and above
by deterministic quantities, and 2) the norm of the sequence generated by
the GSRE converges weakly to a unique stationary distribution.
We then study the minimax control problem over unreliable communica-
tion channels. The transmission of packets from the plant output sensors to
the controller, and from the controller to the plant, are over sporadically fail-
ing channels governed by two independent i.i.d. Bernoulli processes. Two dif-
ferent scenarios for unreliable communication channels are considered. The
first one is when the communication channel provides perfect acknowledg-
ments of successful transmissions of control packets through a clean reverse
channel, which is the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), and the second
one is when there is no acknowledgment, which is the UDP (User Datagram
Protocol). Under both scenarios, the thesis obtains output feedback minimax
controllers; it also identifies a set of explicit existence conditions in terms of
the disturbance attenuation parameter and the communication channel loss
rates, above which the corresponding minimax controller achieves the desired
performance and stability.
In the second part of the thesis, we consider two different large-scale op-
timization problems via mean field game theory, which address structural
constraints in the complex system stated in question (2) above.
We first consider two classes of mean field games. The first problem (P1) is
one where each agent minimizes an exponentiated performance index, captur-
ing risk-sensitive behavior, whereas in the second problem (P2) each agent
minimizes a worst-case risk-neutral performance index, where a fictitious
agent or an adversary enters each agent’s state system. For both problems, a
mean field system for the corresponding problem is constructed to arrive at a
best estimate of the actual mean field behavior in various senses in the large
population regime. In the finite population regime, we show that there exist
-Nash equilibria for both P1 and P2, where the corresponding individual
Nash strategies are decentralized as functions of the local state information.
In both cases, the positive parameter  can be taken to be arbitrarily small
as the population size grows. Finally, we show that the Nash equilibria for
P1 and P2 both feature robustness due to the risk-sensitive and worst-case
behaviors of the agents.
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In the last main chapter of the thesis, we study mean field Stackelberg dif-
ferential games. There is one leader and a large number, say N , of followers.
The leader holds a dominating position in the game, where he first chooses
and then announces his optimal strategy, to which the N followers respond by
playing a Nash game. The followers are coupled with each other through the
mean field term, and are strongly influenced by the leader’s strategy. From
the leader’s perspective, he is coupled with the N followers through the mean
field term. In this setting, we characterize an approximated stochastic mean
field process of the followers governed by the leader’s strategy, which leads
to a decentralized -Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium. As a consequence of de-
centralization, we subsequently show that the positive parameter  can be
picked arbitrarily small when the number of followers is arbitrarily large.
In the thesis, we also include several numerical computations and simula-
tions, which illustrate the theoretical results.
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The thesis focuses on various problems of control and estimation with limited
information within a game-theoretic framework. The first part, that is Chap-
ters 2 and 3, studies optimal estimation and control over unreliable commu-
nication channels within the stochastic zero-sum dynamic game framework.
The second part, that is Chapters 4 and 5, considers two different large-scale
optimization problems via mean field game theory.
In this chapter, we first introduce a general motivation on control and esti-
mation with limited information, and provide an extensive literature review
on the topic of the thesis. We then provide motivation for the questions
studied in the thesis, and include a summary of the main results developed
in the thesis.
1.1 Systems with Limited Information
In classical control systems, one considers designing a centralized controller
that has access to the entire information on the system. In order to design
a centralized controller, it is very common to assume that 1) the controller
has access to information generated by the plant, and 2) the communica-
tion between the controller and the plant is flawless. With these idealized
assumptions, a centralized controller can be designed using various optimal
design methodologies to ensure stability and performance.
These idealized scenarios, however, cannot capture a large class of general
real-world systems that are generally restricted to availability of limited infor-
mation due to communication and/or structural constraints, which therefore
reduces the ability of the control system to adapt to various uncertainties in
the environment that affect its performance. For example, in remote control






Figure 1.1: General networked control system configuration.
plant due to the unreliable nature of communication channels. Moreover,
a centralized controller may not be implementable in large-scale systems,
since the controller may not be able to access all the necessary information
regarding the system.
In the following two subsections, we discuss in more detail the nature of
limited information in control systems due to communication constraints and
structural constraints, and these two constraints separately.
1.1.1 Systems with Communication Constraints
We first discuss communication constraints in control systems. What we
mean by communication constraints is limitations on communication between
the plant and the controller, and in both directions. An overall objective here
is to study and characterize the degradation in performance in the face of
such constraints, and to see how stability is affected. What are for example
the fundamental limits on communication, in the same spirit as Shannon’s
information theory, beyond which the controller can stabilize the system, and
performance degradation is within an acceptable range?
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Over the past decade, the topic of Networked Control Systems (NCSs)
has emerged to analyze the effect of communication limitations on control
systems, which has led to a combined treatment of control and communica-
tions. A general configuration of NCSs is depicted in Fig. 1.1. In NCSs, the
network characterizes communication limitations between controllers, plants,
and sensors, and thus plays a crucial role in the achievement of the desired
overall design objectives. Consequently, the main goal of research for NCSs
is to analyze the behavior of a system under limited communication, and
how to design controllers to cope with that limitation [1, 2, 3].
The application areas of NCSs are very broad; some of these applica-
tions are mobile sensor networks, remote surgery, unmanned aerial vehicles,
and power and chemical plants [1, 4]. Command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems in defense can also be seen as a
sub-class of NCSs, where the local operation areas share their gathered in-
formation, and receive tactical operation messages from the headquarters
through a wireless communication network that generally operates under
some restrictions.
To capture the effects of communication limitations on NCSs, limitations
such as delays, bounds on data rate, and packet drops are imposed on the
communication network. These are natural because 1) delays are contin-
ually generated in communication while encoding, decoding, transmitting,
and receiving signals, 2) every communication channel has a finite capacity
within which the data has to be handled reliably, and 3) communication is
unreliable, that is, it is subject to losses or link failures, especially in wireless
transmissions [1, 2].
To better motivate this class of problems, consider a simple target es-
timation problem in a radar system, where estimation is performed based
on sensor signals that are reflected from the target, as depicted in Fig. 1.2
[5, 6]. Due to a large volume of clutter and unforeseeable weather conditions,
reflected signals can be lost or delayed randomly. In this case, after a cer-
tain number of consecutive measurement losses, the numbers of false alarms
and/or missing targets increase, which results in losing the target informa-
tion. Now, confronted with this scenario, the main objective should be to
achieve stability and performance of the estimator in spite of measurement
losses. To be specific, as mentioned earlier, we need to characterize the fun-
damental communication limits, above which the estimator would be able to
3
Figure 1.2: Configuration of the radar tracking system. Image courtesy:
http://en.wikipedia.org
track the target reliably.
In Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis, we focus on estimation and control prob-
lems over unreliable communication channels within the stochastic zero-sum
dynamic game framework. A related literature review on this class of prob-
lems is provided in Section 1.2.1 of this chapter. Moreover, our motivation
for Chapters 2 and 3, and a summary of the results, are given in Sections 1.3
and 1.4, respectively.
1.1.2 Systems with Structural Constraints
We now move on to structural constraints in control systems. A system that
consists of several interconnected subsystems which are spatially distributed
can be viewed as a large-scale system. In such systems, due to structural
(or topological) constraints, it is not possible to physically connect the whole
system; hence, the individual controllers will have access to limited informa-
tion generated only from their close neighborhood [1, 3, 7]. Therefore, the
information constraint in this case is generally imposed by the system struc-
ture, and a centralized approach with a single computer process to design
an optimal controller is often not feasible. Moreover, even if the problem is
mathematically tractable, the implementation of the controller suffers from
computational complexity due to the high-dimensional state space with a
large number of interconnected inputs and outputs [8, 9].
For example, in a communication network, there can be a large number of
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Figure 1.3: The power network of USA. Image courtesy:
http://www.foxnews.com
Figure 1.4: A large-scale map of protein interactions in fruit flies. Image
courtesy: http://harvardmagazine.com
users who use limited resources provided by the service provider. Moreover,
in the smart grid system, depicted in Fig 1.3, there are several utility com-
panies and users, in which case for a large number of users, the traditional
centralized optimization techniques suffer from computational complexity in
attempting to manage the demand response [10]. Finally, the Web graph,
various social networks with billions of vertices and trillions of edges, and
biological networks as shown in Fig. 1.4, require computationally efficient
algorithms to analyze their dynamics [11, 12].
To circumvent structural difficulties, and make the problem more tractable,
a certain localization technique is needed to obtain a class of decentralized1
1Here, we do not distinguish between the definitions of “decentralized” and “dis-
tributed,” since both terms reflect the localization in the large-scale system [8].
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controllers so that the individual local controllers are able to generate an
appropriate control action by using local measurements to control the large-
scale system. But decentralized designs require much more involved analysis
for the corresponding controller, since in some cases the decentralization can
make the control problem intractable [13, 9].
In view of the above discussion, analyzing and optimizing large-scale sys-
tems constitute a real challenge. In Chapters 4 and 5, we study various
large-scale optimization problems via mean field game theory, which is one
way of coping with decentralization, localization, and complexity due to large
scale. The problem description and literature review are provided in Section
1.2.2 of this chapter. Our motivation for Chapters 4 and 5 and a summary
of the main results are provided in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, we provide a review of the literature related to the topics
studied in this thesis. We first review some of the previous work in NCSs
with unreliable communication channels. We then discuss previous work on
large-scale optimization and decentralized design via mean field game theory.
1.2.1 Optimal Control and Estimation over Unreliable
Communication Channels
An initial study of optimal control over unreliable communication chan-
nels can be traced back to the uncertainty threshold principle developed by
Athans, Ku and Gershwin in [14], which can be regarded as one of the first re-
sults that connect control and communication from Shannon’s point of view.
This result has been generalized to many different forms; see [15, 16], and
the references therein. These results, however, were based on the assump-
tion of perfect state measurement and hence cannot accommodate general
communication limitations on a system.
Another way of looking at this class of problems is the context of Markov
jump linear systems (MJLSs) [17, 18]. This modeling framework is appropri-
ate, since many unreliable communication channels can be modeled simply














































Figure 1.6: Control system configuration with UDP-networks.
rate). This approach, however, requires knowledge of the entire mode of the
Markov chain (also known as the form process), which is not realistic for
many practical control problems.
Subsequently, two different models of unreliable communication channels
have been proposed in [19], where the unreliable communication channel
was categorized based on whether the control packet reception is acknowl-
edged (Transmission Control Protocol, TCP) or not (User Datagram Proto-
col, UDP); see Figs. 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. For this class of problems,
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the authors in [19] assumed that the quantities that model the unreliable
communication channels, that is {αk} and {βk} in Figs. 1.5 and 1.6, are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli processes.
In this setting, for the TCP-case, the authors in [19] considered the linear-
quadratic Gaussian (LQG) problem, and showed that the separation principle
holds, the LQG controller is linear in the measurement, and the stability
region is determined by the unstable modes of the system and control and
measurement loss rates, which can be viewed as the generalized uncertainty
threshold principle. For the UDP-case, it was shown in [19] that the optimal
controller is linear under some conditions; however, there is a dual effect
between control and estimation [20].
The results in [19] were extended by [21] to the noisy measurement case.
Specifically, for the TCP-case, it was shown that the LQG controller in [19]
and the Kalman filter in [22] with the control input can be designed inde-
pendently because there is no dual effect between filtering and control. The
authors also characterized two independent critical values of control and mea-
surement loss rates in terms of the unstable modes of the open-loop system.
Furthermore, precise analytical bounds on these critical values were also pro-
vided. For the UDP-case, the authors showed that the optimal controller is
generally nonlinear in the measurement, but is linear only for the perfect
measurement case considered in [19]. The results for the TCP-case in [21]
were extended to the multiple packet drop case in [23], to the generalized
acknowledgment model in [24], and to the limited transmission bandwidth
case in [25]. The decentralized LQG control problem over TCP-networks was
discussed in [26], and the LQG problem with Markovian packet losses was
studied in [27]. The stabilization issue and a characterization of the explicit
critical values were also considered in [28, 29, 30].
As for H∞ control over unreliable communication channels, the framework
of Markov jump linear systems (MJLSs) was mostly used in the literature
with some related references being [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. Related to the
MJLS approach, [38], [39], and [40] also studied H∞ control with random
packet losses by identifying a set of (different) linear matrix inequalities. The
controllers, however, were restricted to be time invariant and are therefore
suboptimal. It should be mentioned that with the framework of MJLSs, the
information of the form process needs to be available to the controller, that
is, the controller is mode dependent [36, 37]. Since the TCP-case does not
8
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Figure 1.7: Configuration of estimation with intermittent observations.
have access to the current mode of the control packet loss information, as
argued in [19], the unreliable channel modeled by MJLSs is not equivalent to
the TCP-case (or for that matter to the UDP-case). One of the most recent
sets of results on H∞ control over unreliable communication channels was
presented in [41]; however, the communication degradation there was due to
packet delays rather than packet drops.
Along with control over unreliable communication channels, the estima-
tion problem was studied extensively and independently. The general con-
figuration of the underlying system is depicted in Fig. 1.7. This problem is
also known as estimation with intermittent observations, which was initiated
within the minimum mean-square estimation (MMSE), or Kalman filtering
framework [42, 6].
Within the Kalman filtering framework, the first set of notable results were
obtained by [22]. There, the stochastic Kalman filter and the associated
stochastic Riccati equation (or the stochastic error covariance matrix), say
Pk, were obtained such that their processes are dependent on the entire
measurement arrival information, {βk}. Moreover, [22] showed that there
is a critical value of the measurement loss rate beyond which the expected
value of the error covariance matrix, E{Pk}, is bounded. It was also shown
that this critical value is a function of the unstable modes of the system, and
can be analyzed in terms of lower and upper bounds.
The difference between the Kalman filter in [22] and the Markov jump
linear estimator (MJLE) in [43] is that the latter is dependent only on the
current measurement arrival information βk. It was shown in [22] that the
Kalman filter in that paper is optimal over all possible estimators, and thus
provides better estimation performance than the MJLE.
The results obtained in [22] were extended to many different forms, with
some related references being [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54]. In
[44], a characterization of the critical value was studied when the system
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eigenvalues are distinct. In [45], it was shown that the lower bound of the
critical value guarantees boundedness of E{Pk} if the system’s observable
space is invertible or the output matrix, say C, is invertible. For second-
order systems, a closed-form expression for the critical value was obtained in
[46]. In [48], Kalman filtering with two independent partial observation loss
models was studied. Extended Kalman filtering (EKF) with intermittent
observations, and its error covariance, were studied in [49], again in the
expectation sense.
Instead of E{Pk}, other performance metrics, or a correlated intermittent
observation case, were studied in [47, 50, 51, 54, 53, 52] to provide other per-
spectives on the error covariance matrix, Pk. In [47], the authors considered
boundedness of the upper envelope of Pk, and then showed its relationship
to E{Pk} under a Markovian loss model. They also proved boundedness
of E{P rk} for any r ≥ 1 for scalar systems. In [50] and [51], the authors
showed boundedness of Pk in the probabilistic sense, i.e., boundedness of
P(Pk ≤ M). In [53], more detailed results than in [47] were obtained when
the intermittent observations are governed by a Markov process. Weak con-
vergence of {Pk} to a unique stationary distribution was discussed in [52] and
[54]. While the author in [52] considered {Pk} as a random walk and then
proved weak convergence by using its mean contraction property, the authors
in [54] showed the same result by modeling {Pk} as an order-preserving and
strongly sublinear random dynamical system.
The problem of H∞ estimation with intermittent observations was studied
in [55, 56, 57, 33, 58] within the framework of MJLSs. The estimators were
restricted to be time invariant, since the MJLSs approach requires instanta-
neous information (that is βk) on measurement losses. The authors in [59]
proposed a time-varying H∞ estimator; however, it is still suboptimal, since
it uses the instantaneous measurement loss information.
1.2.2 Large-Scale Optimization via Mean Field Game Theory
Mean field games constitute a class of noncooperative stochastic differential
(or dynamic) games, where there is a large number of players or agents, who
interact with each other through a mean field term included in the individ-
ual performance indices and/or each agent’s state system, which captures the
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average behavior of all agents. Rationality of each agent is a key underlying
assumption in the characterization of the Nash equilibrium (or -Nash equi-
librium) for the mean field game, which is the most general solution concept
in noncooperative game theory [60, 61]. The mean field coupling term is
also known as mass behavior or macroscopic behavior in statistical physics,
since each individual agent can be viewed as a small particle; when there is
a large number of particles, the effect of the individual particle on the mass
behavior becomes negligible, and each particle follows this mass behavior via
an individual-mass interaction consistency relationship.
Viewing each subsystem as an agent in a large-scale system, there are
various applications of mean field games for multi-agent systems. In [62], the
problem of a large number of coupled oscillators has been formulated within
the mean field game framework, where decentralized optimal strategies were
characterized to obtain an -Nash equilibrium. The problem of charging of
a large number of plug-in electric vehicles was studied in [63] and [64]. In
addition to this, there are several application domains of mean field games,
such as engineering, finance, economics with a large number of firms, biology,
etc.; see [65, 66, 67, 68, 69].
For games with a large number of agents, computing Nash equilibria for
the corresponding game via direct methodologies as discussed in standard
texts for dynamic games, such as [61], may be cumbersome and complicated,
since complexity increases with the number and heterogeneity of the agents,
and the dimension of the state space. Moreover, due to structural constraints
imposed on the system, it is not realistic that each agent is able to access
the state information generated by all other agents. It is more realistic that
each agent is able to access only his own state information.
To resolve this difficulty, mean field analysis was used to obtain the best
estimate of the actual mean field behavior, in terms of computationally low
complexity optimal decentralized strategies that are functions of local in-
formation and constitute an -Nash equilibrium [70, 71, 72]. In [66], the
authors developed independently a different approach to obtain the mean
field equilibrium, applicable to more general models, which entails solving
coupled forward-backward partial differential equations where the former is
related to optimal control with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, and
the latter is related to the mean field distribution with the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equation. Both of these approaches are built on a platform that
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utilizes the fact that the impact of an individual agent on the mean field
behavior becomes negligible when the number of agents goes to infinity.
Most of the mean field games discussed in the literature referenced above
cannot capture robustness and risk averse-behavior, since the individual per-
formance indices are risk-neutral. The class of risk-sensitive mean field games
was introduced in [73] and [74], where the performance indices involve expo-
nentiated integral cost. The one-agent version is equivalent to risk-sensitive
optimal control, which was first introduced in [75] (see also [76, 77] and
the references therein). In [75], the relationship of the linear-quadratic (LQ)
risk-sensitive control problem to a LQ zero-sum differential game was also es-
tablished. Later, the finite- and infinite-horizon risk-sensitive optimal control
problems were considered in [78, 79, 80, 81, 82], and risk-sensitive differential
nonzero-sum games were studied in [83].
In contrast to the class of mean field games referenced above, [84] and
[85] considered the situation when there are one major agent and a large
number of minor agents, in view of which stochastic mean field approxima-
tion was introduced, and -Nash equilibria were obtained. Specifically, due
to strong influence of the major agent on minor agents, the approximated
mean field coupling term is no longer deterministic, but a stochastic process
driven by the Brownian motion of the leader. In [84], the state augmentation
method was developed via the strong law of large numbers to characterize
the best stochastic mean field process when the followers are heterogeneous
with K distinct models. In [85], fixed point analysis was applied to obtain
similar results as in [84] when the dynamics and costs of the followers are
parametrized within a continuum set. These two different approaches lead
to (different) decentralized optimal strategies for the individual agents that
constitute (different) -Nash equilibrium. The nonlinear counterpart of mean
field games with major and minor agents was studied in [86].
Finally, it should be mentioned that mean field games discussed above are
Nash games. That is, each agent determines his optimal strategy noncoop-
eratively and all simultaneously, which leads to -Nash equilibria, and there
is no hierarchy of decision making between the agents. On the other hand,
if one wants to model a certain hierarchical structure in mean field games,
the corresponding problem can be formulated by employing the Stackelberg
setting. Classical Stackelberg games are hierarchical decision-making prob-
lems, where there is a leader with a dominant position over the follower [87].
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The leader first announces his optimum strategy by taking into account the
rational reactions of the followers. The follower then chooses his optimal
strategy based on the leader’s strategy, and finally the leader comes back
and implements his announced strategy, thus generating his action. When
there is such a solution, the resulting optimum strategies for the leader and
the follower form a Stackelberg equilibrium for the corresponding game [61].
Stackelberg differential and dynamic games have been studied extensively
in the literature since 1970, and detailed expositions can be found in [61,
88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93], and the references therein. Stackelberg games have
a wide range of applications. For example, in the setting of communication
networks, one can have a single service provider and a (large) number of users,
where the service provider sets the usage price(s) for the Nash followers [94].
In the smart grid, optimal demand response management can be studied
within the framework of Stackelberg games, where the utility companies are
leaders, and the users are followers [95].
1.3 Motivation for the Thesis
Chapters 2 and 3 study NCSs with unreliable communication channels. Our
motivation for Chapters 2 and 3 is as follows:
• The problem of optimal estimation with intermittent observations cap-
tured in Fig. 1.7 was investigated exclusively within the Kalman filter-
ing framework; however, the worst-case scenario of this class of prob-
lems (which captures robustness) had not yet been addressed until we
initiated work on this topic in [96, 97]. Some available results on H∞
estimation with intermittent observations are suboptimal due to their
restrictive information and estimator structure.
• The available results on optimal control over TCP- and UDP-like com-
munication channels captured in Figs. 1.5 and 1.6 had been obtained
within the LQG framework, and the same problem for robust control
within the worst-case scenario had not yet been addressed until our
work initiated it in [98, 99, 100, 101]. Some available results on H∞
control over unreliable communication channels discussed are subopti-
mal, and they are not related to the TCP- and the UDP-cases due to
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their specified information structures.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we consider large-scale optimization problems un-
der structural constraints via mean field game theory. Our motivation for
Chapters 4 and 5 is as follows:
• Following up with [73] and [74], it is a natural (but challenging) next
step to extend the previous work on risk-sensitive mean field games
to the heterogeneous agent case with infinite-horizon cost functions.
Moreover, it is necessary to study the robustness property of the cor-
responding -Nash equilibria in view of the fact that the risk-sensitive
approach is closely connected with H∞ control. Finally, we also need
to study the relationship between risk-sensitive, worst-case, and risk-
neutral mean field games with respect to some design parameters, as
was done for classical one-agent optimal control problems in earlier
literature, for example [75, 78, 77, 79].
• As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the previous work on mean field games
are Nash games. Hence, it is necessary to study hierarchical decision-
making problems via mean field game theory within the Stackelberg
framework.
1.4 Main Results of the Thesis
We state a summary of the main results developed in this thesis:
• In Chapter 2, within the setting of intermittent observations depicted
in Fig. 1.7, we obtain a stochastic minimax state estimator (SME)
with an associated generalized stochastic Riccati equation (GSRE) by
solving a corresponding stochastic zero-sum dynamic game. We then
study the asymptotic behavior of the estimation error in terms of the
GSRE, and show that under some conditions, 1) the GSRE is bounded
below and above in the expectation sense, and 2) the GSRE converges
weakly to a unique stationary distribution. This chapter is based on
[96, 97].
• In Chapter 3, we obtain classes of output feedback minimax controllers
for both the TCP- and the UDP-cases by solving a corresponding
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stochastic zero-sum dynamic game. We identify a set of explicit thresh-
old conditions in terms of the loss rates and the disturbance attenuation
parameter, above which the corresponding minimax controller exists,
and achieves the desired disturbance attenuation performance and sta-
bility. This chapter is based on [98, 99, 100, 101].
• In Chapter 4, we consider risk-sensitive and robust mean field games.
For both problems, we obtain -Nash equilibria, where the individual
Nash strategies are decentralized as a function of local state informa-
tion, and the positive parameter  can be picked arbitrarily close to
zero when the number of agents is arbitrarily large. We show that the
-Nash equilibria for both problems are partially equivalent. Finally, we
also show that the -Nash equilibria for both problems feature robust-
ness due to the risk-sensitive and worst-case behaviors of the agents.
This chapter is based on [102, 103].
• In Chapter 5, we study mean field Stackelberg differential games with
one leader and a large number of followers. Given an arbitrary strategy
of the leader, we characterize an approximated stochastic mean field
process, and obtain an -Nash equilibrium for the followers, where the
individual Nash strategies are decentralized as a function of local state
information. We then obtain a decentralized (1, 2)-Stackelberg strat-
egy for the leader, where we show that the positive parameters 1 and
2 converge to zero when the population size of the followers grows to
infinity. This chapter is based on [104, 105].
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we study the minimax
estimation problem with intermittent observations. The minimax control
problem for both the TCP- and UDP-cases is presented in Chapter 3. In
Chapter 4, we consider risk-sensitive and robust mean field games. We study
mean field Stackelberg differential games in Chapter 5. We collect our con-
cluding remarks in Chapter 6, where some future research directions are also
provided. The appendices contain proofs and important lemmas that are
used to prove the mains results presented in the thesis.
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Part I








We study the minimax estimation problem with intermittent observations, as
depicted in Fig. 1.7. As mentioned in Chapter 1, although there has been sig-
nificant progress on the intermittent observation problem within the Kalman
filtering framework, it has not yet been addressed thoroughly through the
worst-case or H∞ approach. Some relevant results for the problem of H∞
estimation with intermittent observations were obtained in [55, 56, 57, 33],
and [58], where different sets of linear matrix inequalities were derived for
the H∞ performance. These results, however, are related more to the theory
of Markov jump linear estimators (MJLEs) and are therefore suboptimal,
since the estimators are restricted to be time-invariant and obtained under
the assumption of instantaneous measurement arrival.
In this chapter, by formulating the problem within the framework of stochas-
tic zero-sum dynamic games, we first obtain a stochastic minimax state es-
timator (SMSE) and an associated generalized stochastic Riccati equation
(GSRE), both of which are time varying and random, and are dependent
on the sequence of the random measurement arrival information {βk} and
the H∞ disturbance attenuation parameter γ. We then identify an exis-
tence condition for the SMSE in terms of the GSRE and γ. We also show
that under that existence condition, the SMSE is able to attenuate arbi-
trary disturbances within the level of γ. Moreover, we show that for the
extreme scenario that corresponds to least disturbance attenuation (that is,
as γ →∞), the SMSE and the GSRE converge, respectively, to the Kalman
filter and its stochastic Riccati equation {Pk} in [22].
The second objective of this chapter is to analyze the asymptotic behavior
of the estimation error in terms of the GSRE. In particular, we prove bound-
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edness of the sequence generated by the GSRE in the expectation sense, and
also show its weak convergence. More specifically, we first show that under
the existence condition, there exist both a critical value of the measurement
loss rate and a critical value for the disturbance attenuation parameter be-
yond which the expected value of the sequence generated by the GSRE can
be bounded both below and above. Second, we prove that under the exis-
tence condition, the norm of the sequence generated by the GSRE converges
weakly to a unique stationary distribution. For both cases, we show that
when γ → ∞, the corresponding asymptotic results are equivalent to those
in [22] and [54]. We also demonstrate by simulations that the SMSE outper-
forms the stationary and suboptimal H∞ MJLE in [58].
Organization
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we formulate the
problem of minimax estimation with intermittent observations. In Section
2.3, we obtain the SMSE and GSRE, and characterize the existence condition.
In Section 2.4, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the GSRE. In Section
2.5, we present simulation results. We end the chapter with the concluding
remarks of Section 2.6.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Consider the following linear dynamical system:
xk+1 = Axk +Dwk (2.1a)




zk = Lxk, (2.1d)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state; {wk} ∈ `p2 and {vk} ∈ `m2 are the disturbance
input and the measurement noise sequences, respectively; ysk ∈ Rm is the
sensor output, yk is the channel output that is available to the estimator (see
Fig. 1.7); zk ∈ Rq is the variable that needs to be estimated; and A, C, D,
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E, L are time-invariant matrices with appropriate dimensions. We assume
that (A,C) is observable and (A,D) is controllable. We also assume that
E is square and non-singular, and define V := EET . In (2.1), the sequence
of random variables, {βk}, models intermittency of observations between the
sensor and the estimator (see Fig. 1.7), which is an i.i.d. Bernoulli process
with P(βk = 1) = β.
Define the information that is available to the estimator at each time k as:
Ik := {β0:k, y0:k}. (2.2)
It is worth noting that the H∞ MJLE in [55] and [58] utilizes the partial
information, {y0:k, βk}, which is a subset of the information structure in (2.2).
Having the information structure as in (2.2), we seek an estimate xˆk (or
zˆk) of the actual state xk, to be generated by xˆk = pik(Ik), where pik is an
admissible (Borel measurable) estimator policy to be determined. We denote
the class of admissible estimation policies by Π.
Now, our first main objective in this chapter is to find a recursive estima-
tor policy pi ∈ Π under (2.2) that minimizes the following worst-case cost
function:
 T Npi := sup
x0,w0:N−1,v0:N−1
E{∑N−1k=0 |zk − zˆk|2Q}1/2
E{|x0 − x˜0|2Q0 +
∑N−1
k=0 |wk|2 + βk|vk|2}1/2
, (2.3)
where Q ∈ Sn≥0, Q0 ∈ Sn>0, and x˜0 ∈ Rn is a known bias term which stands
for some initial estimate of x0. Note that in (2.3), the expectation is taken
with respect to {βk}, since the estimator policy that we are seeking should be
dependent on {βk} in view of our information structure given in (2.2). The
problem in (2.3) can be regarded as an H∞ estimation problem [106, 107].
By invoking the formulation of the corresponding soft-constrained game,
the cost function of the associated zero-sum dynamic game parametrized by
the disturbance attenuation parameter, γ > 0, can be written as follows (see
[61]):
JNγ (pi, x0, w0:N−1) (2.4)
= E
{−γ2|x0 − x˜0|2Q0 + N−1∑
k=0
|xk − xˆk|2Q − γ2
(|wk|2 + |yk − βkCxk|2V −1)},
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where (2.1c) is used with vk = E
−1(yk − βkCxk), and Q := LTQL ≥ 0.1
In view of the deterministic H∞ estimation problem considered in [106],
if (2.4) admits a saddle-point solution2 for some γ, then the corresponding
estimator policy, pi∗γ ∈ Π, is a minimax policy that is parametrized by γ,
and under this policy, we have the bound  T Npi∗γ ≤ γ. Moreover, when γ
is sufficiently large or γ goes to infinity, the minimax policy (or estimator)
exists, which corresponds to the Kalman filter [106].
Bearing in mind the previous observation, we seek a minimax estimator









γ, x0, w0:N−1). (2.5)
Such a pi∗γ will be obtained in Section 2.3. We also need to characterize the
smallest values of γ and β, say γ∗s and βs, for which the minimax estimator
exists for all γ > γ∗s and β > βs. Obviously, γ
∗
s and βs are coupled with
each other; hence they cannot be determined independently. Moreover, γ∗s ,
provided that it is finite, will be the value of (2.3).
After solving (2.5) and characterizing γ∗s and βs, or more precisely, finding
the relationship between γ∗s and βs, we will analyze the asymptotic behaviors
of the minimax estimator in Section 2.4.
2.3 Stochastic Minimax State Estimator
In this section, we obtain a minimax estimator by solving the zero-sum dy-
namic game in (2.4). The main result is the following.
Theorem 2.1. Consider the zero-sum dynamic game (2.4) subject to (2.1)
with k ∈ [0, N − 1], β ∈ [0, 1], and a fixed γ > 0. Then:
1We can also use the measurement model yk = βkCxk + Evk with
 T Npi := sup
x0,w0:N−1,v0:N−1
E{∑N−1k=0 |zk − zˆk|2Q}1/2
E{|x0 − x˜0|2Q0 +
∑N−1
k=0 |wk|2 + |vk|2}1/2
,
to arrive at the same zero-sum dynamic game as in (2.4). Note that the above model
considers the situation when the estimator receives noise only signal when there are mea-
surement losses.
2See [106] and [61] for the definition of saddle point for zero-sum dynamic games.
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(i) There exists a stochastic minimax state estimator (SMSE) if
ρ(ΣkQ) < γ
2, almost surely (a.s.) for all k, (2.6)
where Σk with Σ0 = Q
−1




k − γ−2Q+ βkCTV −1C)−1AT +DDT . (2.7)
(ii) The SMSE is given by
zˆk = Lxˆk
xˆk+1 = Axˆk + βkAKk(yk − Cxˆk), xˆ0 = x˜0, (2.8)
where Kk is the estimator gain that can be written as
Kk = (Σ
−1
k − γ−2Q+ βkCTV −1C)−1CTV −1. (2.9)
(iii) Suppose that (2.6) holds for all k. Then the SMSE achieves the per-
formance level of γ, that is,  T Npi∗γ ≤ γ.
Proof. Since we seek a causal estimator, by using forward dynamic program-
ming, we can introduce the quadratic cost-to-come (worst past cost) function
Wk(xk) = E{−|xk − x¯k|2Zk + lk|Ik}, where Zk > 0, Z0 = γ2Q0, and l0 = 0
[106, 107, 96]. Then, the cost from the initial state to stage k + 1 is
E{|xk+1 − x¯k+1|2Zk+1 − lk+1|Ik+1}
= min
(wk,xk)
[−|xk − xˆk|2Q + γ2|wk|2 + γ2|yk − βkCxk|2V −1 + |xk − x¯k|2Zk − lk],
where the equality follows from the definition of the information structure
Ik+1.
For existence of a unique minimizer, by Lemma 6.1 in [106], given Ik, it
is necessary to have Zk −Q > 0 for all k. Then, by Lemma 6.2 in [106], the
21
minimum cost at stage k + 1 can be obtained as
E{|xk+1 − x¯k+1|2Zk+1 − lk+1|Ik+1}
= |xk+1 − AU−1k (Zkx¯k + βkγ2CTV −1yk −Qxˆk)|2Z¯−1k
+ |Qxˆk − Zkx¯k − βkγ2CTV −1yk|2U−1k + |x¯k|
2
Zk
− |xˆk|2Q + γ2|yk|2V −1 − lk,
where Uk := Zk + βkγ
2CTV −1C − Q and Z¯k := AU−1k AT + γ−2DDT . Note
that the last equation is equivalent to its conditional expectation given Ik+1.
Since this is true for all k, the dynamic equation for x¯k can be written as
x¯k+1 = AU
−1
k (Zkx¯k + βkγ




T + γ−2DDT )−1.
Also, with Z0 = γ
2Q0, let Σk := γ
2Z−1k ; then (2.10) can be rewritten as
x¯k+1 = Ax¯k + βkAKk((yk − Cx¯k) + γ−2Q(x¯k − xˆk)).
Now, choose the estimator policy to be the certainty equivalence policy, i.e.,
xˆk = x¯k for all k [106, 107], which can be obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
xˆk = arg max
xk
E{−γ2|xk − x¯k|2Σ−1k + lk|Ik}.
Note that the above problem has a unique solution. Then we have (2.7) and
(2.8).
To prove part (iii), observe that under (2.6), by the definition of the cost-
to-come function [107], Wk(xk) ≤ 0 for all disturbances (x0, w0:N−1) and for
all k. This implies that the value of the zero-sum game (2.4) is finite and
bounded from above by zero. Hence, the SMSE achieves the disturbance
attenuation level γ. Note that if (2.6) does not hold at k¯ ∈ [0, N − 1], the
zero-sum game is unbounded because Wk(xk) can be made arbitrarily large
by an appropriate choice of the disturbance [106, 107]. This implies that γ
cannot be the disturbance attenuation level for the SMSE. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
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We define
Γ(β) := {γ > 0 : ρ(ΣkQ) < γ2, a.s. ∀k ∈ [0,∞)}
Λ(γ) := {β ∈ [0, 1) : ρ(ΣkQ) < γ2, a.s. ∀k ∈ [0,∞)}.
Let γ∗s (β) := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ(β)} and βs(γ) := inf{β : β ∈ Λ(γ)}. Then
we have the following proposition which follows from the definitions of γ∗s (β)
and βs(γ).
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that γ is finite, and γ > γ∗s (β) and β > βs(γ).
Then ρ(ΣkQ) < γ
2 holds a.s. for all k. 
We have two observations on γ∗s (β). First, when A is stable, γ
∗
s (β) is fi-
nite for all β ∈ [0, 1]. This is because when β = 0, which is the worst-case
communication channel, the problem reduces to the open-loop H∞ estima-
tion problem of the stable system, and it was shown in [106] that γ∗s (0) is
finite. Second, when A is unstable, γ∗s (0) is not finite since Γ(0) is empty.
Notice that γ∗s (1) is finite since (2.7) becomes the Riccati equation of the
deterministic H∞ estimation problem in [106].
We have some remarks. Note that Pk below is the error covariance matrix
of the Kalman filter in [22], which is provided in (A.14) (or (A.15)).
Remark 2.1. (i) γ∗s (β) and βs(γ) are functions of each other and therefore
cannot be determined independently.
(ii) By induction, we can show that Pk ≤ Σk a.s. for all k, provided that
the condition in Proposition 2.1 holds and P0 = Q
−1
0 .
(iii) As γ → ∞, Σk → Pk and the SMSE converges to the Kalman filter in
(A.13).
(iv) By using the matrix inversion lemma, the GSRE can be written as
Σk+1 = AΣkA



















where GTG = Q. Then clearly, Σk → Pk as γ →∞.
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Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that H∞ MJLEs in [55]
and [58] utilize the partial information structure for estimation; hence, they
are time-invariant and suboptimal. In fact, the SMSE will provide better
estimation performance than H∞ MJLEs. This fact will be demonstrated by
numerical examples in Section 2.5.2.
2.4 Asymptotic Analysis of the GSRE
In this section, we provide an asymptotic analysis of the GSRE. The first sub-
section deals with boundedness of E{Σk}. This constitutes a generalization
of Result A.1 in Appendix A.3. The second subsection considers the weak
convergence of {‖Σk‖}. This result can be seen as a minimax counterpart of
Theorem 3.1 in [54], which considers the weak convergence of {‖Pk‖} where
Pk is the SRE given in Appendix A.3 as (A.14) (or (A.15)).
2.4.1 Boundedness of E{Σk}
Consider the following modified Lyapunov equation and modified generalized
Riccati equation (MGRE):
Σ˘k+1 = (1− β)h1(γ, Σ˘k) (2.11)
Σ¯k+1 = (1− β)h1(γ, Σ¯k) + βh2(γ, Σ¯k) =: h(γ, β, Σ¯k), (2.12)
where Σ˘0 = Σ¯0 = Q
−1
0 , and the functions h1 and h2 are defined in Appendix
A.1 as (A.2a) and (A.2b), respectively. The objective here is to show that
under some conditions, (2.11) and (2.12) constitute respectively lower and
upper bounds on E{Σk}.
Proposition 2.2. Introduce the following algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
Σ˘ = (1− β)h1(γ, Σ˘). (2.13)
Define
Γ˘ := {γ > 0 : ρ(Σ˘+Q) < γ2, Σ˘+ ∈ Sn>0 solves (2.13)}.
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Let γ˘∗ := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ˘} and β˘c := 1− 1ρ2(A) . Then if γ is finite, and γ > γ˘∗
and β > β˘, we have {Σ˘k} → Σ˘+ as k →∞.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.3. Introduce the following modified generalized algebraic Ric-
cati equation (MGARE):
Σ¯ = h(γ, β, Σ¯) = (1− β)h1(γ, Σ¯) + βh2(γ, Σ¯). (2.14)
Define the following sets:
Γ¯(β) := {γ > 0 : ρ(Σ¯Q) < γ2, Σ¯ ∈ Sn>0 solves (2.14)}
Λ¯(γ) := {β ∈ [0, 1) : ρ(Σ¯Q) < γ2, Σ¯ ∈ Sn>0 solves (2.14)}.
Let γ¯∗(β) := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ¯(β)} and β¯c(γ) := inf{β : β ∈ Λ¯(γ)}. Suppose
Q−10 ≤ DDT . Then, for any finite γ > γ¯∗(β) and β > β¯c(γ), as k → ∞,
{Σ¯k} → Σ¯+ where Σ¯+ is a fixed point of the MGARE with ρ(Σ¯+Q) < γ2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the condition in Proposition 2.3 holds. Then:
(i) Suppose Γ¯(β) is not empty with β1 and β2. If β1 ≥ β2, then γ¯∗(β1) ≤
γ¯∗(β2). Also γ¯∗(β) ≥ γ¯∗(1) for all β.
(ii) If γ1 ≥ γ2 > γ¯∗(β) is finite, then β¯c(γ1) ≤ β¯c(γ2). Also, as γ → ∞,
β¯c(γ)→ λ¯ where λ¯ is defined in Result A.1 in Appendix A.3.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We now show the existence of critical values, βc(γ) ∈ [0, 1) and γ∗c (β) > 0,
which determine boundedness of E{Σk}.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose that the condition in Proposition 2.1 holds. Then,
there exist βc(γ) ∈ [0, 1) and γ∗c (β) > 0 such that




where M(γ,Σ0) depends on the initial condition of the GSRE and γ.
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Proof. When A is stable, there exists γ > 0 such that E{Σk} is bounded
for all β ∈ [0, 1]. This is because the GSRE becomes the deterministic
generalized Riccati equation of the H∞ estimation problem when β = 1, and
is the modified Lyapunov equation when β = 0 where the boundedness of the
former and the latter were shown in [106] and Appendix A.1, respectively.
Consider the case when A is unstable. If β = 1, then under the controlla-
bility and observability assumptions, E{Σk} converges to a positive definite
matrix. If β = 0, then the problem is equivalent to the open-loop estimation;
therefore, E{Σk} → ∞ as k → ∞. Now, suppose that there is β1 such that
E{Σk} is bounded. Clearly, by Lemma A.3(i) in Appendix A.2, E{Σk} is
bounded for all β > β1. In fact, if β2 ≥ β1, then we have
Eβ1{Σk+1} = (1− β1)E{h1(γ,Σk)}+ β1E{h2(γ,Σk)}
≥ (1− β2)E{h1(γ,Σk)}+ β2E{h2(γ,Σk)} = Eβ2{Σk+1},
where Lemma A.3(i) is used to arrive at the inequality. It is possible to define
βc(γ) as follows:
βc(γ) := inf{β ∈ [0, 1) : E{Σk} is bounded in Sn≥0}.
Now, for a given β, if γ1 ≥ γ2, we have
Eβ{Σγ2k+1} = (1− β)E{h1(γ2,Σk)}+ βE{h2(γ2,Σk)}
≥ (1− β)E{h1(γ1,Σk)}+ βE{h2(γ1,Σk)} = Eβ{Σγ1k+1},
where the inequality follows from Lemma A.3(ii). Therefore, γ∗c (β) can be
defined as
γ∗c (β) := inf{γ > 0 : E{Σk} is bounded in Sn≥0}.
This completes the proof.
The previous theorem shows that under the existence condition of the
SMSE, there are critical values that determines boundedness of E{Σk}. Pre-
cise characterizations of βc(γ) and γ
∗
c (β) are even harder than in the Kalman
filtering case due to the worst-case scenario. However, it is still possible to
obtain lower and upper bounds for them under the following assumption:
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Assumption 2.1. h(γ, β,Σk) is concave in Σk for all k.
This condition guarantees the concavity of the GSRE in the expectation
sense. It is shown in Appendix A.2 and Lemma A.4 that there are certain
ranges of γ and β for which the above assumption holds. Note that in the
rest of this subsection, Sk are Fk are as defined in Result A.1 in Appendix
A.3, which constitute respectively lower and upper bounds of E{Pk}.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 2.1 and Assump-
tion 2.1 hold, and Q−10 ≤ DDT . Then:
(i) βc(γ) satisfies β˘c ≤ βc(γ) ≤ β¯c(γ).
(ii) γ∗c (β) satisfies γ˘
∗ ≤ γ∗c (β) ≤ γ¯∗(β).
(iii) Sk ≤ Σ˘k ≤ E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯k for all k.
(iv) Suppose that γ > γ¯∗(β), β > β¯c(γ), and γ is finite. Then, limk→∞ Σ˘k =
Σ˘+ and limk→∞ Σ¯k = Σ¯+.
Proof. We first show that Σ˘k ≤ E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯k for all k. Clearly, Σ˘0 = Σ¯0 =
E{Σ0} = Q−10 . Then, by induction, Σ˘k ≤ E{Σk} implies






≥ (1− β)h1(γ, Σ˘k) = Σ˘k+1,
where (a) follows from the law of iterated expectations, (b) is due to Lemma
A.3(v) in Appendix A.2, (c) follows from Jensen’s inequality due to Lemma
A.3(iii), and (d) is due to the induction argument and Lemma A.3(viii).
Similarly, Sk ≤ Σ˘k can be shown by induction and Lemma A.3(v).
For the second part, E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯k implies




≤ h(γ, β, Σ¯k) = Σ¯k+1,
where (e) is due to the law of iterated expectations, (f) follows due to the
assumption and from Jensen’s inequality, and (g) is obtained from the in-
duction argument and Lemma A.3(viii).
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Now, if γ < γ˘∗ and β < β˘c, then since
√
1− βA is not stable, {Sk} → ∞
as k → ∞ due to Theorem 3 in [22]. Therefore, {Σ˘k} → ∞ as k → ∞ and
E{Σk} → ∞ as k → ∞. This implies that βc(γ) ≥ β˘c and γ∗c (β) ≥ γ˘∗. Let
us consider the second case. By Proposition 2.3 and the previous inequality,
we have that {Σ¯k} → Σ¯+ as k → ∞, and Σ¯+ ≥ E{Σk} for all k. Since
Σ¯+ ≥ Σ˘k, we have convergence of the lower bound due to Proposition 2.2.
Hence, we have βc(γ) ≤ β¯c(γ) and γ∗c (β) ≤ γ¯∗(β). This completes the proof
of the theorem.
The following series of discussions provides a comparison of Theorem 2.3
with Result A.1 in Appendix A.3.
Remark 2.2. We have Sk ≤ Σ˘k and Fk ≤ Σ¯k due to Lemma A.3(v) and
(ii). Moreover, Σ˘k → Sk and Σ¯k → Fk as γ → ∞ from Lemma A.3(vi)
and (vii), respectively. This shows that since Pk ≤ Σk a.s. for all k, Sk ≤
E{Pk} ≤ E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯k, and the lower and upper bounds converge to the
deterministic values in view of Theorem 2.3. This implies that given γ and
β, if E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯+, then E{Pk} ≤ Σ¯+, that is, the Kalman filter is also stable
in the expectation sense.
Remark 2.3. Remark 2.2 implies that given γ and β, if we have E{Σk} ≤
Σ¯+, then β ≥ λ¯, where λ¯ is the upper critical value of the Kalman filter
defined in Appendix A.3. Therefore, β ≥ λ¯ is a necessary condition for
boundedness of E{Σk}. On the other hand, for the Kalman filtering case,
β ≥ λ¯ is a sufficient condition for the boundedness of E{Pk} (see Appendix
A.3).
Remark 2.4. As γ → ∞, E{Σk} → E{Pk}. Moreover, when γ → ∞, its
boundedness condition is equivalent to that in Result A.1, since β˘c = λ˘ and
β¯c(γ)→ λ¯ in view of Proposition 2.4. In this case, Assumption 2.1 holds for
any β as discussed in Appendix A.2.
Remark 2.5. Even if C is invertible, there is no reason that βc(γ) = β˘c un-
less γ is sufficiently large. This is because the SMSE considers the worst-case
scenario that results in increasing β¯(γ) depending on γ due to Proposition
2.4(ii). This fact will be demonstrated in Section 2.5. This implies that the
statement of Result A.1(iii) is not valid for the minimax estimation problem.
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2.4.2 Weak Convergence of {‖Σk‖}
This subsection presents a result on weak convergence of the norm of the
sequence generated by the GSRE, as captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4. Suppose that the condition in Proposition 2.1 holds, β > 0,
and DDT > 0. Then, {‖Σk‖}3 converges weakly to a unique stationary
distribution from any initial condition Σ0 = Q
−1
0 .
Proof. Under the existence condition, since Pk ≤ Σk a.s. for all k, for any
M ≥ 0 we have
P(‖Pk‖ ≤M) ≥ P(‖Pk‖ ≤M, ‖Σk‖ ≤M)
= P(‖Pk‖ ≤M | ‖Σk‖ ≤M)P(‖Σk‖ ≤M) = P(‖Σk‖ ≤M),
where P(·|·) is conditional probability. We let FΣk(M) := P(‖Σk‖ ≤M) and
FPk(M) := P(‖Pk‖ ≤ M). Clearly, {FPk(M)} is a sequence of distribution
functions of the norm of the matrices generated by the SRE in (A.14) (or
(A.15)) for all k. In the same vein, {FΣk(M)} is a sequence of distribution
functions of the norm of the matrices generated by the GSRE in (2.7) for
all k. Also, by definition, FΣk(M) ≤ FPk(M) for all k. Then, if {FΣk(M)}
converges to some distribution function at all continuity points M of its limit,
we have the weak convergence [108].
For any β > 0, {‖Pk‖} converges weakly to a unique stationary distribution
due to Theorem 3.1 in [54]. We can also equivalently say that for any β > 0,
the sequence of distribution functions {FPk(M)} converges to FP (M) as k →
∞ at all continuity points of M of FP (M), where FP (M) is a distribution
function [108]. Therefore, limk→∞ FΣk(M) ≤ FP (M).
Now, we use the following fact that follows from the convergence of se-
quences of real numbers [109]: a sequence of real numbers, say {xk}, con-
verges to x if and only if every subsequence of {xk} converges to x.
By using Helly’s selection theorem [108], for the sequence of distribution
functions {FΣk(M)}, there is a subsequence, {FΣk(l)(M)}, and a right con-
tinuous nondecreasing function FΣ(M) so that liml→∞ FΣk(l)(M) = FΣ(M)
at all continuity points M of FΣ(M).
We claim that FΣ(M) is a distribution function. To show this, due to [108,
Theorem 2.6], it suffices to show that the sequence {FΣk(M)} is tight, i.e.,
3Note that ‖X‖ is the induced 2-norm of the matrix X.
29
for all  > 0, there is an M so that lim supk→∞ 1−FΣk(M)+FΣk(−M) ≤ .





 such that FΣk(M
(1)
 ) <  and FΣk(M
(2)
 ) > 1− , for all k [110].
Note that the sequence {FPk(M)} is tight in view of [108, Theorem 2.6].
Then, for each  > 0, there exists M
(1)
 such that FΣk(M
(1)
 ) ≤ FPk(M (1) ) < 
for all k. Moreover, for all k, we have
1− FPk(M) ≤ 1− FΣk(M)⇔ P(‖Pk‖ > M) ≤ P(‖Σk‖ > M),
and limM→∞ P(‖Pk‖ > M) = limM→∞ P(‖Σk‖ > M) = 0. This implies that
for each  > 0, there exists M
(2)
 such that P(‖Σk‖ > M (2) ) <  for all k,
which leads to 1 − P(‖Σk‖ > M (2) ) = FΣk(M (2) ) > 1 − . This proves the
claim.
We have shown that for the sequence of distribution functions {FΣk(M)},
there exists a convergent subsequence {FΣk(l)(M)}, where its limit, FΣ(M),
is also a distribution function. To complete the proof, we need to show that
every subsequence converges to FΣ(M).
Consider any arbitrary subsequence {FΣm(l)(M)} of {FΣk(M)}. Note that
{FΣm(l)(M)} and {FΣk(l)(M)} are different subsequences of {FΣk(M)} in-
dexed by l. Moreover, since {FPk(M)} is a convergent sequence, by using
the above fact, the subsequences, {FPk(l)(M)} and {FPm(l)(M)}, also converge
to FP (M) as l→∞.




, ∀l ≥ l1
|FΣm(l)(M)− FΣk(l)(M)| ≤ |FPk(l)(M)− FP (M)| ≤

2
, ∀l ≥ l2,
where we made use of the fact that |FΣm(l)(M)−FΣk(l)(M)| ≤ 1 and FΣk(M) ≤
FPk(M) for all k.
Let l′ := max{l1, l2}. Then, for any l ≥ l′,
|FΣm(l)(M)− FΣ(M)| ≤ |FΣk(l)(M)− FΣ(M)|+ |FΣm(l)(M)− FΣk(l)(M)|







Since  was arbitrary, {FΣm(l)(M)} also converges to FΣ(M) as l→∞. Note
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that this holds for any arbitrary subsequence. Hence, every subsequence of
{FΣk(M)} has the same limit, which proves the theorem.
Remark 2.6. The weak convergence of {‖Pk‖} to a unique stationary dis-
tribution was discussed in [52] and [54]. While [52] considered the SRE in
(A.14) (or (A.15)) as a random walk and then proved weak convergence by
using the mean contraction property when A is non-singular, [54] showed the
same result by modeling the SRE as an order-preserving and strongly sub-
linear random dynamical system. On the other hand, in this chapter, under
the existence condition, we have proven the weak convergence of {‖Σk‖} by
showing the convergence of the sequence of distribution functions.
Remark 2.7. When γ →∞, the stationary distribution in (i) converges to
that in [54, Theorem 3.1]. Moreover, Theorem 2.4 also holds when ‖Σk‖2 =
Tr(ΣTkΣk) where Tr(·) is the trace operator.
2.5 Simulations: Asymptotic Analysis and Estimation
Performance
In this section, we present simulation results on the asymptotic analysis of the
GSRE discussed in Section 2.4.1, and compare the estimation performance
with the H∞ MJLE in [58].
2.5.1 SMSE and Kalman Filter: Lower and Upper Bounds
We first analyze the lower and upper bounds on E{Σk} and E{Pk}. To allow
for a comparison, we use the same linear system model as in [22]. We first
consider the scalar case where A = −1.25, C = 1, D = 1, V = 2.5, and
Q = 1. For the Kalman filter case, λc = 0.36. Moreover, it can be calculated
that γ¯∗(1) = 1.585. Figure 2.1(a) shows a plot of the convergence region of
(2.12). This plot is obtained by using the following approach:
(S.1) Fix β = 1 and take a sufficiently large value of γ > 0.
(S.2) Obtain the solution, Σ¯ ∈ Sn>0, of the MGARE in (2.14), and check the
condition ρ(Σ¯Q) < γ2.
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Region of the MGRE











Region of the MGRE
Figure 2.1: Convergence region of (2.12) (top: scalar case, bottom: matrix
case).
(S.3) If the condition holds, decrease β and then go to (S.2). Otherwise, it
is the critical value of β for that γ; go to the next step.
(S.4) Decrease γ and fix β = 1. Go to (S.2).
As can be seen, as γ →∞, β¯c(γ)→ 0.36 = β˘c. Figure 2.2 shows a plot of the
steady state upper and lower bounds on E{Σk} versus β. In this simulation,
although C is invertible, since β¯c(γ) = 0.36 only when γ is sufficiently large,
β˘c cannot be the critical value for boundedness of E{Σk}, provided that
the existence condition in Proposition 2.1 and Assumption 2.1 hold. That
is, β ≥ β˘c is necessary but not sufficient for boundedness of E{Σk}. This
result is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.4 and is due to the worst-case
approach.
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Σ¯, γ = 1000
Σ¯, γ = 20
βc(1000) = β˘c = β¯c(1000)
βc(20) = β¯c(20)
Figure 2.2: Transition to instability in the scalar case.

















, V = 2.5, Q = 20.
Figure 2.1(b) shows the convergence region of (2.12). The plot is also ob-
tained by using the above approach. Note that β¯c(γ) → λ¯ as γ → ∞. The
plot of the lower and upper bounds on E{Σk} for the two-dimensional case is
shown in Fig. 2.3. Note that the critical transition for boundedness of E{Σk}
depends on the level of the disturbance attenuation parameter γ. Moreover,
as mentioned, β ≥ λ¯ is necessary for boundedness of E{Σk}.
2.5.2 SMSE versus H∞ MJLE
We compare estimation performance of the SMSE with that of the H∞ MJLE
in [58]. Figure 2.4 shows the existence region of the SMSE for the same scalar
system as in Section 2.5.1. We obtained this plot by Monte Carlo simulations
with 1000 samples of the GSRE.
Now, to use the H∞ MJLE theory in [58], the transition matrix S is given
33


















TrΣ¯, γ = 3000
TrΣ¯, γ = 30
TrΣ¯
β˘ βc(3000) = β¯(3000)



















TrΣ¯, γ = 3000












It is easy to show that the i.i.d. Bernoulli process {βk} with P(βk = 1) = β
is identical to the Markov process {βk} with S. Also, the corresponding
optimum disturbance attenuation level when β = 0.7 is 7.5.
Figure 2.5 shows E{Σk} and Σ¯k when γ = 40 and β = 0.7. Note that we
have E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯k for all k; therefore, Assumption 2.1 holds. Figure 2.6 shows
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Existence Region of the
SMSE
Figure 2.4: Existence region of the SMSE of the scalar system. The plot is
obtained by Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 samples of (2.7).






















Figure 2.5: E{Σk} and Σ¯k of the scalar system. The plot of E{Σk} is
obtained by averaging 10, 000 Monte Carlo simulations.
the mean-square estimation error of the SMSE and the H∞ MJLE when
β = 0.7, and wk = −vk = 10. Each curve is obtained by averaging 10, 000
Monte Carlo simulations. We use γ = 40 for the SMSE. Due to Figures 2.4
and 2.1(a), and Theorem 2.3, such a choice guarantees existence of the SMSE
and E{Σk} ≤ Σ¯. Note that although γ for the SMSE is larger than that of
the H∞ MJLE (that is 7.5), the better estimation error is achieved by the
SMSE. This is expected, since the SMSE uses {βk} that corresponds to the
entire information on the measurement arrivals, whereas the H∞ MJLE uses
only the instantaneous information βk. Finally, the SMSE with the static
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Figure 2.6: Empirical r.m.s. estimation error when wk = 10 and vk = −10.
This plot is obtained by averaging 10, 000 Monte Carlo simulations.
gain obtained from Σ¯ also shows better estimation performance than the
H∞ MJLE, since Σ¯ constitutes the tight upper bound for E{Σk}.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have considered the problem of minimax estimation with
intermittent observations. Unlike the previous work, we have considered
the situation when the sensor noise and the disturbance are not stochastic
processes, but are treated as adversarial inputs. As such, the problem has
been formulated within the framework of stochastic zero-sum dynamic games.
We have obtained the stochastic minimax state estimator (SMSE) and the
associated generalized stochastic Riccati equation (GSRE). We have identi-
fied a threshold-type existence condition for the SMSE as a function of the
disturbance attenuation parameter, γ, and also one for the GSRE, which
implicitly depends on the measurement arrival rate β. We have shown that
when the existence condition holds for a particular γ, the SMSE achieves the
disturbance attenuation level corresponding to that γ, and if γ → ∞, the
SMSE converges to the Kalman filter with intermittent observations.
Two different asymptotic behaviors of the GSRE have been discussed.
Specifically, we have shown boundedness of the sequence generated by the
GSRE in the expectation sense, and weak convergence of the norm of that
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sequence to a unique stationary distribution. These two results indicate that
stability of the SMSE implies stability of the Kalman filter with the same
unreliable communication channels. This is a consequence of the fact that
the SMSE should be more conservative than the Kalman filter, since the
former deals with arbitrary disturbances under the worst-case scenario.
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CHAPTER 3
MINIMAX CONTROL OVER UNRELIABLE
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a minimax control problem over unreliable com-
munication channels. Unlike the previous work on control over unreliable
communication channels, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this chapter considers
the case when the disturbance and the sensor noise in dynamical systems are
arbitrary and controlled by adversaries, instead of being stochastic with a
priori specified statistics. We consider two different scenarios for unreliable
communication channels: the TCP- and the UDP-cases, as depicted in Figs.
1.5 and 1.6, respectively. Both communication channels are assumed to be
temporally uncorrelated, which are modeled as two independent and identi-
cally distributed Bernoulli processes. These two different problems are for-
mulated within the framework of stochastic zero-sum dynamic games, which
enables us to develop worst-case (H∞) controllers under TCP- and UDP-like
information structures.
We first consider the TCP-case. Due to its acknowledgment nature, we
are able to apply the certainty equivalence principle developed in [106] and
[107], where the deterministic H∞ optimal control was analyzed through
three steps. By following these steps, we obtain a class of output feedback
minimax controllers in terms of the H∞ disturbance attenuation parameter,
say γ, and the control and measurement loss rates, where γ is a parameter
that measures robustness of the system against arbitrary disturbances as in
standard H∞ control [106, 111]. For the TCP-case, the minimax controller
obtained is dependent on the acknowledged control packet loss information,
which differs from the existing mode-dependent H∞ controller for MJLSs in
the literature as discussed in Chapter 1.
Specifically, the main results for the TCP-case are as follows:
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(i) The existence of a minimax controller is dependent on γ, and the loss
rates.
(ii) For given loss rates and γ > 0, if all the existence conditions are sat-
isfied, then γ is the attenuation level of the corresponding minimax
controller.
(iii) The critical values of the control and measurement loss rates for closed-
loop system stability and performance are functions of γ.
(iv) There is no separation between control and estimation.
(v) As γ →∞, the parametrized (in γ) minimax control system converges
to the corresponding LQG control system in [19] and [21].
Item (ii) implies that if γ exists and is finite, then the corresponding ad-
missible minimax controller achieves the disturbance attenuation level γ for
an arbitrary disturbance, that is, the H∞ norm of the closed-loop system is
bounded above by γ [106]. As for item (v), the limiting behavior in terms of γ
implies that in view of item (ii), the disturbance does not play any role, since
it is infinitely penalized; hence, the limiting behavior of the corresponding
minimax controller collapses to the LQG controller as in the standard case
discussed in [106, 111].
For the UDP-case, we consider the scenario when there is no measurement
noise, which is a counterpart of the LQG problem discussed in [19]. We show
that due to the absence of acknowledgments regarding control packet losses,
there is dual effect between control and estimation, but the corresponding
minimax controller parametrized by γ is linear in the measurement. Such a
dual effect problem did not arise in the H∞ control problem within the MJLS
framework, since as already mentioned, the latter has access to the current
mode of the Markov chain. We provide the (different) existence condition for
the corresponding problem in terms of γ and control and measurement loss
rates. We also provide explicit expressions on the H∞ optimum disturbance
attenuation parameter and the critical values for mean-square stability and
performance of the closed-loop system. Moreover, we show that when γ →
∞, the minimax control system collapses to the corresponding LQG system
in [19]. Finally, from simulation results, we show that the stability and
performance regions for the UDP-case are more stringent than those of the
TCP-case due to lack of acknowledgments.
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Organization
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The problem formulation is
stated in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 are for the TCP-case, which
consider problems of state feedback minimax control, minimax estimation
with intermittent observations (for which complete development can be found
in Chapter 2), and the H∞ synthesis problem, respectively. A special case of
the UDP problem is studied in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides numerical
examples. We end the chapter with the concluding remarks of Section 3.8.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We consider the following linear dynamical system:
xk+1 = Axk + αkBuk +Dwk (3.1a)
yk = βkCxk + Ewk, (3.1b)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state; uk ∈ U ⊂ Rm is the control (actuator);
wk ∈ W ⊂ Rp is the disturbance input as well as the measurement noise;
yk ∈ Y ⊂ Rl is the sensor output; and A, B, C, D, E are time-invariant
matrices with appropriate dimensions. In (3.1), {wk} is a square-summable















, V = E¯E¯T > 0,
where E¯ is square and non-singular. Finally, we assume that the communi-
cation network is temporally uncorrelated, that is, {αk} and {βk} in (3.1)
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli processes with
P(αk = 1) = α and P(βk = 1) = β, respectively. We denote the variance of
αk by α¯ := α(1− α).
The TCP-like information that is available to the controller is defined byI0 := {y0, β0}Ik := {y0:k, α0:k−1, β0:k}, k ≥ 1. (3.2)
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The UDP-like information is defined byG0 := {y0, β0}Gk := {y0:k, β0:k}, k ≥ 1. (3.3)
Note that the major difference between (3.2) and (3.3) is that in (3.2), the
acknowledgment signal, α0:k−1, is included, by which, as expected from the
LQG case in [19], the controller under (3.2) will provide better stability and
performance.
A convention we adopt in this chapter is one of zero-input strategy. That
is, the actuator does not do anything when there are control packet losses. It
was shown in [112] that for the disturbance free case (wk ≡ 0), using the one-
step previous control packet in order to compensate for the current packet
loss does not necessarily lead to better performance.
Let U andW be the appropriate spaces of control and disturbance policies,
respectively. We define control and disturbance policies, µ ∈ U and ν ∈ W ,
that consist of sequences of functions:
µ = {µ0, µ1, ..., µN−1}, ν = {ν0, ν1, ..., νN−1},
where µk and νk are Borel measurable functions which map the information
set (3.2) or (3.3) into the control and disturbance spaces of Rm and Rp, re-
spectively. Note that in the spirit of the worst-case approach, the disturbance
is assumed to know everything the controller does.
Now, our main objective in this chapter is to obtain output feedback con-
trollers over TCP- and UDP-networks, which minimize the following cost
function:


















where Q,QN ≥ 0, R,Q0 > 0, and µ and ν are the control and disturbance
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policies as introduced earlier. Note that the control uk incurs the additional
cost only if it is applied to the plant. This can be viewed as an H∞ optimal
control problem [106]. It is worth noting that if αk is included in (3.2), then
the problem can be studied in the framework of Markov jump linear systems,
and the optimal controller can then be obtained directly from [36].
Associated with the system (3.1), we introduce the zero-sum dynamic game
that is parametrized by the disturbance attenuation parameter, γ > 0:
JNγ (µ, ν) = E
{
|xN |2QN − γ2|x0|2Q0 +
N−1∑
k=0
|xk|2Q + αk|uk|2R − γ2|wk|2
}
, (3.5)
subject to system (3.1a) and the measurement equation (3.1b).
Now, in view of (3.4) and (3.5), our main objective in this chapter can
be rephrased as one of obtaining a controller for (3.1) under the specified
information structure such that it minimizes the cost function (3.5) while
the disturbance maximizes the same cost function. In other words, we need
to characterize a saddle point,1 say (µγ, νγ), for the zero-sum dynamic game
(3.5) in terms of γ.
As in standard H∞ control [106], the existence of saddle-point solutions for
(3.5) will be dependent on the value of γ. Therefore, we need to characterize
the smallest value of γ, say γ∗, above which the saddle-point solutions exist.
Then, by definition, for any γ > γ∗, the saddle point, (µγ, νγ), exists, provided
that γ∗ is finite. Moreover, for any finite γ > γ∗, µγ is a minimax controller
that leads to finite upper value for the zero-sum dynamic game in (3.5), and
achieves the performance level of γ for (3.4), i.e., under µγ,  T Nµγ ≤ γ.
After characterizing a class of minimax controllers for the TCP- and UDP-
cases, the next goal is to examine such controllers with respect to the com-
munication channel conditions. Specifically, given the controllers, we need
to obtain the smallest values of α and β, say αc and βc, for the closed-loop
system stability and performance. Obviously, αc and βc are functions of γ,
and γ∗ is a function of α and β.
In what follows, in Sections 3.3-3.5, we obtain a class of output feedback
minimax controllers for the TCP-case. Toward that end, we apply the cer-
1See [106] and [61] for the definition of saddle point for zero-sum dynamic games.
Normally, in going from (3.4) to (3.5), one would be looking for the minimax solution of
(3.5), but as in [106], one could instead look for the saddle-point solution, without any
loss of generality.
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tainty equivalence principle discussed in Appendix B.2, in view of which the
corresponding zero-sum dynamic game can be analyzed through three steps
discussed in Appendix B.2. Note that the certainty equivalence principle
was originally developed by [106] and [107] for the deterministic (no packet
drops) H∞ control problem, and the results presented in Appendix B.2 can
be regarded as the certainty equivalence principle of the H∞ control problem
for the TCP-case.
In Section 3.6, we obtain a (different) class of output feedback minimax
controllers for the UDP-case. We consider a special case of this problem,
where there is no measurement noise in (3.1b). As discussed in Section
3.6, the general minimax control problem for the UDP-case is hard, since
there is no acknowledgment of control packet losses. In view of the certainty
equivalence principle in Appendix B.2, this is because part (b) of the certainty
equivalence principle cannot be applied to the UDP-case, which is shown in
Section 3.4.
3.3 State Feedback Minimax Control over the
TCP-Network
This section addresses part (a) of the certainty equivalence principle dis-
cussed in Appendix B.2. In particular, we obtain a state feedback minimax
controller over the TCP-network.
3.3.1 Finite-Horizon Case
Lemma 3.1. Consider the zero-sum dynamic game in (3.5) with a fixed
γ > 0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then:
(i) There exists a unique state feedback saddle-point solution if and only if
ρ(DTZk+1D) < γ
2, for all k ∈ [0, N − 1], (3.6)
where Zk is generated by the generalized Riccati equation (GRE):
Zk = Q+ P
T
uk
(αR + α¯BTZk+1B)Puk − γ2P TwkPwk +HTk Zk+1Hk, (3.7)
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where ZN = QN , and
Hk = A− αBPuk +DPwk (3.8a)
Puk = (R +B





×BT (I + Zk+1DM−1k DT )Zk+1A
Pwk = (γ
2I −DT (I − αZk+1BL−1k BT )Zk+1D)−1 (3.8c)
×DT (I − αZk+1BL−1k BT )Zk+1A
Mk = γ
2I −DTZk+1D (3.8d)
Lk = R +B
TZk+1B. (3.8e)
(ii) The feedback saddle-point policies, (µ∗γ, ν
∗
γ), can be written as
u∗k = µ
∗
k(Ik) = −Pukxk (3.9)
w∗k = ν
∗
k(Ik) = Pwkxk, k ∈ [0, N − 1]. (3.10)
(iii) If Mk has a negative eigenvalue for some k, then the zero-sum dynamic
game does not admit a saddle point and the upper value of the game
becomes unbounded.
Proof. To prove parts (i) and (ii), we need to employ dynamic programming
with the following value function Vk(xk) = E{xTkZkxk|Ik}, where Zk ≥ 0 is
given in (3.7) with ZN = QN [61]. Now, by induction, suppose the claim
is true for k + 1. That is, Vk+1(xk+1) is the saddle-point value of the static
zero-sum game at k + 1 under (3.6). Then, since the information structure















hk(x, u, w) + Vk+1(xk+1)
∣∣Ik}, (3.12)
where hk(x, u, w) := |xk|2Q + αk|uk|2R − γ2|wk|2. Under (3.6), the static zero-
sum game above is strictly convex in uk and concave in wk; hence there is a
unique pair of minimizer and maximizer, which can be written as
u∗k = −(R +BTZk+1B)−1BTZk+1(Axk +Dw∗k) =: ϕ1,k(xk, w∗k)
w∗k = (γ
2I −DTZk+1D)−1DTZk+1(Axk + αBu∗k) =: ϕ2,k(xk, u∗k).
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The explicit expressions of u∗k and w
∗
k can be obtained by seeking fixed points
of the above:
u∗k = ϕ1,k(xk, ϕ2,k(xk, u
∗
k)) = −Pukxk
w∗k = ϕ2,k(xk, ϕ1,k(xk, w
∗
k)) = Pwkxk,
which is (3.9) and (3.10). Then the pair of (3.9) and (3.10) for each k consti-
tutes a saddle point for the static zero-sum game at k, and by substituting
(3.9) and (3.10) into (3.11) (or (3.12)), we arrive at the GRE. Proceeding
similarly, we can obtain the state feedback saddle-point strategies in (ii) with
the GRE for all k, where the corresponding saddle-point value is V0(x0).
To prove part (iii), suppose that it has a negative eigenvalue for some
k¯ ∈ [0, N − 1]. Then the corresponding static zero-sum game does not admit
a saddle point. In fact, there exists a sequence of maximizer strategies by
which the upper value of this static zero-sum game becomes unbounded at k¯,
which also proves the necessity of part (i) [106]. This completes the proof.
3.3.2 Infinite-Horizon Case
We now discuss the infinite-horizon problem of state feedback minimax con-
trol over the TCP-network. Before presenting the result, we provide some
preliminaries. In this section, we assume that QN = 0. We first state the
infinite-horizon version of the solution in Lemma 3.1.
• The associated generalized algebraic Riccati equation (GARE) can be
written as
Z¯ = Q+ P¯ Tu (αR + α¯B
T Z¯B)P¯u − γ2P¯ Tw P¯w + H¯T Z¯H¯, (3.13)
where H¯, P¯u, and P¯w are infinite-horizon versions of (3.8) with respect
to Z¯.
• The stationary minimax controller and the worst-case disturbance are
u¯∗k = −P¯uxk (3.14)
w¯∗k = P¯wxk. (3.15)
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• The infinite-horizon version of the existence condition in Lemma 3.1(i)
is given by
ρ(DT Z¯D) < γ2. (3.16)
We also introduce the time-reverse notation, which is used in the next
proposition that states the convergence of the GRE. Let Z˜k := ZN−k. Then
the GRE in (3.7) can be rewritten as
Z˜k+1 = Q+ P˜
T
uk
(αR + α¯BT Z˜kB)P˜uk − γ2P˜ TwkP˜wk + H˜Tk Z˜kH˜k, (3.17)
where P˜uk , P˜wk , and H˜k are the time-reverse versions of (3.8) in Lemma 3.1
with respect to Z˜k. The time-reverse version of the concavity condition can
be written as
ρ(DT Z˜kD) < γ
2. (3.18)
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose (A,B) is controllable and (A,Q1/2) is observable.
Define the sets
Γ1(α) := {γ > 0 : Z¯ ≥ 0 solves (3.13) and satisfies (3.16)}
Λ1(γ) := {α ∈ [0, 1) : Z¯ ≥ 0 solves (3.13) and satisfies (3.16)}.
Let γ∗1(α) := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ1(α)} and αc(γ) := inf{α : α ∈ Λ1(γ)}. Then for
any finite γ > γ∗1(α) and α > αc(γ), as k → ∞, {Z˜k} → Z¯+ where Z¯+ is a
fixed point of (3.13) that satisfies (3.16).
Proof. Let us first note some basic facts regarding the GARE in (3.13). In
[106], it was proven that when α = 1, (3.16) is a necessary and sufficient
condition that guarantees convergence of the GRE in (3.17). In particular,
for a fixed γ > γ∗1(1), given a fixed point of (3.13) that satisfies (3.16), {Z˜k}
converges to Z¯+. Now, when α = 0, (3.13) can be written as
Z¯ = AT Z¯A+Q+ AT Z¯D(γ2I −DT Z¯D)−1DT Z¯A, (3.19)
which is the algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) associated with the optimiza-
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tion problem of (B.1) in Appendix B.1. If A is stable, (3.19) has a solution
that satisfies (3.16), which is also equivalent to saying that {Z˜k} converges
to Z¯+ [106]. When A is unstable, since the maximum cost of (B.1) is not
bounded, (3.19) does not admit any solution in the class of positive semi-
definite matrices, which also shows that {Z˜k} does not converge for any
γ > 0. Thus, Γ(0) is an empty set when A is unstable.
Now, from definitions of γ∗1(α) and αc(γ), Z¯ ≥ 0 is a solution to (3.13)
that satisfies (3.16). Due to Lemma B.1(ii), Z¯ constitutes an upper bound on
the GRE. Therefore, we have (3.18), which guarantees monotonicity of the
GRE from Lemma B.1(i). Then, we can conclude that the monotonic and
bounded sequence {Z˜k} converges as k →∞. This completes the proof.
We also have the following result which shows the relationship between
LQG and minimax control over the TCP-network.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 3.1 hold.
Then, as γ →∞, Z¯+ defined in Proposition 3.1 converges to the solution of
the following ARE:
Z¯+ = AT Z¯+A− αAT Z¯+B(R +BT Z¯+B)−1BT Z¯+A+Q.
Proof. The value of the soft-constrained zero-sum dynamic game decreases
in γ [106]. Then the result follows immediately.
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose (A,B) is controllable and (A,Q1/2) is observable.
Then for any finite γ > γ∗1(α) and α > αc(γ), the following hold:
(i) The state feedback minimax controller is given by (3.14) with Z¯+.
(ii) Suppose αP¯ Tu RP¯u− γ2P¯ Tw P¯w > 0. Then the closed-loop system with the
worst-case disturbance in (3.15), i.e., xk+1 = (A − αkBP¯u + DP¯w)xk,
is stable in the mean-square sense, that is, E{|xk|2} → 0 as k →∞ for
all initial conditions.
(iii) The closed-loop system, i.e., xk+1 = (A−αkBP¯u)xk+Dwk, is bounded in
the mean-square sense, that is, there exists M ≥ 0 such that E{|xk|2} ≤
M for all k and initial conditions.
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(iv) The state feedback minimax controller achieves the performance level of
γ, that is,  T ∞µ∗γ ≤ γ.
Proof. Parts (i) follows from Proposition 3.1. To prove part (ii), by using
(3.13), we have
E{|xk+1|2Z¯+} − E{|xk|2Z¯+} = E{xTk (H¯T Z¯+H¯ + α¯P¯ Tu BT Z¯+BP¯u − Z¯+)xk}
= −E{xTkQxk + αxTk P¯ Tu RP¯uxk − γ2xTk P¯ Tw P¯wxk}.
Now, we have







u RP¯u − γ2P¯ Tw P¯w)xi
}
.




E{xTk (Q+ αP¯ Tu RP¯u − γ2P¯ Tw P¯w)xk} = 0.
Then in view of the observability assumption and (αP¯ Tu RP¯u− γ2P¯ Tw P¯w) > 0,
we must have E{|xk|2} → 0 as k →∞.
For part (iii), when wk ≡ 0, we have the following equation:
Z = αP¯ Tu RP¯u + (1− α)ATZA+ α(A−BP¯u)TZ(A−BP¯u) +Q,
where Z ≥ 0 exists due to Theorem 3 in [19] and the relationship between
the minimax control when wk ≡ 0 and the LQG control. Then from (ii), we
can show that E{|xk|2} → 0 as k →∞ for all initial conditions when wk ≡ 0;
hence, the result follows.
To prove part (iv), first note that for any finite γ > γ∗1(α), since the upper
value of the game is bounded with Z¯+, we have the following inequality for
all disturbances in `p2:






By taking x0 = 0, the result holds. This completes the proof.
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3.4 Minimax Estimation over the TCP-Network
This section considers minimax estimation for the TCP-case, which corre-
sponds to part (b) of the certainty equivalence principle in Appendix B.2.
The detailed analysis of this section can be found in Chapter 2.
Lemma 3.2. Consider the zero-sum dynamic game in (3.5) with α ∈ [0, 1],
β ∈ [0, 1], and a fixed γ > 0. Then:
(i) A stochastic minimax estimator (SME) exists if and only if
ρ(ΣkQ) < γ
2, ∀k ∈ [0, N − 1], (3.20)
where Σk is generated by the following generalized stochastic Riccati
equation (GSRE) in (2.14).
(ii) The SME is
x¯k+1 = Ax¯k + αkBuk + AΠk(γ
−2Qx¯k + βkCTV −1(yk − Cx¯k)), (3.21)
where the estimator gain Πk = (Σ
−1
k − γ−2Q+ βkCTV −1C)−1.
We now construct the smallest values of γ and β for which the SME exists.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that (A,C) is observable and (A,D) is control-
lable. Define the following sets and parameters:
Γ2(β) := {γ > 0 : ρ(ΣkQ) < γ2, ∀k}, γ∗2(β) := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ2(β)}
Λ2(γ) := {β ∈ [0, 1) : ρ(ΣkQ) < γ2, ∀k}, βc(γ) := inf{β : β ∈ Λ2(γ)}.
Then, for any finite γ > γ∗2(β) and β > βc(γ), ρ(ΣkQ) < γ
2 holds for all k;
hence, the SME exists.
Remark 3.1. (i) Due to the acknowledgment nature of the TCP-case, the
SME is a function of control and measurement packet loss information,
i.e. {αk} and {βk}.
(ii) The SME is time varying and random because the estimator gain de-
pends on the GSRE that is a function of the measurement arrival pro-
cess. Furthermore, when βk = 0, while the Kalman filter in [21] is
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identical to the open-loop estimator, the SME performs the state esti-
mation under the worst-case disturbance.
(iii) For any finite γ > γ∗2(β) and β > βc(γ), by induction, we can show
that Pk ≤ Σk for all k, where Pk with P0 = Q−10 is the error covariance
matrix of the Kalman filter in Appendix A.3. Moreover, as γ →∞, the
SME and Σk converge to the Kalman filter and Pk in [21].
3.5 Minimax Control over the TCP-Network
In this section, we consider part (c) of the certainty equivalence principle
in Appendix B.2 and therefore complete the design of the output feedback
minimax control system over the TCP-network. Toward this end, we com-
bine the results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, and then introduce one additional
existence condition for the worst-case state estimator.
Theorem 3.2 ([99, 101]). For any γ, α, and β, suppose (3.6) and (3.20)
hold for all k, i.e. there exist the state feedback minimax controller and the
SME over the TCP-network. Then:
(i) The worst-case state estimator, xˆk, exists if
ρ(ΣkZk) < γ
2, for all k ∈ [0, N − 1]. (3.22)
(ii) If the condition in (i) holds, then the worst-case state estimator can be
written as
xˆk = (I − γ−2ΣkZk)−1x¯k, (3.23)
where x¯k is generated by the SME in Lemma 3.2.
(iii) If the condition in (i) holds, then the output feedback minimax controller
is given by (3.9) with (3.23). Furthermore, this controller achieves the
disturbance attenuation performance level of γ, that is,  T Nµ∗γ ≤ γ.
Remark 3.2. As expected from standard H∞ control theory, there are three
conditions on γ; (3.20) is for the existence of the SME, (3.6) is related to the
state feedback minimax controller, and (3.22) is the spectral radius condition
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that ensures the existence of the worst-case state estimator. Moreover, unlike
the LQG case considered in [21], there is no separation between control and
estimation due to (3.22).
For the infinite-horizon case, we can use the theories developed in Sections
3.3 and 3.4 to obtain a corresponding output feedback minimax controller.
This is done next; the proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that (A,B) and (A,D) are controllable, and (A,Q1/2)
and (A,C) are observable. Define
Γ3(α, β) := {γ > 0 : γ > γ∗1(α), γ > γ∗2(β), ρ(ΣkZ¯+) < γ2, ∀k},
where Z¯+ is the solution of the GARE in (3.13) that satisfies (3.16). Let
γ∗3(α, β) := inf{γ : γ ∈ Γ3(α, β)}. Then for any finite γ > γ∗3(α, β),
α > αc(γ), and β > βc(γ), the stationary output feedback minimax controller
is given by (3.14) with the following worst-case state estimator:
xˆk = (I − γ−2ΣkZ¯+)−1x¯k, (3.24)
where x¯k is generated by the SME in Lemma 3.2. Finally,  T ∞µ∗γ ≤ γ. 
Remark 3.3. (i) γ∗3(α, β) is the smallest value of γ that satisfies all the
existence conditions, which is the optimum disturbance attenuation level
of the original disturbance attenuation problem.
(ii) The optimum disturbance attenuation level is a function of α and β. In
fact, γ∗3(1, 1) is related to the deterministic H
∞ control problem, and
γ∗3(0, 0) is analogous to the open-loop problem that is not finite when A
is unstable.
(iii) As can be seen from Theorem 3.3, the critical values, αc(γ) and βc(γ),
are coupled with each other through γ; hence, in general, their values are
problem dependent and cannot be quantified analytically. This fact actu-
ally stems from standard H∞ control, in which the optimum disturbance
attenuation level (the smallest value of γ in the context of standard H∞
control) cannot be determined analytically, and a heuristic approach is
generally used depending on the problem at hand [106, 111].
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(iv) When γ → ∞, from (3.24), we can easily see that xˆk = x¯k for all k.
Furthermore, the state feedback minimax controller as well as the SME
collapse to the LQG system presented in [21] in view of Proposition 3.2
and Remark 3.1(iii).
3.6 Minimax Control over the UDP-Network
In this section, we study the minimax control problem over the UDP-network.
3.6.1 Finite-horizon Case
We first consider the finite-horizon problem. The UDP-like information
structure and the associated cost function are given by (3.3) and (3.5), re-
spectively. We assume that the linear dynamical system in (3.1) has no
measurement noise (E = 0), and C is the identity matrix, that is, in case of
transmission the controller has perfect access to instantaneous value of the
state. We then have the following linear dynamical system:
xk+1 = Axk + αkBuk +Dwk, yk = βkxk. (3.25)
We let α¯ := α − α2, α′ := 1 − α and β′ := 1 − β. We now obtain the
output feedback minimax controller (and the worst-case disturbance) under
the UDP-type information structure for (3.25).
Lemma 3.3. Consider the zero-sum dynamic game in (3.5) with (3.25). For
fixed γ > 0, α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1], we have the following result:
(i) A unique output feedback saddle-point solution exists if and only if
ρ(DTZk+1D) < γ
2, (3.26)
where Zk is generated by the following coupled generalized Riccati equa-
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tions (GREs): ZN = QN , UN = 0 and
Zk = H˘
T
k Zk+1H˘k +Q− γ2P˘ TwkP˘wk
+ P˘ Tuk(αR + α¯B
TZk+1B + β
′α¯BTUk+1B)P˘uk
= Q+ ATZk+1A− Uk + β′ATUk+1A (3.27)
Uk = β
′ATUk+1A+ P˘ Twk(γ
2I −DTZk+1D)P˘wk + 2αP˘ TukBTZk+1DP˘wk
− P˘ Tuk(αR + β′α¯BTUk+1B)P˘uk + 2αP˘ TukBTZk+1A− 2P˘ TwkBTZk+1A,
(3.28)
where
H˘k = A− αBP˘uk +DP˘wk






×BT (I + Zk+1DM−1k DT )Zk+1A






×DT (I − αZk+1BS−1k BT )Zk+1A
Sk = R +B




(ii) The saddle-point solution can be written as, where xˆk = E{xk|Gk}:
u∗k = −P˘uk xˆk (3.29)
w∗k = P˘wk xˆk, k ∈ [0, N − 1]. (3.30)
Proof. To prove parts (i) and (ii), we need to employ dynamic programming
or rather the Isaacs equation. At stage N , the value function is given by
VN(xN) = E{xTNQNxN |GN}. It is easy to see that, from the dynamic pro-
















hN−1(x, u, w) + VN(xN)|GN−1
}
(3.32)
= E{|xN−1|2ZN−1 + |eN−1|2UN−1|GN−1}, (3.33)
where hN−1(x, u, w) := |xN−1|2Q+αN−1|uN−1|2R−γ2|wN−1|2, ZN−1 is the GRE
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in Lemma 3.1, ek := xk − xˆk with xˆk = E{xk|Gk}, and UN−1 is given by






where PuN−1 and PwN−1 are defined in Lemma 3.1. Note that UN−1 ≥ 0. The
equality in (3.33) is achieved by using the following saddle-point solution
under (3.26):
u∗N−1 = −PuN−1xˆN−1, w∗N−1 = PwN−1xˆN−1,
which can be achieved by solving the static zero-sum game in (3.31).
Note that as mentioned in [19], the estimator error becomes a function of
uN−2 at stage N − 2 so that there is dual effect. To see this, we first write
















hN−2(x, u, w) + VN−1(xN−1)|GN−2
}
. (3.35)
Now, note that the estimation error at k = N−2 is zero when βN−2 = 1, and
eN−1 = AeN−2 + (αN−2 − α)uN−2, otherwise. Therefore, (3.34) (or (3.35))
yields a unique minimizer and maximizer under (3.26), which can be written
as follows:
u∗N−2 = −(R +BT (ZN−1 + α′β′UN−1)B)−1BTZN−1(AxˆN−2 +Dw∗N−2)
=: ψ1,N−2(xˆN−2, w∗N−2)
w∗N−2 = (γ
2I −DTZN−1D)−1DTZN−1(AxˆN−2 + αBu∗N−2)
=: ψ2,N−2(xˆN−2, u∗N−2).
We obtain the saddle point, (u∗N−2, w
∗
N−2), for (3.34) (or (3.35)) by solving
the above fixed-point equations:
u∗N−2 = ψ1,N−2(xˆN−2, ψ2,N−2(xˆN−2, u
∗
N−2)) = −P˘uN−2xˆN−2 (3.36)
w∗N−2 = ψ2,N−2(xˆN−2, ψ1,N−2(xˆN−2, w
∗
N−2)) = P˘wN−2xˆN−2. (3.37)
54
Substituting (3.36) and (3.37) into (3.34) (or (3.35)), we obtain
VN−2(xN−2) = E{|xN−2|2ZN−2|GN−2}+ E{|eN−2|2UN−2|GN−2},
where ZN−2 and UN−2 are given in (3.27) and (3.28), respectively. Then pro-
ceeding similarly, the minimax controller and the worst-case disturbance that
constitute a saddle point can be written as (3.29) and (3.30), respectively.
This completes the proof.
In summary, for the linear system given in (3.25), the corresponding mini-
max controller is (3.29), which is linear in the information Gk given by (3.3),
and is a function of two coupled nonlinear GREs (3.27) and (3.28). If the
above existence condition fails to hold, then the minimax controller does not
exist. In fact, the value of the corresponding zero-sum dynamic game would
then be infinite as we discussed in the TCP-case.
It should be mentioned that there is no known general solution to the
problem of LQG control over the UDP-network for the noisy measurement
model in (3.1b), since the associated optimization problem is then no longer
convex, and the optimal LQG controller is generally nonlinear in the avail-
able information ([21]). Also, there is no separation between control and
estimation. We would naturally expect a similar difficulty to arise in the
minimax control problem under the noisy measurement case.
We next proceed with the infinite-horizon case for again the additive noise
free problem.
3.6.2 Infinite-Horizon Case
The infinite-horizon versions of the coupled GREs and the existence condition
are provided below:
• The coupled GAREs are given by
Z = H˘TZH˘ +Q− γ2P˘ Tw P˘w + P˘ Tu (αR + α¯BTZB + β′α¯BTUB)P˘u
= Q+ ATZA− U + β′ATUA (3.38)
U = β′ATUA+ P˘ Tw (γ
2I −DTZD)P˘w − P˘ Tu (αR + β′α¯BTUB)P˘u
+ 2αP˘ Tu B
TZA− 2P˘ TwBTZA+ 2αP˘ Tu BTZDP˘w, (3.39)
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where P ′u, P
′
w, and H





• The corresponding minimax controller and the worst-case disturbance
are given by
u∗k = −P˘uxˆk (3.40)
w∗k = −P˘wxˆk. (3.41)
• The existence condition can be written as
ρ(DTZD) < γ2. (3.42)
We need to obtain conditions on γ, α and β that guarantee convergence
of the coupled GREs in (3.27) and (3.28) under (3.26), which can be charac-
terized by
γ∗U(α, β) = inf{γ > 0 : lim
k→∞
Z˜k = Z, lim
k→∞
U˜k = U, Z ≥ 0 and U ≥ 0 solve
(3.38) and (3.39), and satisfy (3.42)}
αUc (γ, β) = inf{α ∈ [0, 1) : lim
k→∞
Z˜k = Z, lim
k→∞
U˜k = U, Z ≥ 0 and U ≥ 0
solve (3.38) and (3.39), and satisfy (3.42)}
βUc (γ, α) = inf{β ∈ [0, 1) : lim
k→∞
Z˜k = Z, lim
k→∞
U˜k = U, Z ≥ 0 and U ≥ 0
solve (3.38) and (3.39), and satisfy (3.42)},
where Z˜k and U˜k are the time-reverse equations of (3.27) and (3.28), respec-
tively, as introduced in Section 3.3.2. Note that these parameters are coupled
with each other. Also, if γ > γ∗U(α, β), α > α
U
c (γ, β), and β > β
U
c (γ, α), then
the infinite-horizon minimax controller for the UDP-case is (3.40), provided
that γ is finite, which stabilizes the closed-loop system and achieves the dis-
turbance attenuation level of γ. Moreover, as γ → ∞, the critical values,
αUc (γ, β) and β
U
c (γ, α), converge to the corresponding LQG values in [19, 21].
For the LQG problem, the explicit convergence conditions of the corre-
sponding Riccati equations were obtained in [19, 21] when B is invertible.
Since the minimax controller is equivalent to the LQG controller when γ
asymptotically goes to infinity, those conditions are necessary for the min-
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imax controller; that is, due to the existence condition, the conditions in
[19, 21] are only necessary for the convergence of (3.27) and (3.28) even if B
is invertible. We should note that the general convergence conditions cannot
be obtained analytically, because the critical values, αUc (γ, β) and β
U
c (γ, α),
are coupled with each other.
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that (A,B) and (A,D) are controllable, and (A,Q1/2)
is observable. Suppose that γ > γ∗U(α, β) is finite, and α > α
U
c (γ, β) and
β > βUc (γ, α). Then:
(i) The minimax controller is given by (3.40).
(ii) Suppose αP˘ Tu RP˘u− γ2P˘ Tw P˘w > 0. Then the closed-loop system with the
worst-case disturbance in (3.41) and the estimation error are bounded
in the mean-square sense, that is, there exist M,M ′ ≥ 0 such that
E{|xk|2} ≤M and E{|ek|2} ≤M ′ for all k and initial conditions.
(iii) The closed-loop system with an arbitrary disturbance and the estimation
error are bounded in the mean-square sense.
(iv) The minimax controller in (i) achieves the disturbance attenuation level
of γ.
Proof. Parts (i) and (iv) follow from the preceding discussion. To prove part
(ii), by using (3.38) and (3.39), we have
E{|xk+1|2Z − |xk|2Z + |ek+1|2U − |ek|2U}
= E{−xTk (Q+ αP˘ Tu RP˘u − γ2P˘ Tw P˘w)xk + eTk (αP˘ Tu RP˘u − γ2P˘ Tw P˘w)ek}.
Summing up the above expression over k yields
E{|xk+1|2Z + |ek+1|2U}
= E{|x0|2Z + |e0|2U}+
k∑
i=0




E{xTi (Q+ αP˘ Tu RP˘u − γ2P˘ Tw P˘w)xi}.
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Note that for any L ≥ 0, β′E{xTkLxk} ≥ E{eTkLek}, and we have αP˘ Tu RP˘u−
γ2P˘ Tw P˘w > 0. Therefore,




E{xTi (Q+ β(αP˘ Tu RP˘u − γ2P˘ Tw P˘w))xi}.
Since the left-hand side of the above inequality is bounded below by zero, we
have limk→∞ E{xTk (Q + β(αP˘ Tu RP˘u − γ2P˘ Tw P˘w))xk} = 0. Since αP˘ Tu RP˘u −
γ2P˘ Tw P˘w > 0, in view of the observability assumption, we have the desired
result.
For part (iii), when wk ≡ 0, we have
Z = α′ATZA+ α(A−BP˘u)TZ(A−BP˘u) + P˘ Tu (αR + α¯β′BTUB)P˘u +Q
U = αATZA− α(A−BP˘u)TZ(A−BP˘u) + β′ATUA
− P˘ Tu (αR + α¯β′BTUB)P˘u,
where Z ≥ 0 and U ≥ 0 exist due to Theorem 9 in [19] and the relationship
between the minimax control when wk ≡ 0 and the LQG control. Then from
(ii), we can show that E{|xk|2} and E{|ek|2} are bounded when wk ≡ 0;
hence, the result follows.
3.7 Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples to demonstrate the relation-
ship between α, β, and γ, and compare the disturbance attenuation perfor-
mance for different values of γ.
3.7.1 Stability and Performance Region
Consider the following system:
xk+1 = Axk + αkuk + wk, (3.43)
where A = 2 and A = 1.1. We take R = 1 and Q = 1.
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Stability and Performance Region (A=2)
Stability and Performance Region (A=1.1)
Figure 3.1: Stability and performance region of (3.43) for the TCP-case.
Figure 3.1 shows the stability and performance region of (3.43) for the
TCP-case. To obtain the region numerically, we use the following approach:
(S.1) Fix α = 1 and take a sufficiently large value of γ > 0.
(S.2) Obtain the solution of the GARE in (3.13), and check the existence
condition in (3.16).
(S.3) If the existence condition holds, decrease α and then go to (S.2). Oth-
erwise, it is the critical value of α for that γ; go to the next step.
(S.4) Decrease γ and fix α = 1. Go to (S.2).
Figure 3.1 shows (as goes with intuition) that the system needs a more reli-
able communication channel if the high level of disturbance attenuation is re-
quired. For both cases, αc(γ)→ αR as γ →∞ where αR = 1− (1/22) = 0.75
when A = 2 has been calculated in [19]. Moreover, as the plant becomes more
open-loop unstable, the stability and performance region becomes smaller.
This is an expected result, since the more open-loop unstable a plant is, the
more frequently we need to measure its state and control it. Finally, it is
easy to see that α > αR is a necessary condition for the existence of the state
feedback minimax controller for the TCP-case.
The region of stability and performance for the UDP-case is shown in Fig.
3.2. We used the same approach above to obtain this plot. As expected, the
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Stability and Performance Region (A=2 and β = 0.9)
Stability and Performance Region (A=1.1 and β = 0.5)

















A=1.1, γ = 2000
A=2, γ = 20
A=2, γ = 2000
A=1.1, γ = 2000
A=2, γ = 2000
A=1.1, γ = 20
A=2, γ = 20
Figure 3.2: Stability and performance region of (3.43) for the UDP-case.
UDP controller has a smaller stability and performance region in terms of α,
β, and γ than the TCP-case. Moreover, as γ → ∞, αUc (γ, β) and βUc (γ, α)
converge to the corresponding critical values shown in [19]. This also shows
that the condition given in [19] is a necessary condition for the existence of
the minimax controller for the UDP-case.
3.7.2 Disturbance Attenuation Performance (TCP-case)
We use the pendubot system as in [21], where the system and cost matrices
can be found. Figure 3.3 shows the existence regions of the state feedback
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State Feedback (vertical: α)
SME (vertical: β)
Existence regions of the state
feedback minimax controller
and the SME
Figure 3.3: Existence regions of the state feedback minimax controller and
the SME for the pendubot system.
minimax controller and the SME. This plot is also obtained by using the
approach described in Section 3.7.1. The vertical axis is α for the state
feedback controller, whereas it is β for the SME. Note that the intersection
of regions above the two lines guarantees the existence of the state feedback
minimax controller as well as the SME. Moreover, as γ →∞, all these regions
converge to the corresponding value of the LQG problem in [21].
Figure 3.4 shows the disturbance attenuation performance of the minimax
controller for different values of γ when wk is Gaussian or a sinusoidal distur-
bance with amplitude of 0.01. We use α = 0.8 and β = 0.9. As can be seen,
when γ = 20, the minimax controller outperforms the LQG controller. Fi-
nally, when γ is sufficiently large, the performance of the minimax controller
is identical to the corresponding LQG controller in [21].
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have studied the minimax control problem for LTI systems
over unreliable communication channels. We have considered two different
scenarios for the communication channels: the TCP-case and the UDP-case.
Unlike the previous work, we have considered the situation when the sen-
sor noise and the disturbance are not necessarily stochastic processes, but
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Figure 3.4: Disturbance attenuation performance with α = 0.8 and β = 0.9
(top: Gaussian disturbance, bottom: sinusoidal disturbance).
are treated as adversarial inputs. The control problems are then naturally
formulated within the framework of stochastic zero-sum dynamic games.
For both the TCP and UDP cases, we have obtained different classes of
output feedback minimax controllers by characterizing the corresponding sets
of existence conditions in terms of the H∞ disturbance attenuation parameter
and the packet loss rates. We have shown that stability and performance
of the closed-loop system are determined by the disturbance attenuation
parameter and the packet loss rates. Finally, as the disturbance attenuation
parameter goes to infinity, the minimax controllers become equivalent to the






RISK-SENSITIVE AND ROBUST MEAN
FIELD GAMES
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study two classes of mean field games; linear-quadratic
risk-sensitive mean field game (LQ-RSMFG, P1) and LQ robust mean field
game (LQ-RMFG, P2).
In P1, each agent minimizes an exponentiated performance index, which
captures risk-sensitive behavior. In P2, each agent minimizes a worst-case
performance index, where the performance is affected by a fictitious agent or
an adversary who affects each agent’s state system through an input (possibly
independent across different agents’ systems). In contrast to [113], the ad-
versary in P2 is state dependent, which is generally unknown to each agent.
In both cases, that is P1 and P2, we consider the heterogeneous agent case
with infinite-horizon performance indices, and the individual agents are cou-
pled with each other through the mean field term included in the individual
performance indices.
Now, the main objectives of the chapter are as follows:
(i) to characterize Nash equilibria for P1 and P2 in a decentralized man-
ner;
(ii) to establish conditions under which the Nash equilibria of P1 and P2
are equivalent ;
(iii) to analyze limiting behaviors of equilibria in the large population regime
as well as at particular limiting values of the design parameters.
To attain our goal, we use mean field game theory. Specifically, we first
obtain an individual optimal decentralized controller by solving the LQ risk-
sensitive optimal control problem (LQ-RSOCP) for P1 or the LQ stochastic
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zero-sum differential game (LQ-SZSDG) for P2, which is a function of the
local state information and an arbitrary deterministic function. Note that
as shown in [75, 106, 78, 79, 77], LQ-RSOCP and LQ-SZSDG are equiva-
lent; therefore, the corresponding optimal controllers are identical. We then
construct a mean field system for P1 and P2 that is used to approximate
the mass behavior effect on the individual agent by characterizing a unique
deterministic function that can be determined off-line. This characterization
is based on a fixed point analysis using a contraction mapping argument.
Since the worst-case disturbance plays a crucial role in P2, these two mean
field systems are not generally identical, which results in providing a different
estimate of the mass behavior.
We show consistency between the best approximated mass behaviors for
P1 and P2, and the actual mass behavior in different senses. In particu-
lar, we prove that in the large population regime, the approximation error
converges to zero in both the mean-square sense and the almost sure sense.
We prove that the set of N -optimal decentralized controllers form -Nash
equilibria for P1 and P2, and  can be made arbitrarily close to zero when
the population size grows to infinity. We also show that the -Nash equilibria
for P1 and P2 are partially equivalent, because of the equivalence of the in-
dividual optimal control laws, and the differences in the approximated mass
behaviors obtained by the corresponding mean field systems.
Finally, we discuss limiting behaviors of the -Nash equilibria for P1 and
P2 with respect to the design parameters. Specifically, we show that when
the disturbance attenuation parameter goes to infinity, their -Nash equilibria
are equivalent to that of the risk-neutral game considered in [71]. We also
show by numerical examples that the Nash equilibria feature robustness.
This follows from the inherent robustness property of the individual optimal
control problems, i.e., LQ-RSOCP and LQ-SZSDG.
Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we formulate LQ risk-
sensitive mean field games and LQ robust mean field games. We solve the
LQ risk-sensitive mean field game in Section 4.3, and discuss its limiting
behaviors with respect to two design parameters in Section 4.4. In Section
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4.5, we solve the LQ robust mean field game. In Section 4.6, the partial
equivalence between the LQ risk-sensitive mean field game and the LQ robust
mean field game, and their limiting behaviors, are discussed. In Section
4.7, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the results. We end the
chapter with the concluding remarks of Section 4.8.
We use the following notation: universal constants c, M , , etc., are inde-
pendent of the population size N and/or the time-horizon T . On the other
hand, constants (N) and X(T ) are dependent on N and T , respectively,
and X(N, T ) is dependent on N and T , jointly.
4.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate two problems: the linear-quadratic risk-sensitive
mean field game (LQ-RSMFG, P1) and the linear-quadratic robust mean
field game (LQ-RMFG, P2).
4.2.1 LQ Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games (P1)
The stochastic differential equation (SDE) for agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given
by
dxi = (A(θi)xi +B(θi)ui)dt+
√
µD(θi)dWi(t), (4.1)
where xi(0) = x¯i; xi ∈ Rn is the state; ui ∈ Rm is the control input;
{Wi(t), t ≥ 0} is a p-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a
complete probability space (Ω,F ,P); and µ > 0 is a noise intensity parame-
ter. Further, θi ∈ Θ ⊂ Rq, with q := n(n+m+ p), is an independent system
vector that determines the triplet (A(θ), B(θ), D(θ)) of each agent. We have
the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1. (a) {Wi(t), t ≥ 0; 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent across
different agents.
(b) A(·), B(·), and D(·) are continuous matrix-valued functions of θ with
appropriate dimension for all θ ∈ Θ. Also, Θ is compact.
(c) x¯i ∈ X for all i where X is a compact subset of Rn.
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1{θi≤θ, x¯i≤x}, θ ∈ Θ, x ∈ X,
where each inequality is componentwise.
(e) There is a probability distribution F (θ, x) on Rq+n such that FN(θ, x)
converges weakly to F (θ, x) as N →∞. In other words, for any bounded





p(θ, x)dFN(θ, x) =
∫
Rq+n
p(θ, x)dF (θ, x).
Remark 4.1. (i) If each agent is uniform (θi = (A,B,D) and x¯i = x¯ for
all i), then F (θ, x) degenerates to a point mass, and in that case, (b)-(e)
in Assumption 4.1 would not be needed.
(ii) Let F (θ) and FN(θ) be the marginal distribution functions of F (θ, x)
and FN(θ, x), respectively, with respect to θ. Due to the Glivenko-
Cantelli theorem [108], FN(θ) converges weakly when {θi} is a sequence
of i.i.d. random variables under the distribution F (θ).
In this chapter, we consider only the risk averse problem; hence, δ > 0.
We let γ :=
√
δ/2µ and call it the disturbance attenuation parameter. The
significance and relevance of the disturbance attenuation parameter will be
clarified throughout the chapter.
Now, given (4.1) and Assumption 4.1, in the problem under consideration,
each agents seeks a controller that minimizes the following risk-sensitive per-
formance index:












where u−i = {u1, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN}, δ is the risk sensitivity index, and
φ1i (x, fN , u) :=
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)− fN(t)‖2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2Rdt, (4.3)
where Q ≥ 0 and R > 0. In (4.3), fN(t) denotes the mean field term or the
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In view of this setting, the agents interact with each other through the mean
field term, and the coupling effect on each agent is taken into account in
(4.2).
Remark 4.2. Let λ = 1/δ. By using the Taylor expansion of (4.2) around
λ = 0, one arrives at the following relation:












var{φ1i (x, fN , u)}+ o(λ)
]
,
where var is the variance of φ1i (x, fN , u) and o(λ) is a higher order term (in
λ) which involves higher-order moments of (4.3). This shows that the risk-
sensitive performance index entails all the moments of (4.3). Note that when
δ →∞ (λ→ 0), the performance index (4.2) corresponds to the risk-neutral
case considered in [71].
We define the following two sets of admissible controls:
U c1,i = {ui : ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N), (4.5)
‖xi(T )‖2 = o(T ),
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt = O(T ) a.s.}
Ud1,i = {ui : ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), s ≤ t), (4.6)
‖xi(T )‖2 = o(T ),
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt = O(T ) a.s.},
where σ(xi(s), s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N) is the σ-algebra generated by xi(s) for
s ≤ t and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and σ(xi(s), s ≤ t) is the σ-algebra generated
by xi(s) for s ≤ t. It should be noted that the admissible control in (4.5)
is centralized in terms of states of all agents, while the control in (4.6) is
decentralized since it is associated with the local state information. Since
Ud1,i ⊆ U c1,i, we accordingly say that U c1,i is a set of admissible centralized
controllers and Ud1,i a set of admissible decentralized controllers for P1.
Now, under the admissible control sets defined above, P1 is equivalent
to characterizing an individual optimal control strategy that forms a Nash
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equilibrium (or -Nash equilibrium). The definition is given as follows.
Definition 4.1. The set of controllers, {u∗i ∈ U c1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, constitutes
an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the cost functions {JN1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N},










If  is zero, then {u∗i ∈ U c1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is a Nash equilibrium with respect
to {JN1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
Note that in the definition, the Nash strategies, {u∗i ∈ U c1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤
N}, and the infimization on the RHS are not necessarily restricted to the
decentralized set (4.6).
In Section 4.3, we characterize an -Nash equilibrium for P1 where the
corresponding strategy of each agent, say u∗i , is decentralized, i.e. u
∗
i ∈ Ud1,i
for all i. We also show that when the number of agents is large, {u∗i ∈
Ud1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is a Nash equilibrium.
4.2.2 LQ Robust Mean Field Games (P2)
We now consider the following SDE for agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
dxi = (A(θi)xi +B(θi)ui +D(θi)vi)dt+
√
µD(θi)dWi(t), (4.7)
where xi(0) = x¯i and vi ∈ Rp is an auxiliary decision variable (disturbance
input). The other parameters satisfy Assumption 4.1.
Similarly, we define the sets of admissible centralized and decentralized
controllers for P2 by
U c2,i = {ui : ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N),
E{‖xi(T )‖2} = o(T ),E{
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt} = O(T ) }
Ud2,i = {ui : ui(t) ∈ σ(xi(s), s ≤ t),
E{‖xi(T )‖2} = o(T ),E{
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt} = O(T ) }.
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In this second problem, P2, each agent seeks a controller that minimizes
the following worst-case performance index (defined for agent i):






E{φ2i (x, fN , u, v)} (4.8)
φ2i (x, fN , u, v) := φ
1




where Vi is the class of disturbances such that each vi(t) is adapted to
σ(xi(s), s ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N), and JN2,i(ui, u−i) <∞ for all ui ∈ U c2,i.
It should be noted that each agent is coupled via the mean field term (4.4).
The disturbance vi in (4.7) can be viewed as a fictitious player (or adversary)
of agent i, which determines the worst-case risk-neutral performance index
of agent i; therefore, the actual maximizing one in (4.7) for (4.8) will, in
general, be different for different i. Notice also that this is not a 2N -agent
game, but is still an N -agent game with respect to (4.8). Now, viewed as an
N -agent game, with the individual worst-case performance index (4.8), the
two equilibrium concepts in Definition 4.1 are well-defined with respect to
{JN2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} under U c2,i.
In Section 4.5, we carry out the same analysis for P2 as we do in Section
4.3 for P1. We then show in Section 4.6 that P1 and P2 are partially
equivalent in the sense that the decentralized Nash strategies of the agents
are similar, but are determined by different auxiliary systems that lead to
the decentralized form.
4.3 LQ Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games
In this section, we solve P1 via risk-sensitive mean field control theory.
4.3.1 Risk-sensitive Optimal Control
This section solves a single LQ risk-sensitive optimal control problem.
We consider the following SDE:
dx = (Ax+Bu)dt+
√
µDdW (t), x(0) = x¯, (4.10)
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and the risk-sensitive cost function












φ¯1(x, g, u) :=
∫ T
0
‖x(t)− g(t)‖2Q + ‖u(t)‖2Rdt, (4.12)
where g ∈ Cbn. The optimal control problem (4.11) can be seen as a robust
tracking problem with respect to the given reference signal g [106]. We have
the following result, where we suppress the subscript i and the parameter θ.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the risk-sensitive control problem (4.11) with
(4.10). Suppose that (A,B) is controllable and (A,Q1/2) is observable. Sup-
pose that for a fixed γ :=
√
δ/2µ > 0, there is a matrix P > 0 that solves the
following generalized algebraic Riccati equation (GARE):
ATP + PA+Q− P (BR−1BT − 1
γ2
DDT )P = 0. (4.13)
Then,
(i) H := A−BR−1BTP + 1
γ2
DDTP and G := A−BR−1BTP are Hurwitz.
(ii) The optimal decentralized controller that minimizes (4.11) is given by
u¯(t) = −R−1BTPx(t)−R−1BT s(t), (4.14)
where s(t) satisfies the following differential equation:
ds(t)
dt
= −HT s(t) +Qg(t), (4.15)




(iii) The closed-loop system (4.10) with the optimal decentralized controller
in (4.14) satisfies ‖x(T )‖2 = o(T ) and ∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt = O(T ) almost
surely.








(v) The minimum cost is






q(τ)dτ + µTr(PDDT ), (4.17)
where q(τ) = gT (τ)Qg(τ)− sT (τ)BR−1BT s(τ) + γ−2sT (τ)DDT s(τ).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Remark 4.3. (i) Define
γ∗ := inf{γ > 0 : P > 0, P solves (4.13)}. (4.18)
Then by definition, for any finite γ > γ∗, the GARE in (4.13) admits
a solution P . In this case, γ∗ is known as an optimum disturbance
attenuation level, and any γ > γ∗ determines the level of the disturbance
attenuation [106]. Moreover, given the system and the cost matrices, γ∗
can be computed by transforming the GARE into the form of a linear
matrix inequality (LMI) [115].
(ii) For any finite γ > γ∗, since H and G are Hurwitz, there exist positive
constants ρ > 0 and η > 0 such that ‖eHt‖ ≤ ρe−ηt for all t ≥ 0. The
same holds for G.
In the rest of the section, from Proposition 4.1, the triplet (A,B,D) is
replaced by the ordered triplet (A(θi), B(θi), D(θi)); accordingly the solution
of the GARE in (4.13) is denoted by P (θi) > 0. In that sense, si(t) is the bias
term of agent i with (A(θi), B(θi), D(θi), P (θi)). For notational convenience,
we use the subscript i when θ = θi.
4.3.2 Mean Field Analysis
We now construct a mean field system for P1 to characterize the best ap-
proximated mass behavior to the actual mass behavior (4.4) when N is large.
Let x¯θ(t) = E{xθ(t)}. By substituting the optimal decentralized controller














where U¯(θ) = B(θ)R−1BT (θ). Then we can construct the following auxiliary




x¯θ(t)dF (θ, x). (4.20)
The operator (4.20) is a function of g, which captures the average behavior
of all agents within the system parameter space Θ and the initial conditions
when N is large; hence it must be consistent with the mass behavior (4.4)
under (4.14). We call (4.20) the mean field system for P1.
Assumption 4.2. (a) (A(θ), B(θ)) and (A(θ), Q1/2) are controllable and ob-
servable, respectively, for all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) γ∗θ is finite and γ > γ
∗
θ for all θ ∈ Θ, where γ∗θ := inf{γ > 0 : P (θ) >













dF (θ) < 1.
Remark 4.4. For one-dimensional agent systems, by using the GARE, As-






dF (θ) < 1.
As γ →∞, the above condition coincides with [71, Equation (18)].
We have the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Then there is a
unique g∗ ∈ Cbn such that g∗ = T (g∗).
Proof. From Lemma C.2(i) in Appendix C.1, the operator T (x) ∈ Cbn for any
x ∈ Cbn, where Cbn is a Banach space. Then for any x, y ∈ Cbn, we have














By Assumption 4.2 and the contraction mapping theorem [116], we have the
desired result.
Remark 4.5. Under Assumption 4.2(c), the infinite-dimensional fixed point
problem in Theorem 4.1 can be solved via the Banach successive approxima-
tion method [116] or the policy iteration method [70].
The optimal decentralized controller for agent i with g∗ can be written as
u∗i (t) = −R−1BTi Pix∗i (t)−R−1BTi si(t), (4.21)
where si(t) is determined by g
∗ in Theorem 4.1. Due to Proposition 4.1(iii),
u∗i ∈ Ud1,i. We denote the closed-loop system and the mass behavior under
the optimal decentralized controller in (4.21) by x∗i (t) and f
∗
N , respectively.
4.3.3 Closed-loop System Analysis
The following result shows the closed-loop system stability in the time-
average sense.











0 ‖x∗i (t)‖2Q+‖u∗i (t)‖2Rdt]} <∞.
Proof. Note that












, C1z1(t) + C2z2(t) + C3z3(t),
and ‖u∗i (t)‖2R ≤ C4(‖xi(t)‖2 + ‖si(t)‖2); therefore, since si ∈ Cbn for all i, we
can choose a constant C > 0 independent of N such that































where the equality follows since z1 and z2 are deterministic processes.














µDidWi(t), z¯3(0) = 0,
where Gi is Hurwitz. We introduce the auxiliary SDE
dz¯4(t) = Giz¯4(t)dt+Diwi(t)dt+
√
µDidWi(t), z¯4(0) = 0.
Due to the connection between risk-sensitive and H∞ control discussed in




















Now, consider the following Riccati inequality



















Then in view of the above inequality, the KYP Lemma [117] and Example
2.2 in [78], and from the “completion of squares” method, the corresponding
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optimal solution is w∗i (t) =
1
γ2












≤ CµTr(PiDiDTi ) ≤ Cµ sup
θ∈Θ
Tr(P (θ)D(θ)DT (θ)) <∞,
where the last inequality follows from the compactness of Θ. This completes
the proof.
4.3.4 Consistency Analysis
We now show consistency between g∗ and the actual mass behavior under
(4.21) in the large population regime.



































‖f ∗N(t)− g∗(t)‖2dt = 0, a.s.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Theorem 4.2 states that there is exact consistency between g∗ and f ∗N in
the mean-square sense as well as in the almost sure sense when the number
of agents is arbitrarily large. We can also view this result as a law of large
numbers with respect to N [71].
The following result establishes the concentration inequality of Theorem
4.2; the proof is given in Appendix C.2.
Corollary 4.1. Let X(N, T ) :=
∫ T
0
‖f ∗N(t) − g∗(t)‖2dt. If Assumptions 4.1
and 4.2 hold, then
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(i) For each c > 0, there exists N ′ such that for all N ≥ N ′,
P(|X(N, T )− E{X(N, T )}| ≥ s) ≤ 2e−2s2/c2 , ∀T ≥ 0.
(ii) For each c(N) > 0 with N ≥ 1, there exists T ′ such that for all T ≥ T ′,
P(|X(N, T )− E{X(N, T )}| ≥ sT ) ≤ 2e−2s2/c(N)2 .
In Corollary 4.1, with small c and c(N), X(N, T ) is concentrated around
its mean value with high probability. Note that in Corollary 4.1(ii), c(N) can
be chosen to be arbitrarily small when N is large due to Theorem 4.2(ii).
4.3.5 Asymptotic Equilibrium Analysis: The -Nash
Equilibrium
This section characterizes an -Nash equilibrium for P1. We first introduce
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∗, f ∗N , u
∗) is (4.3) when all agents use the optimal decentralized
controller (4.21) and φ1i (x, f
−i∗
N , u) is (4.3) when agent i is under the full state
feedback controller ui ∈ U c1,i (i.e., xi(t) := xi(t)|ui(t)), while other agents are
still under the optimal decentralized controller (4.21).
We now state the main result, whose proof is given in Appendix C.2.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Then the set of
the optimal decentralized controllers in (4.21), {u∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, constitutes
an -Nash equilibrium for P1. That is, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , there exists









−i) + N ,
where N → 0 as N →∞.
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Remark 4.6. Note that given g∗, P1 is transformed into N independent
risk-sensitive optimal control problems, and the resulting optimal controllers
constitute an -Nash equilibrium.
Remark 4.7. As discussed in Remark 4.3(i), the individual Nash strate-
gies have the disturbance attenuation properties with γ. This shows that the
-Nash equilibrium features robustness, which will be demonstrated by simu-
lations in Section 4.7.
4.4 Limiting Behaviors of LQ Risk-Sensitive Mean
Field Games
This section discusses limiting behaviors of P1 with respect to two different
design parameters. The first one is known as the large deviation limit (small
noise limit) and the second one is the risk-neutral limit.
4.4.1 Small Noise Limit
We consider the small noise limit of P1 in which the noise intensity parameter
µ decreases to zero. If we take µ→ 0, then the SDE for agent i now becomes




Moreover, the risk-sensitive objective function in (4.2) heavily penalizes the
large deviation of (4.3) when δ also decreases such that γ =
√
δ/2µ is fixed
and positive. In this case, the results in Proposition 4.1 and Theorems 4.1-
4.3 are valid, since γ still remains as the same value. Specifically, under
this limit, the set of N optimal controllers in (4.21) constitutes an -Nash
equilibrium for P1.
4.4.2 Risk-neutral Limit
Now, consider the case when δ →∞ for a fixed µ. As mentioned in Remark
4.2, under this limit, the risk-sensitive cost function (4.2) is equivalent to the
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risk-neutral case considered in [71]. This imposes a smaller weight on the
large deviation of (4.3). We have the following result.
Proposition 4.3. Consider P1 with δ → ∞ for a fixed µ > 0. If Assump-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, then
(i) The optimal decentralized controller for each agent can be written as
u∗i (t) = −R−1BTi Zixi(t)−R−1BTi ri(t),
where Zi ≥ 0 is a solution of the following ARE:








where Fi = Ai −BiR−1BTi Zi is Hurwitz.
(ii) The set of N-decentralized controllers in (i) constitutes an -Nash equi-
librium for P1. Moreover,  can be made arbitrarily small by picking
N arbitrarily large.
Proposition 4.3 implies that P1 has the same limiting behavior of δ as the
case of the LQ risk-sensitive control problem discussed in [75, 78, 106].
4.5 LQ Robust Mean Field Games
In this section, we solve P2 formulated in Section 4.2.2 via worst-case mean
field control theory.
4.5.1 The LQ Stochastic Zero-sum Differential Game
This section considers the LQ stochastic zero-sum differential game by re-
placing the mass behavior (4.4) with an arbitrary function h ∈ Cbn.
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We consider the following SDE (from (4.7)):
dx = (Ax+Bu+Dv)dt+
√
µDdW (t), x(0) = x¯. (4.22)
The performance index is given by






φ¯2(x, h, u, v)
}
(4.23)




We then have the following result:
Proposition 4.4. Consider the LQ stochastic zero-sum differential game
(4.22)-(4.23). Suppose that (A,B) is stabilizable and (A,Q1/2) is detectable.
Suppose that for a fixed γ > 0, there is a matrix P ≥ 0 that solves the GARE
(4.13). Then,
(i) H := A−BR−1BTP + 1
γ2
DDTP and G := A−BR−1BTP are Hurwitz.
(ii) The optimal decentralized controller and the worst-case disturbance that
constitute a saddle-point equilibrium1 for (4.23) are given by
u¯(t) = −R−1BTPx(t)−R−1BT s(t) (4.25)
v¯(t) = γ−2DTPx(t) + γ−2DT s(t), (4.26)
where s(t) satisfies the differential equation (4.15) with g(t) replaced by
h(t).
(iii) The closed-loop system (4.22) with the optimal controller (4.25) and
the worst-case disturbance (4.26) satisfies E{‖x(T )‖2} = o(T ) and
E{∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt} = O(T ).
(iv) s(t) in (ii) has a unique solution in Cbn, which can be written as (4.16)
with g(t) replaced by h(t).
(v) The saddle-point value is (4.17) with g(t) replaced by h(t).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
1See [61] or [106] for the definition of saddle-point equilibrium.
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It should be mentioned that the optimal decentralized control laws of the
individual agents for P1 and P2 are identical. This is to be expected, since
the corresponding optimal control problems are equivalent in the sense that
they share the same controller, and the minimum cost and the saddle-point
value are identical [106, 78]. We also note that in Proposition 4.4, γ is a free
variable.
Remark 4.8. Just like the optimal control problem in Section 4.3.1, γ is the
disturbance attenuation parameter that measures robustness of the closed-loop
system [106]. Also, as γ →∞, (4.23) coincides with the LQ optimal control
problem in [71].
4.5.2 Mean Field Analysis
We now construct a mean field system for P2. Again, let x¯θ := E{xθ(t)}.













where U(θ) = B(θ)R−1BT (θ) − γ−2D(θ)DT (θ). The mean field system for




x¯θ(t)dF (θ, x), (4.28)
where F (θ, x) is the distribution function given in Assumption 4.1(e). Then,
by following the argument as in Section 4.3.2, if the operator (4.28) is a
contraction, then we have the fixed point. Notice that in general, its fixed
point, say h∗, will not be identical to g∗ in Theorem 4.1, provided that they
exist, since h∗ is also determined by the worst disturbance.
Assumption 4.3. (a) (A(θ), B(θ)) and (A(θ), Q1/2) are stabilizable and de-
tectable, respectively, for all θ ∈ Θ.
(b) γ∗θ is finite and γ > γ
∗











(‖B(θ)‖2‖R−1‖+ γ−2‖D(θ)‖2)dF (θ) < 1.
Remark 4.9. As γ → ∞, Assumption 4.3(c) becomes equivalent to that in
[71].
The following result is the counterpart of Theorem 4.1 in the present case.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3 hold. Then there is a
unique h∗ ∈ Cbn such that h∗ = L(h∗).
Now, the optimal decentralized controller for agent i is
u∗i (t) = −R−1BTi Pix∗i (t)−R−1BTi si(t), (4.29)
and the worst-case disturbance for agent i is
v∗i (t) = γ
−2DTi Pix
∗
i (t) + γ
−2DTi si(t), (4.30)
where si(t) is now dependent on h
∗ in Theorem 4.4. Note that due to Propo-
sition 4.4(iii), u∗i ∈ Ud2,i with v∗i . By a possible abuse of notation, we denote
the closed-loop system and the mass behavior under (4.29) and (4.30) by
x∗i (t) and f
∗
N(t), respectively.
4.5.3 Closed-loop System Analysis
The next result shows the closed-loop system stability.












‖x∗i (t)‖2 + ‖u∗i (t)‖2dt
}
<∞.
Proof. The result can be shown in a similar way to that in Lemma C.3 in
Appendix C.1.
4.5.4 Consistency Analysis
The following result is the counterpart of Theorem 4.2 in this case.
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‖f ∗N(t)− h∗(t)‖2dt = 0, a.s.
The next result is the counterpart of Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. Let Y (N, T ) :=
∫ T
0
‖f ∗N(t) − h∗(t)‖2dt. If Assumptions 4.1
and 4.3 hold, then
(i) For each c > 0, there exists N ′ such that for all N ≥ N ′,
P(|Y (N, T )− E{Y (N, T )}| ≥ s) ≤ 2e−2s2/c2 , ∀T ≥ 0.
(ii) For each c(N) ≥ 0 with N ≥ 1, there exists T ′ such that for all T ≥ T ′,
P(|Y (N, T )− E{Y (N, T )}| ≥ sT ) ≤ 2e−2s2/c(N)2 .
4.5.5 Asymptotic Equilibrium Analysis: The -Nash
Equilibrium
This section characterizes an -Nash equilibrium for P2. As in Section 4.3.5,
































Figure 4.1: Relationship between P1, P2, and the risk-neutral LQ mean
field game (LQ-MFG) with respect to the design parameters µ, δ, and γ.
where φ2i (x
∗, f ∗N , u
∗, v∗) is (4.9) when all the agents are under the optimal
decentralized controller u∗i in (4.29) and the worst-case disturbance v
∗
i in
(4.30), and φ2i (x, f
−i∗
N , u, v) is (4.9) when all the agents except i are under u
∗
i
and v∗i , while agent i is under the centralized controller ui ∈ U c2,i and vi ∈ Vi.
We now state the main result for P2.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.3 hold. Suppose that
each agent adopts the corresponding worst-case disturbance in (4.30). Then,









−i) + N ,
where N → 0 as N →∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Remark 4.10. Just like P1, given h∗, P2 can be treated as N indepen-
dent LQ stochastic zero-sum differential games, and the resulting N optimal
controllers constitute an -Nash equilibrium.
4.6 Discussion on Partial Equivalence and Limiting
Behaviors of P1 and P2
As we have seen in Sections 4.2-4.5, in P1 and P2, the optimal controller for
each agent that constitutes the -Nash equilibrium shares the same control
law, but the bias term is determined by their respective mean field systems.
This observation, and the limiting behaviors of P1 discussed in Section 4.5
lead to the following conclusions.
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There exists a partial equivalence between P1 and P2 in the sense that
their respective approximated mass behaviors are different, although the in-
dividual optimal controllers that constitute -Nash equilibria share the same
control laws. Specifically, the partial equivalence stems from the worst-case
disturbance in P2. If γ → ∞ (in P1, δ → ∞ for fixed µ), then the Nash
equilibria of P1 and P2 become identical to that of the risk-neutral LQ
mean field game (LQ-MFG) considered in [71], since the individual optimal
controllers as well as the corresponding fixed points are identical to that in
[71], as discussed in Proposition 4.3, and Remarks 4.8 and 4.9. Figure 4.1
summarizes this discussion.
It should be mentioned that a similar partial equivalence was discussed
briefly in [73, Remark 6], and the result here sheds further light on that
issue via the Nash certainty equivalence principle. In [73], it was noted
that the control of fictitious player has to be included in the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov (FPK) equation of the robust mean field game that determines
the density of the mass behavior, and thereby the mean field equilibrium
solutions for the risk-sensitive and robust mean field games are not necessarily
identical. The connection is that here the corresponding approximated mass
behavior functions for P1 and P2, g∗ and h∗, resemble the FPK equation,
and they are generally not identical due to the presence of the adversary in
the latter.
4.7 Numerical Examples
In this section, two different numerical examples are considered. In each one,
we compare P1, P2, and the risk-neutral case in [71] via their tracking per-
formance and consistency between their respective approximated and actual
mean field behaviors.
4.7.1 A System with Uniform Distribution
The first numerical example is the case when each agent’s system parameter
Ai = θi is an i.i.d. uniform random variable on the interval [a, b] where
0 < a < b. Also, B = D = Q = R = 1, µ = 2, and the initial condition
is 5. Note that under this setting, Assumption 4.1 holds where Assumption
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γ = 1.5 (P1)
γ = 1.5 (P2)
γ = 150 (P1 and P2)
Figure 4.2: State trajectories of the scalar example when N = 500 (top)
and the histogram (bottom) with γ = 1.5 and γ = 150.





which implies γ∗θ = γ
∗ = 1. Moreover, Hi = −
√





(1−γ−2) < 0 for all i and any γ > γ
∗ = 1. Then the
mean field systems for P1 and P2, which are given in (4.20) and (4.28),
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γ = 1.5 (P1)
γ = 150 (P1 and P2)
γ = 1.5 (P2)
Figure 4.3: The approximation error, 2(N), with respect to N when
γ = 1.5 and γ = 150.
respectively, can be written as


































Assume that a = 2, b = 5, and consider two cases; γ = 1.5 and γ = 150.
We then need the contraction condition for (4.31) and (4.32) to characterize
their fixed points. Note that since we are dealing with the heterogeneous
agent case, the analytic method proposed in [70] is not applicable to obtain
the fixed points.
It can be verified that Assumptions 4.2(c) and 4.3(c) hold; hence we have
contraction. Then we use the Banach successive approximation method
[116], by which the fixed point of (4.31) and (4.32) when γ = 1.5 are
g∗(t) = 5.086e−8.49t and h∗(t) = 5.1e−3.37t, respectively, where the exact
values are obtained by the curve fitting algorithm. Note that due to the
partial equivalence, g∗ 6≡ h∗, and g∗, h∗ ∈ Cb1. The same method is used to

































h∗ = (h∗1, h
∗
2)
T , of P1 and P2, respectively, for the second order damping
system when γ = 3.
Figure 4.2(top) shows the state trajectories of 500 agents for P1 and P2.
Each trajectory and therefore the equilibrium features robustness when γ =
1.5, which is a consequence of its disturbance attenuation property with γ as
discussed earlier in the chapter. This is well illustrated in the state histogram
in Fig. 4.2 (bottom). Each agent is more concentrated when γ = 1.5. Note
that when γ = 150, the trajectories of P1 and P2 show the same behaviors,
which is a consequence of their limiting behavior with respect to γ. The curve
of the approximation performance, 2(N), with respect to N is shown in Fig.





‖f ∗N(t) − g∗(t)‖2dt} (or h∗). Each
plot shows convergence approximately at the rate of O(1/N), and also shows
that the curve with a smaller γ leads to a better approximation performance
due to the disturbance attenuation property of P1 and P2.
4.7.2 A Second-order Damping System




s2 + 2s+ βi
, (4.33)
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γ = 3 (P1)
γ = 3 (P2)
γ = 150 (P1 and P2)
Figure 4.5: State trajectories of the second order damping system when
N = 50 (top), and (N) with respect to N (bottom). Note that the
equilibrium features robustness with γ = 3.












We assume D = (0, 1)T , Q = I, R = 5, µ = 0.5, and the initial condition is
taken to be (2, 5)T . Also, βi is an i.i.d. uniform random variable on [−4, 4].
Note that the pole of (4.33) is located at a radius of β
1/2
i and at an angle
of sin−1(1/β1/2i ); hence, depending on realizations of βi, the system can be
stable or unstable.
By using the numerical integration method, it can be checked that the
mean field systems for P1 and P2 are contraction when γ = 3. Figure
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4.4 shows the 2-dimensional approximated mass behaviors, g∗ and h∗, for
the second-order system, which are obtained by the Banach successive ap-
proximation method. Figure 4.5 shows the trajectory of N = 50 and the
approximation error, 2(N), with respect to N . Notice that better approxi-
mation performance is achieved when γ = 3 due to the inherent robustness
property of P1 and P2.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, two classes of LQ mean field games have been considered; the
linear-quadratic risk-sensitive mean field game (P1) and the linear-quadratic
robust mean field game (P2). We have obtained -Nash equilibria for both
P1 and P2, where the individual Nash strategies are decentralized as a
function of an agent’s own state and the best approximated mass behavior
function, where the latter can be determined off-line. Specifically, under the
individual optimal decentralized controllers, the mass behavior collapses into
the best approximated function that is obtained by fixed point analysis of
the corresponding mean field system. We have shown that -Nash equilibria
for P1 and P2 are partially equivalent in the sense that the Nash strategies
share the same control laws, but are also characterized by different approx-
imated mass behavior functions. This partial equivalence stems from the
difference between their respective mean field systems due to the presence of
the adversary in P2.
We have also studied the limiting behaviors of the -Nash equilibria in the
large population regime as well as in the limit of the design parameters. In
particular, we have shown that when the population size grows to infinity,
-Nash equilibria become (exact) Nash equilibria. Moreover, when the dis-
turbance attenuation parameter goes to infinity, -Nash equilibria of P1 and
P2 become identical to that of the risk-neutral LQ mean field game consid-
ered in [71]. Note that such a relationship can be viewed as the mean field
counterpart of what is observed in the one-agent case discussed in earlier
literature, see [75, 106, 78, 79, 77]. Finally, we have shown that the -Nash
equilibria for P1 and P2 feature robustness due to the risk-sensitivity of
the former and the worst-case characteristic of the latter. This robustness






In this chapter, we consider mean field Stackelberg differential games when
there is one leader and a large number, say N , of followers. The leader
globally dominates over the followers for the entire duration in the sense that
before the start of the game he chooses and then announces his strategy to
the N followers who play a Nash game. The N number of Nash followers
choose their optimal strategies noncooperatively and simultaneously based
on the leader’s observed strategy. Note that the class of Stackelberg games
with one leader and N number of Nash followers was studied (without the
mean field framework) in [89, 118].
The information structures for both the leader and the followers are adapted
open-loop,1 that is, information on each agent’s initial condition and filtration
is available to each agent (the leader, of course, knows everything that the
followers know). Moreover, in this setting, the followers are coupled with each
other through the mean field term included in each follower’s cost function,
and are strongly influenced by the leader’s strategy included in each agent’s
cost function and dynamics. From the leader’s perspective, he is coupled
with the N followers through the mean field term included in his cost func-
tion. We also consider the heterogeneous case of the followers with K distinct
models, that is, follower i belongs to a finite model set K = {1, 2, ..., K}.
Since there is a large number of followers, complexity issues arise from the
mean field coupling term and heterogeneity of Nash followers. In addition,
solving the leader’s optimal control problem becomes complicated, since it
depends on a large number of Nash followers. Hence, computing an exact
1The notion of (adapted) open-loop information structure for (stochastic) Stackelberg
games can be found in [61, 93].
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Stackelberg-Nash solution is cumbersome to say the least. To circumvent
this difficulty, our approach in this chapter is to apply the stochastic mean
field approximation to characterize the best estimate of the actual mean field
behavior.
We first consider the mean field Nash game for the N followers given an
arbitrary strategy of the leader. We solve a local optimal control problem of
the followers with leader’s control taken as an exogenous stochastic process.
We characterize the best estimate of the actual mean field behavior that is
dependent on the leader’s arbitrary strategy. Note that the local optimal
controller for the followers is decentralized, as it is a function of local in-
formation and the approximated mean field process (and also the leader’s
arbitrary strategy). We show that for each fixed strategy of the leader,
the followers’ optimal decentralized strategies lead to an -Nash equilibrium,
where  converges to zero as N →∞.
We then consider the leader’s problem. The leader’s local optimal control
problem includes additional constraints induced by the mean field process
determined by Nash followers, which is thus still hard to solve, but is much
more tractable than the leader’s original optimal control problem, since in
the latter, the number of additional constraints depends on N . We obtain
the leader’s decentralized optimal controller as a function of his informa-
tion and the mean field process. Unlike the follower’s problem, the leader’s
problem may not have a unique optimal solution due to coupled forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) and the corresponding
nonsymmetric Riccati differential equation (RDE). We identify a linear ma-
trix inequality (LMI) condition under which solutions of the RDE as well as
the FBSDEs exist. We finally show that the optimal decentralized controllers
for the leader and the followers constitute an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium
for the original game, where 1 and 2 both converge to zero as N →∞. This
implies that for a large number of followers, the impact of the followers on
the leader collapses to the approximated mean field process, which reduces
complexity of the original Stackelberg game.
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Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we formulate the problem,
and discuss the difficulty of obtaining the solution to the original problem
when the number of followers is large. Section 5.3 solves the follower’s prob-
lem given an arbitrary strategy of the leader, and characterizes the mean field
process. The leader’s problem is discussed in Section 5.4, where we obtain an
approximated Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical examples are presented in
Section 5.5. We end this chapter with the concluding remarks of Section 5.6.
5.2 LQ Mean Field Stackelberg Games
In this section, we formulate the problem of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field
Stackelberg games, and discuss the difficulty in obtaining the solution with
a finite (but large) number of followers.
5.2.1 Problem Formulation
Let (Ω,F ,Ft, t ≥ 0,P) be a natural complete filtered probability space aug-
mented by all the P null sets in F . We denote the set of all vector-valued
(or matrix-valued) Ft adapted processes satisfying E
∫ T
0
‖ · ‖2dt < ∞ by
L2F(0, T ; ·).
We have one leader, P0, and N followers, {Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. The leader
and the followers have their own cost functions {JNi , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} which each
wants to minimize.
We consider the controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the
leader, P0,
dx0(t) = [A0x0(t) +B0u0(t)]dt+D0dW0(t), (5.1)
where x0 ∈ Rn is the state that captures the behavior of P0, u0 ∈ Rp is the
control of P0, and {W0(t), t ≥ 0} is a q-dimensional Brownian motion. The
SDE for the follower Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
dxi(t) = [A(θi)xi(t) +Bui(t) + Fu0(t)]dt+DdWi(t), (5.2)
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where xi ∈ Rn is the state of follower Pi, ui ∈ Rp is the control of Pi,
and {Wi(t), t ≥ 0} is a q-dimensional Brownian motion. In (5.1) and (5.2),
A0, B0, D0, Ai := A(θi), B, D, and F are time-invariant matrices with
appropriate dimensions. Let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by {xi(0), 0 ≤
i ≤ N} and {Wi(τ), τ ≤ t, 0 ≤ i ≤ N}, i.e., Ft = σ(xi(0),Wi(τ), τ ≤ t, 0 ≤
i ≤ N). Let F it = σ(xi(0),Wi(τ), τ ≤ t), for i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N . We say that
F it is local information of agent i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , whereas Ft is the global (or
centralized) information.
In (5.2), {θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} models the heterogeneity of the followers, which
can be viewed as a sequence of dynamic parameters. For simplicity, we
consider the case that only the system matrices of the followers, Ai = A(θi),
1 ≤ i ≤ N , are different, and the analysis developed in this chapter can
easily be extended to the case when other parameters are also dependent on
θi. We assume that Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is of K distinct models. Specifically,
let K = {1, 2, ..., K} and Nk = {i : θi = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} for k ∈ K. Then
Nk := |Nk| where |Nk| is the cardinality of Nk capturing K distinct types of
followers with {θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. In our heterogeneous model, we have Ai = Aj
if i, j ∈ Nk, in which case we denote Ak := Ai = Aj. Since N =
∑K
k=1Nk, the




k = Nk/N , k ∈ K, becomes the probability
distribution on {θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
We introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1. (a) {xi(0), 0 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent of each other,
and are measurable on F0. Also, E[x0(0)] = x¯0, E[xi(0)] = x¯, and
supi≥0 E[‖xi(0)‖2] ≤ c <∞.
(b) {Wi(t), 0 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent of each other, which are also inde-
pendent of {xi(0), 0 ≤ i ≤ N}.
(c) There exists a probability vector pi = (pi1, ..., piK) such that limN→∞ piN =
pi, where 0 < pik ≤ 1 for all k ∈ K with
∑K
k=1 pik = 1.
It should be mentioned that Assumption 5.1(c) implies that Nk > 0 for
each k ∈ K, and Nk →∞ when N →∞, that is, any type of the followers is
not diminished when N goes to infinity. One example of Assumption 5.1(c)
is K = {1, 2} with N1 = N2 = N/2, in which case pi = (0.5, 0.5). Finally, due
to Assumptions 5.1(a) and 5.1(b), we have Ft = ∨Ni=0F it .
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where Q0 ≥ 0 and R0 > 0. In (5.3), xN(t) = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) denotes the mean
field term that captures the mass behavior of the followers. Note that in
view of (5.3), the leader and the followers are coupled through the mean field
term. The performance index for Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by








where Q ≥ 0 and R > 0. Note that the followers are (weakly) coupled with
each other through the mean field term xN , but are strongly coupled with
the leader’s control u0 included in (5.2) and (5.4).
The classes of admissible controls for P0 and Pi are defined as follows.
Let z ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn). We define U0 to be the set of u0 ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rp) such
that u0 being a function of y = (x0, ..., xN , z) is Lipschitz continuous with
respect to y. Similarly, we define Ui(u0) to be the set of ui ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rp)
such that given u0 ∈ U0, ui being a function of y′ = (x1, ..., xN , u0, z) is
Lipschitz continuous with respect to y′ for all i. Note that under these two
definitions, for any u0 ∈ U0 and ui ∈ Ui(u0), there exists a unique (strong)
solution to SDEs in (5.1) and (5.2) in L2F(0, T ;Rn) [119]. It should also be
noted that in the definitions of U0 and Ui(u0), the corresponding controllers
are not restricted to be functions of the local information.
We next discuss the hierarchy of the (adapted) open-loop Stackelberg game
under consideration. The leader, P0, holds a dominating position in the sense
that he first decides on and announces his strategy u0, and enforces on Pi,
1 ≤ i ≤ N ; in this process, the leader takes into account the rational reactions
of the followers. The N followers then respond by playing a Nash game under
the leader’s strategy. Note that in this framework, each player (leader and
followers) knows his own system and cost parameters, and P0 also knows the
cost and system parameters of the followers. Moreover, the followers know
the leader’s optimal strategy for the entire time-horizon ([0, T ]), that is, the
leader announces his strategy in advance, and ahead of the followers at the
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start of the game.
In this hierarchical setting, the main objective of this chapter is to obtain a
Stackelberg equilibrium2 for the corresponding game. However, since we are
dealing with a large number of followers, two different issues of complexity
arise. One is with regard to the Nash game of the followers, since it is hard
(maybe impossible) to obtain the Nash equilibrium with an arbitrary strategy
of the leader when N is large. Another one is with regard to the stochastic
optimal control problem faced by the leader, as the number of additional
constraints induced by the Nash followers grows with N . This point will be
discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.2.
Now, to address these two issues of complexity, instead of seeking a Stack-
elberg solution, we seek an approximated Stackelberg equilibrium by char-
acterizing the best estimate of the actual mean field behavior xN when N is
arbitrarily large, in view of which 1) the Nash game of the followers admits
an -Nash equilibrium for any arbitrary open-loop strategy of the leader, and
2) the leader is able to characterize a unique optimal solution that leads to
an approximated Stackelberg strategy. We will see that due to the mean
field approximation, the number of additional constraints for the leader’s op-
timization problem induced by the Nash followers will be independent of N ,
making it easier to solve than the leader’s original optimization problem.
5.2.2 Discussion on the Direct Approach
We discuss the direct approach to the Stackelberg game formulated in Section
5.2.1. We do not provide an explicit expression of the Stackelberg equilib-
rium, but (informally) argue why the standard direct approach discussed in
[61, 93] for games with a small number of players may not be applicable to
solve the mean field Stackelberg game formulated in Section 5.2.1.
We first need to solve the Nash game of the followers for an arbitrary
open-loop strategy of the leader. Suppose that each follower has access to
the global state information. From [119], the Hamiltonian for follower i given
2See [61] for the definition of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
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u0 ∈ U0 can be written as (t argument is suppressed)
Hi(xi, ui, sNi , gi) = −
[
‖xi −HxN‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R + 2uTi Lu0
]
+ sN,Ti (Aixi +Bui + Fu0) + Tr(g
T
i D).
Then by the stochastic maximum principle (see [119]), the optimal solution3
for follower i is the one that maximizes the above Hamiltonian:
u′i(t) = R
−1BT sNi (t)−R−1Lu0(t), (5.5)















x′i(0) = xi(0), s
N
i (T ) = 0.
(5.6)
As can be seen from (5.6), the dynamics for x′i depend on the leader’s
open-loop strategy, and the adjoint process sNi is a function of the mean field
term. Note that this optimality condition holds for any follower. Therefore,
since each follower is coupled through the cost functionals only, if there is
an Ft-adapted solution of the FBSDE in (5.6) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , then
the set of u′i in (5.5) leads to a Nash equilibrium of the followers given any
arbitrary open-loop strategy of the leader [61]. In general, however, neither
the existence of the solution of (5.6) nor its uniqueness is guaranteed, and
even if a solution exists, it is hard to obtain, since (5.6) is highly coupled
across followers. Moreover, it may not be realistic in many cases that each
follower has access to the state information of the other followers. This
corresponds to the complexity of the Nash game when the number of followers
is large as mentioned in Section 5.2.1.
Now, to obtain a Stackelberg strategy for the leader, the leader is faced
3Note that in our case, the maximum principle is also sufficient, since R > 0 and Hi is
concave in xi for all i, see [119, Theorem 5.2].
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i , i = 1, 2, ..., N, (5.7)




i are from (5.6),
which are additional constraints induced by Nash followers. Note that in the
above optimization problem, the cost function JN0 (u0, u






i(t) which is dependent on u0 by virtue of (5.6). Moreover,
the number of additional constraints increases with N , which demonstrates
the second complexity issue brought up in Section 5.2.1. Hence, the above
heuristic argument informally shows that the standard approach may not
be applicable to obtain a Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium, and strengthens our
motivation for studying the problem within the mean field theory framework.
5.3 Mean Field Nash Games for the N Followers
This section considers the mean field Nash game for the N followers under
an arbitrary strategy of the leader, u0 ∈ U0. Since the followers are coupled
through only the mean field term, under the mean field approximation, each
follower actually faces a separate stochastic optimal control problem, which
we discuss below.
5.3.1 Local Optimal Control Problem for Pi
Consider the SDE for Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
dxi(t) = [A(θi)xi(t) +Bui(t) + Fu0(t)]dt+DdWi(t), (5.8)





‖xi(t)−Hz(t)‖2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R + 2uTi (t)Lu0(t)
]
dt, (5.9)
where z(t) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn) replaces xN(t) in (5.4), which can be viewed as
the mass behavior when N → ∞, whose explicit expression will be derived
later in this section. Note that due to the hierarchical structure of the game
98
under consideration, z will be determined by an arbitrary strategy of P0.
Moreover, the individual impact of each follower on z may be negligible if z
captures the mass behavior.
The optimal control problem (5.9) can be viewed as a standard stochastic
LQ problem by treating z and u0 as exogenous signals. We have the follow-
ing result, whose proof follows from the standard stochastic optimal control
problem, see [120, 121, 119].
Lemma 5.1. Given z ∈ L2F(0, T,Rn) and u0 ∈ U0, consider the local optimal
control problem for Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , in (5.9). There exists a unique optimal
controller u∗i ∈ L2F(0, T,Rq). Moreover, (x∗i , u∗i ) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn+p) is the
corresponding optimal solution if and only if













−ATi pi(t) +Q(x∗i (t)−Hz(t))
]
dt+ ri(t)dWi(t)
x∗i (0) = xi(0), pi(T ) = 0,
(5.11)
where (x∗i , pi, ri) ∈ L2F(0, T ;R2n,Rn×q) is the solution to the forward-backward
SDE (FBSDE) in (5.11). Finally, given z and u0, (x
∗
i , pi, ri) has a unique
solution in L2F(0, T ;R2n,Rn×q).
We now obtain an equivalent state-feedback representation of the opti-
mal controller and the corresponding optimal trajectory given in (5.10) and
(5.11), respectively. LetGi(t) := Ai−BR−1BTZi(t) and pi(t) = −Zi(t)x∗i (t)+
φi(t), where φi(T ) = 0 and
−dZi(t)
dt
= ATi Zi(t) + Zi(t)Ai +Q− Zi(t)BR−1BTZi(t), Zi(T ) = 0. (5.12)
Notice that (5.12) is a symmetric Riccati differential equation (RDE) that
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arises in the standard LQ optimal control problem. We can show that
dx∗i (t) =
[





−GTi (t)φi(t)−QHz(t)− Zi(t)(BR−1L− F )u0(t)
]
dt
+ (Zi(t)D + ri(t))dWi(t)
x∗i (0) = xi(0), φi(T ) = 0,
(5.13)
where the corresponding optimal decentralized state feedback controller is
given by
u∗i (t) = −R−1BTZ(t)x∗i (t) +R−1BTφi(t)−R−1Lu0(t). (5.14)
Note that φi is now decoupled from x
∗
i . Since R > 0 and Q ≥ 0, from the
standard LQ optimal control theory (see [119]), the RDE in (5.12) admits
a unique solution Zi(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] with Zi(T ) = 0. Moreover,
we have Zk := Zi ≡ Zj if i, j ∈ Nk for any k ∈ K. Therefore, since K is
finite, supk∈K,0≤t≤T ‖Zk(t)‖ ≤ C < ∞. This also implies that given z and
u0, there exists a unique Ft adapted solution to the FBSDE in Lemma 5.1
due to the affine structure of the transformation [121, Theorem 4.1]. The
explicit expression of the solution of (5.13) (and therefore (5.11)) in integral
form can be obtained by using [85, Lemma A.1].
Remark 5.1. It should be noted that the local optimal controller for Pi is
a function of its own information (including z) and an arbitrary open-loop
strategy of the leader. In view of this, we call (5.10) or (5.14) the optimal
decentralized controller for the follower.
5.3.2 Stochastic Mean Field Approximation
This subsection considers the mean field approximation. We first apply the
optimal decentralized controller (5.10) (or (5.14)) to N followers, and denote


































where piNk = Nk/N is the probability of the k-th model in K defined in Section
5.2.1.
























k (T ) = 0,




i∈Nk pi(t). Equivalently, the state-feedback representa-
tion for zNk can be written as
dzNk (t) =
[


















k (T ) = 0,





Note that the Brownian motions for Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are independent




‖ri(t)‖2dt < ∞. Moreover, under Assumption 5.1, N → ∞ im-
plies Nk → ∞ for all k ∈ K. Then from the strong law of large numbers
(SLLN) [122], (1/Nk)
∑
i∈Nk DdWi(t) and (1/Nk)
∑
i∈Nk ri(t)dWi(t) are neg-
ligible as N → ∞ (as mentioned, that implies Nk → ∞), in view of which
zk(t) = limNk→∞ z
N
k (t) and p¯k(t) = limNk→∞ p¯
N
k (t) are well-defined processes.
Therefore, since the mean field xN(t) was replaced by z(t) in (5.9), we may







k=1 pikzk(t), which is a well-defined process.
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zk(0) = x¯, p¯k(T ) = 0.
(5.15)
It should be noted that the actual mean field stochastic process xN is now
captured by the stochastic process z with z(t) =
∑K
k=1 pikzk(t) that depends
on the leader’s open-loop strategy u0 ∈ U0 (note that u0 is adapted to the
filtration Ft). By using the state-feedback representation given in (5.13), we
may obtain the equivalent mean field process
dzk(t) =
[





−GTk (t)φ¯k(t)−QHz(t)− Zk(t)(BR−1L− F )u0(t)
]
dt
zk(0) = x¯, φ¯k(T ) = 0,
(5.16)
where φ¯k(t) = limNk→∞ φ¯
N
k (t). Note that the state-feedback mean field rep-
resentation is also dependent on the leader’s strategy u0 ∈ U0.
Proposition 5.1. Given u0, the stochastic mean field process (5.15) (and
therefore (5.16)) admits a unique solution for all k ∈ K if there exists a
solution of the following RDE
−dZ˜(t)
dt
= AT Z˜(t) + Z˜(t)A+Q3 − Z˜(t)B2Z˜(t), Z˜(T ) = 0, (5.17)
where A, Q3 and B2 are defined in Appendix D.1.
Proof. We can see that p¯k is coupled with zk and the mean field term z(t) =∑K
k=1 pikzk(t). Let z˜ and p˜ be the column vectors associated with zk and p¯k,
k = 1, 2, ..., K, respectively. Then z˜ and p˜ can be written as
dz˜(t) =
[







where BL = 1K ⊗ (BR−1L− F ). Note that z˜(0) = 1K ⊗ x¯ and p˜(T ) = 0nK .
It can be shown that p˜(t) = −Z˜(t)z˜(t) + φ˜(t), where
dφ˜(t) =
[
−(AT − Z˜(t)B2)φ˜(t)− Z˜(t)BLu0
]
dt, φ˜(T ) = 0.
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Then from [121, Theorem 4.1], the existence and uniqueness of a solution
to (5.15) (hence, to (5.16)) follow from the existence of a unique solution of
(5.17). This completes the proof.
The RDE given in (5.17) is not symmetric and positive semi-definite, since
Q3 is neither symmetric nor positive semi-definite. Therefore, in general,
it may not admit a unique solution. We do not provide conditions for the
existence of solution of (5.17), since this issue will be studied together with
the leader’s problem in Section 5.4, where conditions that guarantee existence
and uniqueness of the leader’s optimal solution as well as the solution of
the mean field process are provided in terms of a linear matrix inequality.
Therefore, in the rest of this section, we assume that the solution of the mean
field process in (5.15) (or (5.16)) exists.
The following result shows that (5.15) or (5.16) is indeed the best estimate
of the actual mass behavior when N is arbitrarily large.











where N = supk∈K |piNk − pik|. Moreover, we have
sup
0≤t≤T
E[‖xN(t)− z(t)‖2] = O( 1
N
+ 2N).
Proof. We prove the first statement only, since the second statement can be
shown in a similar way. We use the state-feedback representation given in





















Let ek(t) = z
N
k (t)− zk(t) and e¯k(t) = φ¯Nk (t)− φ¯k(t), where e¯k(T ) = 0 for all


















where we make use of the fact that Brownian motions of the followers are
independent of each other to get the second term in the RHS of the inequality.








k=1 ‖zk(t)‖2dt = O(2N) as N →∞.
Now, for the first term of (5.18), we have








Let Φi(t, s) be the state transition matrix associated with Gi(t), that is,
dΦi(t, s) = Gi(t)Φi(t, s)dt. We have the following facts from linear system
theory:
dΦTi (s, t) = −GTi (t)ΦTi (s, t)dt, dΦTi (t, s) = ΦTi (t, s)GTi (t)dt
ΦTi (0, t)Φ
T
i (s, 0) = (Φi(s, 0)Φi(0, t))
T = ΦTi (s, t),
where 0 ≤ s, t ≤ T . For any k ∈ K, by using Itoˆ formula, we have























Since e¯k(t) has to be an adapted solution with respect to Gkt = ∨i∈NkF it , we
must have ek(t) = E[ek(t)|Gkt ] for all k ∈ K, which implies that e¯k(t) ≡ 0
for all k ∈ K. Due to the fact that supk∈K,0≤t≤T ‖Zk(t)‖ ≤ C and Φk(t, τ)
is continuous in t and τ , there exists a constant C1 > 0 independent of N




‖ek(t)‖2dt ≤ C2 < ∞ for all k ∈ K. Now, due to the fact that


















where the equality follows from the independence of the Brownian motions.
Then we have the desired result. This completes the proof.
5.3.3 Optimality of N followers: The -Nash Equilibrium
This subsection shows that the set of N optimal decentralized strategies for
Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N obtained in Section 5.3.2, constitutes an -Nash equilibrium
for Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , given u0 ∈ U0. The definition of an -Nash equilibrium is
given as follows.
Definition 5.1. The set of strategies, {u¯i ∈ Ui(u0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, constitutes
an -Nash equilibrium with respect to {JNi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, if there exists  ≥ 0
such that JNi (u¯i, u¯−i, u0) ≤ infui∈Ui(u0) JNi (ui, u¯−i, u0)+, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
We now recall the dynamics and the corresponding optimal decentralized











−ATi pi(t) +Q(x∗i (t)−Hz(t))
]
dt+ ri(t)dWi(t)
x∗i (0) = xi(0), pi(T ) = 0
u∗i (t) = R
−1BTpi(t)−R−1Lu0(t),
(5.19)
where pi now depends on the mean field process z(t) =
∑K
k=1 zk(t) determined
in (5.15). As already mentioned in Remark 5.1, the above optimal controller
is decentralized in terms of the local information and the arbitrary strategy of
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the leader. It should be noted that in Definition 5.1, the set of the follower’s
(say i’th) admissible strategies, Ui(u0), was not restricted to be decentralized.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that Assumption 5.1 holds. For any u0 ∈ U0, the set
of N strategies in (5.19) (or (5.14)), i.e., uN∗ = {u∗i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, constitutes










−i, u0) + ,
where  = O( 1√
N
+ N) and N is defined in Proposition 5.2.























where (N) := (E
∫ T
0
‖xN(t)− z(t)‖2dt)1/2 = O( 1√
N
+ N) in view of Propo-
sition 5.2, and the equality follows from Proposition 5.2 and the fact that
x∗i ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn). Note that the above condition implies that for any u0 ∈ U0





On the other hand, since E
∫ T
0








−i, u0) ≤ C < ∞, where C is independent of N .




−i, u0) ≤ JNi (u∗i , u∗−i, u0), we may consider
the controller ui ∈ Ui(u0) that satisfies E
∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt < ∞ for all i. Then
we can show that
JNi (ui, u
∗


















‖xi(t)‖2dt <∞ and E
∫ T
0
‖z(t)‖2dt <∞ for all i, we can show that
J¯i(u
∗
i ) ≤ J¯i(ui)
≤ JNi (ui, u∗−i, u0) + |I1|+ |I2|






















where (N) := (E
∫ T
0
‖xN(t)−z(t)‖2dt)1/2 = O( 1√
N
+N) and the first inequal-
ity follows from the fact that u∗i is the corresponding minimizing solution of
the follower’s local optimal control problem. Then, from (5.20) and (5.21),
we have the desired result. This completes the proof.
We now discuss the relationship between the mean field approach in this
section and the standard approach discussed in Section 5.2.2. For any u0 ∈ U0
and as N → ∞, in view of the FBSDE given in (5.6), we can show that for












since (1/N)HTQx′i(t) = o(1/N) and (1/N)H
TQHxN(t) = o(1/N) in (5.6)
are negligible as N →∞. This implies that the mean field process obtained
by the standard approach is identical to that in (5.15). Moreover, we have




i for all i, where x
∗
i and pi are obtained
in Lemma 5.1. This shows that when N → ∞, the -Nash equilibrium in
Theorem 5.1 is the same as the centralized Nash equilibrium in Section 5.2.2




i for all i, provided that the solution of the corresponding FBSDE in
(5.6) exists for all N .
5.4 Leader’s Problem
In this section, we solve the leader’s problem to obtain an approximated
Stackelberg equilibrium.
5.4.1 Leader’s Local Optimal Control Problem
Due to the nature of the Stackelberg game under consideration, the leader’s






















zk(0) = x¯, p¯k(T ) = 0, k = 1, 2, ..., K,
(5.24)
where E[x0(0)] = x¯0 and E[‖x0(0)‖2] < ∞. In (5.22), the mean field term
is replaced with the approximated mean field behavior of the followers,
z(t) =
∑K
k=1 pikzk(t), which is dependent on the leader’s arbitrary strategy
u0 ∈ U0 as can be seen from (5.24). Note that the leader’s local optimal
control problem has 2K additional constraints induced by the mean field ap-
proximation in Section 5.3, which is independent of N . Hence, as expected,
the optimization problem (5.22) is much more tractable than the original
optimal control problem faced by P0 in (5.7), although the optimal control
problem in (5.22) is still not standard, since it has additional constraints that
have initial and boundary conditions.
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Note that constraints in (5.24) can be replaced by the state-feedback rep-
resentation form, which is given below for convenience:
dzk(t) =
[





−GTk (t)φ¯k(t)−QHz(t)− Zk(t)(BR−1L− F )u0(t)
]
dt
zk(0) = x¯, φ¯k(T ) = 0, k = 1, 2, ..., K.
(5.25)
The following lemma solves the nonstandard optimal control problem in
(5.22); the proof is given in Appendix D.3.
Lemma 5.2. For the local optimal control problem for P0 in (5.22), there
exists a unique optimal controller u∗0 ∈ L2F(0, T,Rq). Moreover, (x∗0, u∗0) ∈













































−1BT p¯k(t)− (BR−1L− F )R−10 BT0 p0(t)










x∗0(0) = x0(0), ξk(0) = 0, zk(0) = x¯
p0(T ) = 0, λk(T ) = 0, p¯k(T ) = 0, k = 1, 2, ..., K.
(5.27)
Remark 5.2. In (5.27), ξk and λk, k = 1, 2, ..., K, are additional Ft adapted
forward-backward processes (or adjoint processes) generated by additional
constraints zk and p¯k, k = 1, 2, ..., K.
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Bearing in mind that in the follower’s problem, the corresponding optimal
solution exists if and only if the mean field limit z and the leader’s optimal
control u∗0 exist. In view of Lemma 5.2, we need to identify conditions for



























where X (0) = (xT0 (0),0TnK ,1TK ⊗ x¯T )T and Y(T ) = 02nK+n. Note that X and
Y are (2nK+n)-dimensional vector-valued forward and backward processes,
respectively. Define













 Q0 0n×nK Q1Q2 −QT3 QK
0nK×n 0nK×nK Q3




where the corresponding block matrices are defined in Appendix D.1. We
can show that
dX (t) = [A1X + B1Y ]dt+D1dW0(t)
dY(t) = [A2X + B2Y ]dt+D2dW0(t).
It can be shown that X and Y satisfy the following affine transformation
Y(t) = −Λ(t)X (t) + V(t), (5.28)
where Λ(t) is a solution to the following RDE
−dΛ(t)
dt
= Λ(t)A1 − B2Λ(t) +A2 − Λ(t)B1Λ(t), Λ(T ) = 0, (5.29)
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and V(t) satisfies V(T ) = 0 and
dV(t) = [B2 + Λ(t)B1]V(t)dt+ [D2 + Λ(t)D1]dW0(t).
Note that V is decoupled from X . It is easy to see that the RDE in (5.29)
is nonsymmetric; hence in general, it may not admit a solution [121, 123].
Since X and Y satisfy the affine transformation (5.28), X and Y admit a
unique solution if the nonsymmetric RDE in (5.29) has a unique solution for
all t ∈ [0, T ] [121, Theorem 4.1] (or see [92]). We now identify conditions for
the existence of a unique solution of (5.29).
The first result is given below, which follows from direct computation, or
see [121, Theorem 4.3].
















Then the RDE in (5.29) admits a unique solution Λ(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] with


















where Π(t) and Ψ(t) are defined in Lemma D.1 in Appendix D.2.
Note that the condition in (5.30) requires computation of the matrix expo-
nential function ((4nK+2n)× (4nK+2n)-dimensional) and its determinant
for all t; therefore, it is sometimes hard to check. The following result pro-
vides an easy-to-check condition for existence and uniqueness of the solution




W1A1 −W2A2 −W1B1 +AT1W2 +W2B2 −AT2W2
0 −BT1 W2 + BT2 W2
)
,
where W1 = W
T
1 > 0 and W2 = W
T
2 . Suppose Υ + Υ
T < 0. Then, the RDE
in (5.29) admits a unique solution Λ(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] with Λ(T ) = 0.
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Proof. The local existence and uniqueness theorem of differential equations
implies that there exists a solution to the differential equation in Lemma D.1
in Appendix D.2 for t sufficiently close to T , that is, Ψ(t) is invertible for t
sufficiently close to T . Therefore, it suffices to show that if Υ+ΥT < 0 holds
with W1 = W
T
1 > 0 and W2 = W
T
2 , Ψ(t) is invertible for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For any z ∈ R2nK+n and z 6= 0, define
V (t, z) = zT (ΨT (t)W1Ψ(t) + Ψ
T (t)W2Π(t)
+ ΠT (t)W2Ψ(t) + Π
T (t)W2Π(t))z.
Clearly, the matrix-valued function in V (t, z) is symmetric, that is, V (t, z) =
V T (t, z), and in view of the terminal condition, we have V (T, z) = zTW1z >


















= 2zTΨTW1(A1Ψ− B1Π)z + 2zT (ΨTAT1 − ΠTBT1 )W2Πz
+ 2zTΨTW2(−A2Ψ + B2Π)z + 2zT (−ΨTAT2 + ΠTBT2 )W2Πz
= z¯T (Υ + ΥT )z¯ < 0.
This implies that V (t, z) is monotonically decreasing from (−∞, T ], and since
V (T, z) = zTW1z > 0, V (t, z) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This also implies that
the matrix-valued function in V (t, z) is positive definite for all t ∈ [0, T ];
therefore, Ψ(t) is invertible for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This completes the proof.
Remark 5.3. Let L(W1,W2) = diag{Υ + ΥT ,−W1}, and C = {W1 = W T1 >
0,W2 = W
T
2 : L(W1,W2) < 0}. We can easily check that L(W1,W2) < 0 is a
linear matrix inequality (LMI), and C is convex. Therefore, the condition in
Proposition 5.4 can be checked by using standard semidefinite programming
by identifying feasibility of the corresponding LMI [115].
We write Λ(t) in the partition form:
Λ(t) =




where Λ11 is n× n, and Λ22 and Λ33 are nK × nK matrices. Then it is easy
to check that the existence of a solution Λ(t) (especially Λ33) implies the
existence of a solution of the RDE in (5.17), which guarantees the existence
of a solution of the mean field process in Proposition 5.1.
Before concluding this subsection, we should note that under the optimal
decentralized controller of the leader in (5.26), the approximated mean field
process, zk and z(t) =
∑K
k=1 pikzk(t), can be obtained by simply taking the
conditional expectation with respect to F0t , i.e., zk(t) = E[zNk (t)|F0t ], which
is indeed equivalent to applying the SLLN in Section 5.3.2. This implies
that under the optimal strategy of the leader, the approximated mean field
is a stochastic process adapted to the leader’s local information, which is
similar to the major and minor problem considered in [84] and [85], but
their stochastic mean field processes are indirectly affected by the major’s
strategy, since the control input of the major player does not appear in the
corresponding mean field process.
5.4.2 Optimality of the Leader: The (1, 2)-Stackelberg
Equilibrium
This subsection shows that if the leader announces u∗0 obtained in Section
5.4.1 to the N followers, the set of the optimal decentralized strategies for the
leader and the followers constitutes an approximated Stackelberg equilibrium.
The definition of an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium is as follows, which can be
viewed as a modified version of the definition of an -Stackelberg equilibrium
given in [61].
Definition 5.2. Let u¯N(u¯0) = {u¯1(u¯0), ..., u¯N(u¯0), u¯i ∈ Ui(u¯0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
and u¯0 ∈ U0. Then u¯ = {u¯0, u¯N(u¯0)} is an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium
with respect to {JNi , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} if the following two properties hold:
(i) u¯N(u¯0) constitutes an 1-Nash equilibrium under u¯0.






Since, in Definition 5.2, the followers are -Nash followers, the above defi-
nition can also be viewed as an approximated version of the definition of the
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Stackelberg equilibrium given in [89, 118].





























where the corresponding FBSDEs are given in Lemma 5.2. Let
u∗ = {u∗0, uN∗(u∗0)}, uN∗(u∗0) = {u∗1(u∗0), ..., u∗N(u∗0)}, (5.32)
where u∗0 is determined from (5.31) and u
N∗(u∗0) is the set of the followers’
optimal decentralized strategies in Theorem 5.1 when u0 is replaced by u
∗
0.
Note that uN∗(u∗0) is the set of followers’ optimal decentralized strategies
when the leader announces his optimal decentralized strategy u∗0 to the N
followers.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that Assumption 5.1 holds and the RDE in (5.29)
has a unique solution Λ(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] with Λ(T ) = 0. Then u∗ given
in (5.32) constitutes an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium, where 1 = 2 =
O( 1√
N
+ N) and N is defined in Proposition 5.2.
Proof. We first note that under u∗0, u
N∗(u∗0) constitutes an 1-Nash equilib-
rium where 1 = O(
1√
N
+ N) in view of Theorem 5.1. Therefore, it suffices
to show that the optimal decentralized strategy of the leader (5.31) with
uN∗(u∗0) satisfies the second property in Definition 5.2. Let z−0 be the mean
field process when the leader takes an arbitrary strategy u0 ∈ U0. Let xN−0 be
the actual mass behavior when the followers are under uN∗(u0). Note that
z−0 and xN−0 are equivalent to those in Proposition 5.2, since Proposition 5.2
holds for any arbitrary strategy of the leader.


















0) is the minimum cost of the leader’s local optimal control prob-
lem in Lemma 5.2. Note that J¯0(u
∗
0) is related to the mean field process z(t)
given in Lemma 5.2.




∞ and E ∫ T
0
‖x∗i (t)‖2dt <∞ for all i; hence there exists a constant C, inde-
pendent of N , such that JN0 (u
∗
0, u
N∗(u∗0)) ≤ C < ∞. Since for any u0 ∈ U0,
we have infu0∈U0 J
N
0 (u0, u
N∗(u0)) ≤ JN0 (u∗0, uN∗(u∗0)), it suffices to consider






















where the first inequality follows from the fact that u∗0 is the corresponding
optimal solution of the leader’s local optimal control problem from Lemma








where 2 = O(
1√
N
+ N). This completes the proof.
In Section 5.3.3 below Theorem 5.1, we had shown that for any u0 ∈ U0
and when N → ∞, the -Nash equilibrium in Theorem 5.1 is equivalent to
the centralized Nash equilibrium obtained in Section 5.2.2 (that is the set
of the centralized strategies u′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , in (5.5)), provided that the
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solution of the FBSDE in (5.6) exists for all N . This implies that when N →
∞, the (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium becomes identical to the centralized
Stackelberg equilibrium that is a solution of the leader’s optimization problem
in (5.7), since the optimization problems for the leader in (5.7) and (5.22)




i(t) in (5.7) converges to the mean
field process z(t) in (5.15) as N → ∞). Therefore, in view of Theorems
5.1 and 5.2, the (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium is approximated centralized
Stackelberg equilibrium with an approximation factor O( 1√
N
+ N). As a
consequence, when there is a large number of followers, there is no need for
the followers to share the information among themselves, which is of course
less restrictive than the original Stackelberg game discussed in Section 5.2.2.
5.4.3 Optimality of Leader’s Policy with State-feedback
Policies by the Followers
We now consider the situation when the followers have, instead, access to
state feedback information, in which case the leader is faced with an optimal
control problem with additional constraints given in (5.25), instead of (5.24).
For notational simplicity, we assume that F = 0, which implies that coupling
effect between the leader and the followers appear in their cost functions only.
Similar to Lemma 5.2, we can then show that (x∗0, u
∗
0) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rn+p) is




















































































x∗0(0) = x0(0), ξ¯k(0) = 0, zk(0) = x¯
p0(T ) = 0, λ¯k(T ) = 0, φ¯k(T ) = 0, k = 1, 2, ..., K.
(5.36)
It is easy to show that λk(t) = Zk(t)ξ¯k(t) + λ¯k(t) for all k ∈ K. By
substituting this transformation into ξ¯k, we have ξ¯k ≡ ξk, which implies that
u∗0 in (5.35) is equivalent to the optimal strategy of the leader when the
followers are under the open-loop representation given in (5.31). Moreover,
since the RDE Zk has a unique solution as discussed in Section 5.3.1, the
existence condition of the solution of the FBSDEs in (5.36) is the same as
the one in Proposition 5.4. Therefore, when the leader announces (5.35)
instead of (5.31) to the N followers, the set of the optimal decentralized
strategies for the leader and the followers, that is, u∗0 in (5.35) and the set
of u∗i s in (5.14) with u
∗
0, still constitute an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium,




We should mention that in standard linear-quadratic Stackelberg stochas-
tic differential games, the information of the follower does not play an impor-
tant role. That is, as discussed in [61], regardless of whether the follower has
open-loop or closed-loop perfect state information, the Stackelberg strategy
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Figure 5.1: Λ(t) over time with Λ(10) = 0.
of the leader is the same, since different information structures do not lead to
different optimization problems for the leader. The results in this subsection
also confirm the same phenomenon in mean field Stackelberg games.
5.5 Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples. We first consider the case of uni-
form followers (K = 1), and then discuss the heterogeneous case with K = 4.
5.5.1 The Case of Uniform Followers
Consider the SDE for P0 and Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
dx0(t) = [2x0(t) + u0(t)]dt+ dW0(t)
dxi(t) = [1.3xi(t) + 2ui(t)]dt+ dWi(t),








[(xi(t)− 0.7xN(t))2 + 2u20(t) + ui(t)u0(t)]dt,
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Figure 5.2: (N) with respect to N .




















Figure 5.3: Λ(t) over time with Λ(7) = 0 for the heterogeneous case.
where x0(0) and xi(0) are distributed according to N (0, 1). It can be checked
that with above parameters, the LMI condition in Proposition 5.4 holds,
where Λ(t) ∈ R3×3 is depicted in Fig 5.1. Note that Λ(t) is neither sym-




z(t)‖2dt)1/2. Note that for the case of uniform followers, we have (N) =
O(1/
√
N). As can be seen, (N) converges as N →∞.
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Figure 5.4: (N) with respect to N for the heterogeneous case.
5.5.2 The Heterogeneous Case with K = 4
We now consider the same model as in Section 5.5.1, except that T = 7 and
there are K = 4 distinct models of the followers with
A(θi) ∈ {1.3, 1.7, 1.9, − 3.8}, pi =
(
2/4 1/8 1/8 1/4
)
.
The nonsymmetric RDE Λ is a 9 × 9 matrix, whose diagonal terms are
depicted in Figure 5.3. The plot of (N) is shown in Fig. 5.4. It also
converges as N →∞.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have considered mean field Stackelberg differential games,
where there is one leader and a large number, say N , of heterogeneous follow-
ers with K distinct types. We have used the stochastic mean field approxi-
mation to characterize the best estimate of the actual mean field process of
the followers. We have shown that with the approximated mean field process
and each fixed strategy of the leader, the optimal decentralized controllers
of the followers, which are solutions of the followers’ local control problems,
constitute an -Nash equilibrium, where  converges to zero as N →∞. For
the leader’s problem, we have identified an LMI condition under which the
leader’s local optimal control problem admits a unique optimal decentralized
120
controller. We have shown that the optimal decentralized controllers for the
leader and the followers constitute an (1, 2)-Stackelberg equilibrium, where






In this thesis, we studied various problems of control and estimation with
limited information within a game-theoretic approach, to address communi-
cation constraints and structural constraints in modern control systems.
In the first part of the thesis, that is Chapters 2 and 3, we considered con-
trol and estimation problems over unreliable communication channels within
the stochastic zero-sum dynamic game framework.
In Chapter 2, we obtained the stochastic minimax state estimator (SMSE)
for the case when the estimator receives the sensor measurement intermit-
tently governed by the Bernoulli process. We analyzed the asymptotic be-
havior of the estimation error in terms of a generalized stochastic Riccati
equation (GSRE). In particular, we identified conditions on the rate of in-
termittent observations and the disturbance attenuation parameter, above
which 1) the expected value of the GSRE is bounded from below and above
by the deterministic quantities, and 2) the sequence of the norm generated
by the GSRE converges weakly to a unique stationary distribution. Finally,
we identified explicit lower and upper bounds for the expected value of the
GSRE, and showed their convergence.
In Chapter 3, we considered the minimax control problem for TCP- and
UDP-like unreliable communication channels that are modeled by two in-
dependent Bernoulli processes. We obtained the output feedback minimax
controllers in both cases. We also characterized the set of threshold-type
existence conditions for both problems in terms of the communication chan-
nel loss rates and the disturbance attenuation parameter, above which the
minimax controller is able to achieve the desired control performance and
stability. Finally, we identified a trade-off between disturbance attenuation
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and fundamental communication limitations.
In the second part of the thesis, that is Chapters 4 and 5, we considered
two different large-scale optimization problems via mean field game theory
to address structural constraints in the large-scale system.
In Chapter 4, risk-sensitive and robust mean field games were considered.
We obtained an -Nash equilibrium for each corresponding problem, where
the individual Nash strategies are decentralized as a function of local state
information, and  can be picked arbitrarily small when the number of agents
is arbitrarily large. We showed that the two -Nash equilibria are partially
equivalent in the sense that the individual Nash strategies for both problems
share the same control law, but are determined by the different mean field
system that provides the best estimation of the actual mean field behavior.
Finally, we showed that both -Nash equilibria feature robustness in terms
of the disturbance attenuation parameter.
The last chapter, Chapter 5, considered mean field Stackelberg differential
games. We identified the approximated stochastic mean field behavior of the
followers governed by the leader’s strategy. With the approximated stochastic
mean field behavior, we obtained a decentralized -Nash equilibrium for the
followers. Moreover, the decentralized (1, 2)-Stackelberg strategy of the
leader was obtained by solving the leader’s local nonstandard optimal control
problem. We identified an existence condition for the (1, 2)-Stackelberg
strategy in terms of a linear matrix inequality. Finally, as a consequence of
decentralization, we showed that 1 and 2 can be picked arbitrarily small
when the number of followers is arbitrarily large.
6.2 Directions for Future Work
There are several interesting open problems on networked control systems
and mean field games as natural outgrowths of the problems treated in this
thesis. We identify some of these below.
Networked Control Systems
Chapter 2 studied the asymptotic behavior of the GSRE in the expectation
sense and the weak convergence sense. The asymptotic behavior of the GSRE
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can also be analyzed in the probabilistic sense, as was done for the Kalman
filtering problem in [50, 51]. In this case, one needs to show boundedness
of P(Σk ≤ M), where M ≥ 0. This will provide a different perspective to
the asymptotic behavior of the GSRE, which cannot be interpreted in the
expectation sense.
In Chapters 2 and 3, the corresponding unreliable communication chan-
nel was taken to be temporally uncorrelated in terms of an i.i.d. Bernoulli
process. This can be extended to the temporally correlated one with the
Gilbert-Elliot channel model, in which case the communication channel can
be regarded as a two-state irreducible and stationary Markov chain [27, 53].
The certainty equivalence principle for the TCP-case still holds. In order to
obtain the corresponding minimax controller, we need to use dynamic pro-
gramming. This, however, requires more involved steps than Section 3.3,
since depending on the acknowledged information, two different zero-sum
games appear at each time k to derive a minimax controller.
The minimax control problem for the TCP-case in Chapter 3 considers
the case of perfect acknowledgments of control packet losses. In real-world
systems, however, these acknowledgments may not be transmitted reliably
due to the unreliable nature of the reverse channel. This unreliability can
be modeled within a probabilistic framework, in which the controller receives
acknowledgments perfectly with probability ν ∈ [0, 1]. Note that when ν = 0,
the problem is equivalent to the UDP-case as studied in Chapter 3. This
would be an interesting and challenging direction of research to pursue.
Finally, it would be interesting to study minimax control and estimation
problems for nonlinear dynamical systems over unreliable communication
channels, which is a problem that has been studied in [124] within the LQG
framework.
Mean Field Games
The results obtained in Chapter 4 have shown how risk-sensitive optimal
control, stochastic zero-sum differential game, and risk-neutral LQG control
are related within the framework of mean field games. A further interesting
problem would be to establish such relationships for systems described by
general nonlinear stochastic differential equations under general cost func-
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tions. Moreover, it would also be interesting to study risk-sensitive and
robust mean field games with major and minor players, as was done for the
risk-neutral case in [84, 85, 86].
The analysis developed in Chapter 5 considers the one leader case. This
can be extended to the problem of multiple leaders and followers. In this
extension, the leaders will also play a Nash game among themselves; there-
fore, the problem can be viewed as a combination of Stackelberg and Nash
games as mentioned in [118]. In this case, due to the multiple influence of the
leaders on the mean field behavior of the followers, the leaders’ local optimal
control problems will be more involved than that in Chapter 5.
Another possible extension of the results of Chapter 5 would be to the case
when the mean field coupling term is also included in the individual stochastic
differential equations, which will introduce a more general coupling scenario
between the followers and the leader.
One can also consider mean field Stackelberg dynamic games with discrete-
time system dynamics for the leader and the followers. This problem can also
be viewed as an extension of [125], where a similar problem is studied with
state feedback information and a simplified cost function.
Finally, studying mean field games for singularly perturbed systems (SPSs)
is an important area of research in control, since SPSs are able to capture gen-
eral dynamic behavior by using two different time scales, “fast” and “slow,”
where the fast term corresponds to dynamics with small time constants. A
major challenge in studying this problem is to construct a separation of time
scales to design a local optimal controller that provides a best estimate mean
field behavior, and to construct a corresponding mean field system.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Convergence of the MGRE
This section provides proofs of convergence of (2.11) and the MGRE in (2.12).
We rewrite the modified generalized Riccati equation (MGRE) in (2.12):
Xk+1 = (1− β)h1(γ,Xk) + βh2(γ,Xk) =: h(γ, β,Xk), (A.1)
where X0 = Q
−1
0 , and h1(γ,X) and h2(γ, β,X) are functions that are defined
by
h1(γ,X) := A(X
−1 − γ−2Q)−1AT +DDT (A.2a)
h2(γ,X) := A(X
−1 − γ−2Q+ CTV −1C)−1AT +DDT . (A.2b)
In terms of h1 and h2, the modified generalized algebraic Riccati equation
(MGARE) can be rewritten as
X = (1− β)h1(γ,X) + βh2(γ,X) =: h(γ, β,X). (A.3)
The following condition is needed:
ρ(XQ) < γ2. (A.4)
Before stating our main result on the convergence of (A.1), we observe
that the MGARE in (A.3) is a convex combination of two different AREs.
For the first part, consider the problem of maximizing
H1γ(p
′
0:N−1) = |z′N |2Q−10 +
N−1∑
k=0
|z′k|2Q − γ2|p′k|2, (A.5)
126




k. The second part of (A.3) is related to the





0:N−1) = |z′′N |2Q−10 +
N−1∑
k=0
|z′′k |2Q + |q′′k |2 − γ2|p′′k|2, (A.6)
and state dynamics z′′k+1 = Az
′′
k + C





minimizer and p′′0:N−1 is the maximizer. Then we can solve (A.5) and (A.6)
by dynamic programming (under the strict concavity assumption, see [61]),
the corresponding Riccati equations are, respectively, given by














where we used the time-reverse notation in [126] and then replaced the triple
(A,D,G) with the ordered triple (AT , GT , DT ) where Q = GTG.
It was shown in [106] that if (A.7) and (A.8) have fixed points, i.e., X ′ =
h1(γ,X
′) and X ′′ = h2(γ,X ′′), satisfying (A.4) where X ′, X ′′ ∈ Sn>0, then
they converge to X ′ and X ′′, respectively. This follows from monotonicity
and continuity of (A.7) and (A.8) with the controllability and observability
assumptions [126, 106].
We now show convergence of (A.1).
Lemma A.1. Suppose that X0 ≤ DDT , β ∈ [0, 1], and γ > 0 is fixed.
Suppose that MGRE satisfies (A.4) for all k. If X¯ ∈ Sn>0 is a fixed point of
(A.3) that satisfies (A.4), then as k →∞, {Xk} → X+ where X+ is a fixed
point of (A.3) satisfying (A.4).
Proof. First note that when X0 = 0, {Xk} is a monotone sequence when
ρ(XkQ) < γ
2. To see this, at k = 0, we have X0 ≤ h(γ, β,X0) = X1. Now,
assume that we have Xk−1 ≤ Xk. Then
Xk = h(γ, β,Xk−1)
= (1− β)h1(γ,Xk−1) + βh2(γ,Xk−1)
≤ (1− β)h1(γ,Xk) + βh2(γ,Xk)
= h(γ, β,Xk) = Xk+1,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A.3(viii). Therefore, if there exists
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M > 0 such that M ≥ Xk for all k satisfying (A.4), then {Xk} converges to
X+, and by continuity, it is a fixed point of the MGARE satisfying (A.4).
We next show that if there is a fixed point X¯ ∈ Sn>0 of the MGARE
satisfying (A.4), then X¯ ≥ Xk for all k. Clearly, at k = 0, we must have
X¯ ≥ X0. Now, suppose we have X¯ −Xk ≥ 0. Consider
X¯ −Xk+1
= (1− β)(A((X¯−1 − γ−2Q)−1 − (X−1k − γ−2Q)−1)AT )
+ β
(
A((X¯−1 − γ−2Q+ CTV −1C)−1 − (X−1k − γ−2Q+ CTV −1C)−1)AT
)
.
Then it is easy to see that X¯ ≥ Xk+1. Therefore, X¯ ≥ Xk for all k.
Finally, if X0 = 0 and there is a fixed point X¯ satisfying (A.4), then due
to the monotonicity of the MGRE, {Xk} converges to X+ as k →∞, where
by continuity X+ is a fixed point of (A.3) satisfying (A.4). The existence of
the fixed point of the MGARE is shown in the next lemma. Note that since
the monotonicity condition holds with X0 ≤ DDT , we have convergence for
all initial conditions X0 ≤ DDT . This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now show existence of the fixed point of the MGARE (A.3) that sat-
isfies (A.4).
Lemma A.2. There is a finite γ > 0 and a fixed point of the MGARE in
Sn≥0 that satisfies (A.4) for all β ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. First assume that A is stable, and observe that (A.2a) and (A.2b) are
standard AREs; hence under the controllability and observability assump-
tion, each of them has a unique fixed point in Sn≥0 that satisfies (A.4) for
some γ1 and γ2, respectively, due to [106]. Choose γ := max{γ1, γ2} and let
X1 and X2 be fixed points of (A.2a) and (A.2b), respectively. Clearly, we
have X2 ≤ X1. Now, consider the function of the convex combination of
(A.2a) and (A.2b), namely (A.3). When β = 0, its fixed point is X1, and X2
when β = 1. Let E = {X : X2 ≤ X ≤ X1}. Then (A.3) can be restricted to
a continuous mapping of E into itself due to Lemma A.3(i). Moreover, E is
convex, compact and nonempty subset of Sn≥0. Then existence follows from
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [61].
Now, we consider the case when A is unstable, in which case (A.2a) does
not have a fixed point for all γ, but (A.2b) does for some γ, which satisfies
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(A.4) [106]. Define
β′(γ) := inf{β ∈ (0, 1) : (A.3) has a fixed point that satisfies (A.4)}.
Then from Lemma A.3(i), for any β > β′(γ), (A.3) can be restricted to a
continuous mapping of E ′ into itself where E ′ = {X : X2 ≤ X ≤ X3} with
X3 = h(γ, β,X3). Then existence follows again from Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2.2. Note that for any β > (1−1/ρ2(A)), we have√1− βρ(A) <
1. Let A˜ :=
√
1− βA and D˜ := √1− βD. By Lemma A.2, there exist γ and
Σ˘+ satisfying Σ˘+ = h1(γ, Σ˘
+), and the condition ρ(Σ˘+Q) < γ2 with A˜ and
D˜. Then convergence of {Σ˘k} is equivalent to convergence of (A.7). This
completes the proof.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose A is stable. Then, for all β ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
solution to (2.14) that satisfies ρ(Σ¯Q) < γ2 due to Lemma A.2. Consequently,
we have convergence due to Lemma A.1. Now, we consider the case when
A is unstable. First observe that Γ¯(0) is empty. From the definitions, there
exists a matrix Σ¯ that solves (2.14) and satisfies ρ(Σ¯Q) < γ2. This existence
is guaranteed due to Lemma A.2. Then, convergence follows from Lemma
A.1. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2.4. (i) The result follows from Lemma A.3(i) in Appendix
A.2 since for a given γ, we have ρ(Σ¯(γ, β1)Q) ≤ ρ(Σ¯(γ, β2)Q) ≤ γ2,
which leads to Γ¯(β2) ⊆ Γ¯(β1). The second statement can be shown in
a similar manner.
(ii) The first statement follows from Lemma A.3(ii) because ρ(Σ¯(γ1, β)Q) ≤
ρ(Σ¯(γ2, β)Q) ≤ γ22 ≤ γ21 shows that Λ¯(γ2) ⊆ Λ¯(γ1). For the second
statement, by Lemma A.3(vi), (2.14) converges to (A.10) as γ →∞.
A.2 Properties of the MGARE
The following lemma provides some useful properties of the MGARE in (A.3).
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Lemma A.3. Suppose that for a fixed γ > 0, X ∈ Sn>0 satisfies (A.4), and
Q = GTG ∈ Sn≥0. Then the following are true:
(i) If β2 ≥ β1, then h(γ, β1, X) ≥ h(γ, β2, X).
(ii) If γ2 ≥ γ1, then h(γ1, β,X) ≥ h(γ2, β,X).
(iii) Suppose ρ ∈ [0, 1] and X := ρX1 +(1−ρ)X2 where X1, X2 ∈ Sn>0. Then
h1(γ,X) ≤ ρh1(γ,X1) + (1− ρ)h1(γ,X2).
(iv) h2(γ,X) = minU maxL ς
′(X,U, L) = maxL minU ς ′(X,U, L), where
ς ′(X,U, L) = (A+ LG+ UV −1/2C)X(A+ LG+ UV −1/2C)T (A.9)
− γ2LLT + UUT .
(v) We have the following inequalities:
(1− β)AXAT +DDT ≤ (1− β)h1(γ,X) ≤ h(γ, β,X).
(vi) As γ →∞, (A.3) can be written as
h(γ, β,X) = AXAT +DDT − βAXCT (CXCT + V )−1CXAT .
(A.10)
(vii) As γ →∞, h1(γ,X) = (1− β)(AXAT +DDT ).
(viii) For any X1 ≤ X2 satisfying (A.4), we have h1(γ,X1) ≤ h1(γ,X2),
h2(γ,X1) ≤ h2(γ,X2), and h(γ,X1) ≤ h(γ,X2).
Proof. (i) Consider (β2 − β1)h1(γ,X)− (β2 − β1)h2(γ,X). Since V ∈ Sn>0
and C cannot be a zero matrix, under (A.4), h1(γ,X) > h2(γ,X); thus,
completing the proof.
(ii) The result follows by inspection.
(iii) Define
ς(X,K) := (A+KG)X(A+KG)T +DDT − γ2KKT . (A.11)
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By applying the matrix inversion lemma, we have
h1(γ,X) = AXA




where the last equality is achieved by KX = AXG
T (γ2I − GXGT )−1,
since the above optimization problem is quadratic and concave in K.
Now, we have
h1(γ,X) = ς(X,KX)
= ρς(X1, KX) + (1− ρ)ς(X2, KX)
≤ ρς(X1, KX1) + (1− ρ)ς(X2, KX2)
= ρh1(γ,X1) + (1− ρ)h1(γ,X2).
(iv) Let us consider the dual problem, i.e., the quadruple (A, V −1/2C,D,G)
is replaced with the ordered quadruple (AT , BT , GT , DT ). Then by
using the matrix inversion lemma,
h′2(γ,X) = A













P 1h′2 = (I +B
T (I +XD(γ2I −DTXD)−1DT )XB)−1
×BT (I +XD(γ2I −DTXD)−1DT )XA
P 2h′2 = (γ
2I −DT (I −XB(I +BTXB)−1BT )XD)−1
×DT (I −XB(I +BTXB)−1BT )XA.









ς ′′(X,U ′, L′),
131
where
ς ′′(X,U ′, L′)
= (A+DL′ +BU ′)TX(A+DL′ +BU ′)− γ2L′,TL′ + U ′,TU ′,
where the corresponding minimizer and maximizer can be written as






Then the result follows by replacing the quadruple (A,B,G,D) with
the ordered quadruple (AT , CTV −1/2, DT , GT ), in which case the min-
imizer is UX = U
′,T
X and the maximizer is LX = L
′,T
X with the ordered
quadruple (AT , CTV −1/2, DT , GT ).
(v) Inequalities follow by inspection.
(vi) It can be shown by using the matrix inversion lemma.
(vii) It can be shown by using the matrix inversion lemma.
(viii) Notice that (A.11) and (A.9) are affine in X. Consider
h1(γ,X1) = ς(X1, KX1) ≤ ς(X2, KX1) ≤ ς(X2, KX2) = h1(γ,X2),
and
h2(γ,X1) = ς
′(X1, UX1 , LX1)
≤ ς ′(X1, UX2 , LX1)
≤ ς ′(X2, UX2 , LX1) ≤ ς ′(X2, UX2 , LX2) = h2(γ,X2).
Hence, the result follows. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now show that there is a class of γ and β such that h(γ, β,X) is concave
in X. Note that when β = 0, h(γ, β,X) cannot be concave due to Lemma
A.3(iii). We have the following relation:
h(γ, β,X) = (1− β)h1(γ,X) + βh2(γ,X)
= (1− β)ς(X,KX) + βς ′(X,UX , LX),
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where ς(X,K) and ς ′(X,U, L) are defined in (A.11) and (A.9), respectively,
and KX , LX , and UX are given in the proof of Lemma A.3(iii) and (iv).
Define
Υ(X,K,U, L) := (1− β)ς(X,K) + βς ′(X,U, L).
Note that by definition, Υ(X,K,U, L) is affine in X. We then have










which follows because the zero-sum game is strictly convex in U and strictly
concave in L and K, and ς(X,K) (resp. ς ′(X,U, L)) is independent of U and
L (resp. K).
Let X = ρX1 + (1− ρ)X2 where ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider
h(γ, β,X) = Υ(X,KX , UX)
= ρΥ(X1, KX , UX , LX) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX , UX , LX)
≥ ρΥ(X1, K, UX , L) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, K, UX , L), ∀K,L,
where the inequality follows from the definition of the saddle point [61]. Let
K = KX1 and L = LX1 . Clearly, we have
h(γ, β,X) ≥ ρΥ(X1, KX1 , UX , LX1) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX1 , UX , LX1)
≥ ρΥ(X1, KX1 , UX1 , LX1) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX1 , UX2 , LX1),
since UX1 and UX2 are the corresponding minimizers. On the other hand, we
also have the following relation due to the definition of the saddle point:
h(γ, β,X) ≤ ρΥ(X1, KX , UX1 , LX) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX , UX1 , LX)
≤ ρΥ(X1, KX1 , UX1 , LX1) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX2 , UX1 , LX2).
Note that by Lemma A.3(iii) and (iv),
Υ(X2, KX1 , UX2 , LX1) ≤ Υ(X2, KX2 , UX2 , LX2),
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and
Υ(X2, KX2 , UX1 , LX2) ≥ Υ(X2, KX2 , UX2 , LX2).
Hence, it can be easily seen that we can choose γ and β such that for all
ρ ∈ [0, 1],
h(γ, β,X) ≥ ρΥ(X1, KX1 , UX1 , LX1) + (1− ρ)Υ(X2, KX2 , UX2 , LX2) (A.12)
= ρh(γ, β,X1) + (1− ρ)h(γ, β,X2).
Then we have the desired result. The following lemma states the above
discussion.
Lemma A.4. Suppose that X = ρX1 + (1 − ρ)X2 > 0 where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and
X satisfies (A.4). Then h(γ, β,X) is concave in X if one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) γ is sufficiently large.
(ii) CTV −1C − γ−2Q ≥ 0 and β = 1.
(iii) Equation (A.12) holds for some γ and β. 
Note that part (i) is the case considered in [22]. Part (ii) can be shown in
a similar way to that in Lemma A.3(iii).
A.3 Kalman Filtering with Intermittent Observations
In this appendix, we recall the results on Kalman filtering with intermittent
observations in [22, 46, 45].
Suppose that x0 is a Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covari-
ance matrix Q−10 , and {wk} and {vk} are i.i.d. Gaussian processes with zero
mean and covariance matrices DDT and V , respectively. Moreover, suppose
that (x0, {wk}, {vk}) are independent of each other. Suppose P(βk = 1) =
β = λ. Then under the full information structure in (2.2), the Kalman filter
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and the associated stochastic Riccati equation (SRE) can be written as [22]
xˆk+1 = Axˆk + βkAPkC
T (CPkC
T + V )−1(yk − Cxˆk) (A.13)
Pk+1 = APkA
T +DDT − βkAPkCT (CPkCT + V )−1CPkAT (A.14)
= A(P−1k + βkC
TV −1C)−1AT +DDT , P0 = Q−10 , (A.15)
where Pk := E{(xk − xˆk)(xk − xˆk)T |Ik} is an error covariance matrix and
(A.15) is obtained by applying the matrix inversion lemma to (A.14). The
error covariance matrix (A.14) (or (A.15)) was studied extensively in the
literature. We state below the relevant result obtained by [22, 44, 46, 45].
Result A.1 (Boundedness of E{Pk}). (i) There exists a critical value λc ∈
[0, 1) such that
∀P0, k, E{Pk} ≤MPo if λ > λc
∃P0, lim
k→∞
E{Pk} =∞ if λ ≤ λc,
where MPo ∈ Sn≥0 depends on the initial condition of (A.14).
(ii) Define
Sk+1 = (1− λ)ASkAT +DDT =: v1(Sk)
Fk+1 = AFkA
T +DDT − λAFkCT (CFkCT + V )−1CFkAT =: v2(Fk),
where S0 = F0 = P0. Let λ˘ and λ¯ be such that
lim
k→∞





Fk = F ∈ Sn≥0, ∀λ > λ¯,
where S = v1(S) and F = v2(F ). Then λc satisfies λ˘ ≤ λc ≤ λ¯. Moreover,
if λ > λ¯, then S ≤ E{Pk} ≤ F for all k.
(iii) The critical value satisfies λc = λ˘ if one of the following three condi-
tions holds:
(a) C is invertible or invertible on the observable subspace
(b) A has only one unstable eigenvalue
(c) The eigenvalues of A have distinct absolute values. 
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Properties of the GARE
Here, we provide some useful properties of the GARE in (3.13). For nota-
tional convenience, the “overbar” is dropped.
Lemma B.1. Suppose (A,B) is controllable and (A,Q1/2) is observable. As-
sume that given γ and α, (3.18) holds for all k. Assume further that the
GARE has a solution Z := Z(γ, α) ≥ 0 which satisfies (3.16). Then:
(i) Z˜k ≤ Z˜k+1 for all k.
(ii) Z ≥ Z˜k for all k.
Proof. (i) Note that Z˜k with α = 1 is the GRE of the deterministic H
∞
optimal control problem, and its monotonicity was proven in [106]. Moreover







|xk|2Q − γ2|wk|2, (B.1)
with the constraint of xk+1 = Axk + Dwk. Then under the concavity con-
dition, the monotonicity holds [106]. To prove the general case, note that
136


























Vk+2(Ax+Bu+Dw) + |x|2Q + |u|2R − γ2|w|2
∣∣Ik+1}]
= |x|2Zk+1 = Vk+1(x).
Here Vk(x) = E{xTZkx|Ik} is the saddle-point value of the dynamic game
with only N − k stages (see Lemma 3.1). Hence, we have Zk ≥ Zk+1 for all
k. Then the result follows by reversing the time index.
(ii) Note that when α = 1 or α = 0, Z ≥ Z˜k for all k, which was shown
in [106]. To see the general case, when k = 0, Z ≥ Z˜0 = 0. Suppose
Z − Z˜k+1 ≥ 0. Under this assumption and the fact that α is positive, it can
be checked that Z − Z˜k ≥ 0. Therefore, the result follows.
B.2 Certainty Equivalence Principle
The main idea of the certainty equivalence principle for H∞ control is as
follows ([106]): At time k, given the state feedback minimax controller, one
should first look for the worst past disturbances that maximize the cost func-
tion under the specified information structure and then find the worst-case
state estimator, xˆk, that corresponds to the worst past disturbances. If such
an xˆk exists, then the minimax controller can use it in place of the state xk
to generate the control action.
In this appendix, we show that the TCP problem formulated in Section 3.2
in Chapter 3 satisfies the three basic properties of the certainty equivalence
principle in [106], but the UDP problem does not.
Toward this end, we use the notation s := {sk} ∈ S′ and sτ := {sk}τk=0 ∈
Sτ . Let the set of disturbances Ω be (x0, w) =: ω ∈ Ω := Rn ×W′. For the
LTI system, let the solutions of (3.1a) and (3.1b) be xt = φt(u,w, x0, {αk}t−1k=0)
and yt = ηt(u,w, x0, {αk}t−1k=0, βt). By using the inherent causality, we have
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xt = φt(u
t−1, wt−1, x0, {αk}t−1k=0) and yt = ηt(ut−1, wt, x0, {αk}t−1k=0, βt). Let Θτ
be the set of realizations of packet drops until τ ∈ [0, N − 1]. Now, for any
given τ ∈ [0, N − 1] and (u¯, y¯, κ¯) ∈ Uτ ×Yτ × Θτ , we define the following
subset Ωτ of Ω:
Ωτ (u¯, y¯, κ¯) := {ω ∈ Ω : ηk(u¯, ω, κ¯) = y¯k, k = 0, 1, ..., τ},
where the set is compatible with all disturbance sequences in Ω. We also
introduce the following set which is the set of restrictions of the elements of
Ωτ to [0, τ ]:
Ωττ (u¯, y¯, κ¯) := {ωτ ∈ Ωτ : ω ∈ Ωτ (u¯, y¯, κ¯)}.
Note that Ωτ and Ω
τ
τ are the sets that are related to the disturbances, which
are compatible with observed sequences of control, measurement, and real-
izations of packet drops.
Now, it can be shown that the information process (u, ω, κ) 7→ {Ωτ} carries
consistent, perfect recall, and nonanticipative properties introduced in [106,
page 249]. Hence, we are now in a position to apply the certainty equivalence
principle for the TCP problem. In particular, the zero-sum dynamic game for
the TCP-case formulated in Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 can be studied through
the following three steps:
(a) State feedback minimax control by assuming that the controller has the
actual state information.
(b) Minimax estimation under the TCP-like information structure.
(c) Synthesis of the results in (a) and (b) by characterizing the worst-case
state estimator, say xˆk, that will be used in the minimax controller ob-
tained in part (a) by replacing the true state with xˆk.
For the UDP-case, on the other hand, due to the absence of acknowledg-
ments, we cannot construct the above information process. Therefore, the




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Preliminary Results
Lemma C.1. (i) The following inequality holds:∫ T
0




‖x∗i − g∗‖2Q + ‖u∗i ‖2Rdt+ ‖Q‖
∫ T
0













(ii) The following holds:∫ T
0
































Proof. (i) It can be shown by using the following relation:∫ T
0




‖x∗i − g∗‖2Q + ‖u∗i ‖2Rdt+
∫ T
0













(ii) We have (a.s.)∫ T
0
‖xi − f−i∗N ‖2Q + ‖ui‖2Rdt ≥
∫ T
0





































and this proves the lemma.
Lemma C.2. (i) Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Then we
have T (x) ∈ Cbn for any x ∈ Cbn.
(ii) x¯θ(t) in (4.19) is equicontinuous and uniformly bounded on Θ×X.
Proof. (i) The result follows from [127, Lemma 9.1].
(ii) The boundedness follows from the compactness of Θ and X. As for
equicontinuity, see [71, Lemma 5.1].
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Lemma C.3. Under the conditions in Proposition 4.4, the closed-loop system
(4.22) with the optimal controller in (4.25) and the worst-case disturbance in
(4.26) satisfies E{‖x(T )‖2} = o(T ) and E{∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt} = O(T ).
Proof. We first prove E{∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖2dt} = O(T ). Consider

















, 8Ξ1(t) + 8Ξ2(t) + 8Ξ3(t) + 8Ξ4(t).
Then it suffices to show that lim supT→∞(1/T )
∫ T
0
Ξj(t)dt <∞, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
From Remark 4.3(ii), we have ‖eHtx¯‖2 ≤ ρ2e−2ηt‖x¯‖2; hence, we can show
that lim supT→∞(1/T )
∫ T
0
Ξ1(t)dt = 0. To prove the second term, since
‖s‖∞ ≤ ‖g‖∞‖Q‖ρ/η =: M , we have Ξ1/22 (t) ≤ ‖Bi‖2‖R−1‖Mρ/η =: M¯ ,
which leads to lim supT→∞(1/T )
∫ T
0
Ξ2(t)dt ≤ M¯2. Similarly, it can be shown
that lim supT→∞(1/T )
∫ T
0









where Z(0) = µDDT . Then, Z(t) is a nondecreasing function, and converges
to Z ≥ 0 as t → ∞, since H is Hurwitz. Hence, Ξ3(t) ≤ Tr(Z) for all
t ≥ 0 and lim supT→∞(1/T )
∫ T
0
Ξ3(t)dt ≤ Tr(Z). Similarly, we can show that
E{‖x(T )‖2} = o(T ). This completes the proof.
C.2 Proofs for Chapter 4
Here, we provide proofs for several of the results presented in Chapter 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Part (i) is shown in [106]. For part (iv), the solu-
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Then it is easy to show that with s(0), s(t) admits a unique solution in Cbn
[70, 71]. Part (iii) follows from [71, Theorems 3.1 and 4.1], since G and H
are Hurwitz.
To prove parts (ii) and (v), let








where φ¯1(x, g, u) :=
∫ T
0
‖x(t) − g(t)‖2Q + ‖u(t)‖2Rdt is defined in (4.12). We
also define









φ˜(x, g, u) := φ¯1(x, g, u) + ‖x(T )‖2P + 2sT (T )x(T ) + ‖s(T )‖2P−1
= φ¯1(x, g, u) + ‖P 1/2x(T ) + P−1/2s(T )‖2.










Now, for any admissible controllers, it can be shown that







where q(t) = ‖g(t)‖2Q − ‖BT s(t)‖2R−1 + γ−2‖DT s(t)‖2.
On the other hand, by using Itoˆ formula, (4.13), and (4.15) with the “com-
pletion of squares” method, we obtain












‖u(t) +R−1(BTPx(t) +BT s(t))‖2Rdt
Υ2(T ) = ς
∫ T
0







where ς = 2
√
µ/δ. Now, we introduce a change of probability measure [77]
dP¯ = eΥ2(T )dP,
where it can be verified that eΥ2(t) is a martingale on [0, T ] for any admissible
controllers in Ud1,i and T ≥ 0 [114]. Then due to the Girsanov theorem
[77, 114], P¯ is also a valid probability measure, and we can define the new
expectation E¯ with respect to P¯. Therefore, since s ∈ Cbn, we have
















Then it is easy to see that the controller given in (4.14) is the corresponding
optimal controller, and (4.17) is the minimum cost. This completes the
proof.























Let e∗i (t) = x
∗
i (t) − x¯∗i (t) and Λi(t) := E{e∗i (t)(e∗i (t))T} where x¯∗i (t) is (4.19)



























where the equality follows due to the fact that the Brownian motions are









Note that Gi is Hurwitz for all agents. Then the above Lyapunov equation
is monotonically nondecreasing, and converges to a positive definite matrix,
say, Λi > 0, as t → ∞ for all i. Since Θ is compact, there exists a positive











Therefore (C.1) converges to zero as N → ∞ for all T ≥ 0. For (C.2), note









Then the convergence (C.2) follows from Lemma C.2(ii) in Appendix C.1,
and Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2. The second statement of part (i) follows from
the first one.
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To prove the first statement of part (ii), consider
∫ T
0

















where e∗i (t) is defined in (C.3). Then the second term converges to zero as
N →∞. Note that for each t ≥ 0, e∗i (t) is a random vector with E{e∗i (t)} = 0
and E{‖e∗i (t)‖2} = Tr(Λi(t)) ≤ Tr(Λi) ≤ Tr(Λ) < ∞ for all i and t ≥ 0.
Hence, for each t ≥ 0, e∗1(t), e∗2(t), ... are mutually orthogonal random vectors.



















i (t)‖ = 0 a.s. for all t ≥ 0 due to the law of
large numbers [122, Theorem 5.2]. Since ‖(1/N)∑Ni=1 e∗i (t)‖ is integrable on
[0, T ] for all T ≥ 0 [71, Lemma 5.2], limN→∞
∫ T
0
‖(1/N)∑Ni=1 e∗i (t)‖2dt = 0
for all T ≥ 0 a.s. which proves the first statement of part (ii).



























Then the second term converges to zero as N →∞. For the convergence of










, w1i (t) + w2i (t).
It should be pointed out that the Brownian motion for t < 0 is just for
mathematical purposes, since this process does not affect the entire process
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∥∥∥2dt = 0. (C.5)




i (t) is a wide-
sense stationary Gaussian process with mean-zero and the following auto-
correlation function [122]:






Then from the result on estimation of the auto-correlation function in [71,
















which converges to zero as N →∞ with probability 1.
Let zi := ‖√µ
∫ 0
−∞ e
−GisDidWi(s)‖2. We can show that by using Itoˆ for-
mula, E{z2i } < ∞ for all i, and hence limN→∞
∑N
i=1 supθ∈Θ E{z2θ}/i2 < ∞.
Then from the law of large numbers [122, Theorem 3.4], we can show that
limN→∞ 1N
∑N
i=1(zi − E{zi}) = 0 almost surely. This implies that for any κ,
there exists N ′ := N(κ) such that for all N ≥ N ′, 1
N
∑N
i=1 zi ≤ κ. Then with


















κρ2e−2ηtdt = 0, a.s.
which establishes (C.5). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. (i) From Theorem 4.2(ii), for each c > 0, there
exists N ′ := N(c) such that for all N ≥ N ′, we have X(N, T ) ≤ c for
all T ≥ 0. Note that X(N, T ) is now a random variable that is bounded
above by c with probability 1. Then, by using Hoeffding’s inequality
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[128], for any s ≥ 0,
P(X(N, T )− E{X(N, T )} ≥ s) ≤ e−2s2/c2 .
The same bound can be obtained for P(X(N, T )−E{X(N, T )} ≤ −s).
Then the result follows from their union bound.
(ii) For each c(N) with N ≥ 1, there exists T ′ := T (c(N)) such that for
all T ≥ T ′, (1/T )X(N, T ) ≤ c(N), which implies X(N, T ) is bounded
above by c(N)T with probability 1. Then, by using Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity, for any s ≥ 0, we get
P(X(N, T )− E{X(N, T )} ≥ sT ) ≤ e−2s2/c(N)2 .
The remaining part is similar to part (i). This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. From Theorem 4.2, for each N ≥ 1 and (N), there








Note that in view of Theorem 4.2(ii) and Corollary 4.1, for large N , we can
choose a small enough (N) to arrive at the above relation.
Due to Proposition 4.1(iii), there exist M1 and T1 such that∫ T
0
‖x∗i (t)‖2dt ≤M1T, ∀T ≥ T1, a.s. (C.6)




−i) ≤ C where C ≥ 0





−i), we may consider ui ∈ U c1,i with the property that there exist M2
and T2 such that ∫ T
0
‖xi(t)‖2dt ≤M2T, ∀T ≥ T2, a.s. (C.7)
Note that in (C.6) and (C.7), M1 and M2 do not depend on N due to the
compactness of Θ. Furthermore, since g∗ ∈ Cbn, from Proposition 4.1, there
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exist M3 and T3 such that∫ T
0
‖g∗(t)‖2dt ≤M3T, ∀T ≥ T3.
Let T¯ := max{T ′, T1, T2, T3}, M¯1 := 4 max{M1,M2}, M¯2 := 4 max{M1,M3},
and M¯3 := 4 max{M2,M3}.
Now, from Lemma C.1(i), for all T ≥ T¯ , we have (a.s.)∫ T
0




‖x∗i − g∗‖2Q + ‖u∗i ‖2Rdt+ ‖Q‖(N)2T + 2‖Q‖(M¯2T )1/2(N)T 1/2.
Since exponentiating, taking expectation and logarithm, and taking the limit











logE{e 1δ φ¯1i (x∗,g∗,u∗)}+ 2‖Q‖(N)2 + 2‖Q‖M¯1/22 (N), (C.8)
where (C.8) is the performance index of (4.11) for agent i when agent i uses
the optimal decentralized controller in (4.21).
Furthermore, from Lemma C.1(ii), for all T ≥ T¯ ,∫ T
0











Again, since exponentiating, taking expectation and logarithm, and taking
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where φ¯1i (x, g
∗, u) is the modified version of (4.12) when agent i is under the
centralized controller ui ∈ U c1,i. Note that the first inequality follows from
the fact that the optimal decentralized controller in (4.21) solves the robust










−i) + 2‖Q‖(N)2 + 2‖Q‖M¯1/22 (N)





















Note that (N) is a constant that is dependent on N , which converges to zero
as N →∞ due to the previous argument and Theorem 4.2. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. We need to prove parts (ii) and (v). Part (iii) was
shown in Lemma C.3 in Appendix C.1. The proofs of the remaining parts
are similar to that of Proposition 4.1.



































‖x(t)− h(t)‖2Q + ‖u(t)‖2R − γ2‖v(t)‖2dt
















where q(t) = ‖h(t)‖2Q − ‖BT s(t)‖2R−1 + γ−2‖DT s(t)‖2. Then due to the fact
that s ∈ Cbn and E{‖x(T )‖2} = o(T ) shown in Lemma C.3 in Appendix C.1,
we have

























Since H is Hurwitz, (4.25) and (4.26) constitute the saddle-point equilibrium
of the infinite-horizon LQ stochastic zero-sum differential game [61], and the
corresponding saddle-point value is (4.17) with g(t) replaced by h(t). This
completes the proof.














Note that (N) defined above is similar to that in Theorem 4.3, since by
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Theorem 4.5(i) and Corollary 4.2, (N) can be taken to be arbitrarily small
when N is arbitrarily large.















−i) ≤ C where C ≥ 0





−i), we may consider ui ∈ U c2,i with the property that with the











Note that due to the compactness of Θ, M1 and M2 are not dependent on
N . We also use M3 as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.3. Then we can
define M¯1, M¯2 and M¯3 in a similar way to that in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
We introduce the performance index of the stochastic zero-sum differential

















∗, h∗, u∗, v∗) is (4.24) for agent i when ui ≡ u∗i and vi ≡ v∗i . Note









∗) = supvi∈Vi J¯2,i(u
∗
i , vi, h
∗).

















∗, h∗, u∗, v∗)
}























N , u, v)}





−i) +O((N)) +O(1/N). (C.10)
Then from (C.9) and (C.10), we have the desired result. This completes the
proof of the theorem.
152
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5
D.1 Block Matrices for Nonsymmetric RDEs
From Assumption 5.1(c), pi = (pi1, ..., piK). The following block matrices are
used in RDEs in (5.17) and (5.29):
A = diag{A1, ..., AK}
B1 = pi ⊗−B0R−10 (LTR−1BT − F T )
B2 = IK ⊗ (BR−1BT ), B3 = 1K ⊗ (−(BR−1L− F )R−10 BT0 )
B4 = pi ⊗ (BR−1L− F )R−10 (LTR−1BT − F T ), BK = 1K ⊗ B4
Q1 = pi ⊗−Q0H0, Q2 = 1K ⊗ (−HT0 Q0)
Q3 =

Q−QHpi1 −QHpi2 . . . −QHpiK





−QHpi1 −QHpi2 . . . Q−QHpiK

Q4 = pi ⊗HT0 QH0, QK = 1K ⊗Q4
q¯(t) =
(
































where Ψ(t) is invertible for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then the RDE in (5.29) has a










= (−A2Ψ(t) + B2Π(t))Ψ−1(t)
+ Π(t)(−Ψ−1(t)A1 + Ψ−1(t)B1Π(t)Ψ−1(t)).
This proves the lemma.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
The existence and uniqueness of the optimal controller follows from a similar
argument as discussed in [120, 121, 119].
To prove the optimality of the controller given in (5.26), we first consider
the following variations of SDEs with δu0 ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rp) and k ∈ K:
dδx0(t) = A0δx0(t)dt+B0δu0(t)dt
dδzk(t) = Akδzk(t)dt+BR
−1BT δp¯k(t)dt− (BR−1L− F )δu0(t)dt
δp¯k(t) = −ATk δp¯k(t)dt+Q(δzk(t)−Hδz(t))dt,
where it can be seen that δx0(0) = 0, δzk(0) = 0 and δp¯k(T ) = 0. We also
note that δz(t) =
∑K
k=1 pikδzk(t). Since the cost functional is convex in x0
and strictly convex in u0, u
∗
0 is the corresponding optimal controller if and





















Now, by Itoˆ formula,





T (t) + δxT0 (t)Q(x0(t)−H0z(t))dt
+ δxT0 (t)q0(t)dW0(t),
















−1BTλk(t)− δuT0 (t)(LTR−1BT − F T )λk(t)
+ δzTk (t)H
T














−1BTλk(t)− δuT0 (t)(LTR−1BT − F T )λk(t)
+ δzTk (t)H
T





























































δzTk (t)Qξk(t)− δzT (t)HTQξk(t)− δp¯Tk (t)BR−1BTλk(t)
]
dt.































TR−1BT − F T )λk(t)
]
dt.
This leads to the desired result, and completes the proof.
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